The Russian economic transformation in the early 1990s and some assessment in the West by Kocaman, Ömer
2.-.£)ÖÖ
Devoted to Yörük* Ali
* My father is called Yörük Ali in Alanya.Yörük means nomad. Before he was married to my 
mother, he used to be a nomad in the Taurus mountains. Thanks to my dear father for his 
endless devotion to my education.
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE EARLY 1990s 
AND SOME ASSESSMENTS IN THE WEST
BY
ÖMER KOCAMAN
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2000
ANKARA
'¿Г) ,  и.
■ KCl
ІО о о
βί'·532ί>7
Approved by the Institute of Economic and Sociai Sciences
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
(Thesis Supervisor) Prof. Norman Stone
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master ol International Relations.
Prof. Duygu Sezer
y · /
■ .-/.'i.
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
Prof, ilber Ortaylı
ABSTRACT
The Russian economic transformation is a fascinating story on many grounds. When the 
Soviet Union disintegrated at the end 1991, the new question pervaded the West was how to 
integrate the post-communist Russia into the international community, politically and 
economically. As to the economic transformation and integration, the economists and other 
intellectuals produced an enormous literature on how to convert centrally planned socialist 
economies into capitalist market economies. Many Russian and foreigners, who have 
dedicated large energies to the economic transformation of Russia in its first years, argued 
that Russia would end up in economic growth if it followed the proposed reform packages. 
Although Russia realized many proposed reform packages, it ended up in economic failure. 
This master thesis strives to explain the Russian economic transformation between 1992-1995 
and its assessment or perception in the West.
Ö ZET
Rusya’nın ekonomik gelişiminin birçok açıdan büyüleyici bir öyküsü vardır. 1991 
yılı sonlarında Sovyetler Birliği dağıldığı zamanlarda, Batı dünyasında yeni bir soru 
sorulmaya başlandı, bu soru kominizm sonrası Rusya’nın politik ve ekonomik 
açılardan nasıl uluslararası bir devlet haline getirileceğiydi. Ekonomi değişimi ve 
ekonominin yenilenmesi açılarından bakıldığında, birçok ekonomist ve entellektüel’in 
merkez dayanaklı sosyalist ekonomilerin ne şekilde kapitalist pazar ekonomilerine 
dönüştürleceği konusunda tezler ürettikleri görülür. Rusya’nın ekonomik değişiminin 
ilk yıllarında özverili çalışmalarıyla gündemde olan birçok Rus ve yabancı ekonomist, 
Rusya’nın önerilen reform paketlerini kabul etmesi halinde ekonomik büyümenin 
gerçekleşeceği konusunda uzlaşmışlardı. Rusya önerilen ekonomik paketleri kabul 
ettiği halde ekonomik gelişme başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu master tezi, 1992- 
1995 yılları arasında Rusyadaki ekonomik gelişmeleri anlatmak ve Batı ülkeleri 
tarafından nasıl değerlendiridiğini veya algılandığını açıklamak üzere hazırlanmıştır.
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Introduction
The Russian economic transformation is a fascinating story on many grounds. Russian 
capitalism is a subject of heated debate in academic and business circles. On the one hand 
some see nothing but robber barons, a giant mafia in place of government, universal theft, 
economic stagnation, ostentatious luxury for a few, and impoverishment for millions, on the 
other hand, the others evaluate the previous argument as an oversimplified and distorted 
picture.
The tpjth about Russia, today, is that it is ruled by a handful of men who are called 
“the oligarchs” since Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 presidential elections was distinguished by the 
rise of a new class of oligarchs. The new oligarchs are humiliating and stopping factor in the 
transition to market economy since they are so self-interested. So little of their wealth finds its 
way into the Russian economy, the rest is stored in foreign banks. The estimates of capital 
flight over the past seven years range from $50 billion to $150 billion.' Throughout the 
transition period the nomenklatura continued its firm existence and manipulated the 
transitional polices into its own advantage. The economic and political reform policies, which 
were followed during both Glasnost-Perestroika period and post-communist Russian 
economic and political transitional period under the lead of Yeltsin, not only strengthened 
their place but also provided them with enormous wealth. Other actors such as the black 
market and Mafia members were also principal winners in those both transitional periods.
When the Soviet Union was on the eve of political and economic chaos. Western 
commentators proposed many political and economic prescriptions for ameliorating the 
economic and political mess. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russian federation was on 
the agenda of the Western commentators. People such as Jeffrey Sachs, Anders Aslund, 
Richard Layard, Joseph Blasi and Andrei Shleifer served the Russian government as adviser
Los Angeles Times. 3 September 1999
on economic and political matters. They firmly believed that if Russia followed the proposed 
reform packages, Russia would end up in the free market economy and with wealth. They 
played important roles in the Russian economic transformation. Today, Russia is in 
undisputable economic and political chaos. Although Russia has realized many proposed 
economic reform packages, it ended up in an economic failure. The reasons behind this 
economic failure make a fascinating story, which will be analyzed throughout this thesis 
work.
Throughout this paper, the Russian economic transformation between 1992-1995 will 
be analyzed. If Russia is, today, in severe economic problems, the root causes lie in the nature 
of the Stalinist economic model to a considerable extent. As Richard Sakwa pointed out, the 
post-communist system emerged out of the old nomenklatura system and its way represented 
the reconstitution of late Soviet forms of rule -but without CPSU.^ If Russia today is under an 
overall social, economic and political crisis, the nomenklatura revolution gives us the hints to 
grasp the nature of the political and economic changes in post-communist Russia. The post­
communist Russian transition to free market and democracy was in many respects an 
incomplete revolution with profound political and economic continuities with the past. In 
Russia, the pattern of political and economic transition left much of the old system in their 
place. From this point of view, the nature of Soviet economy with special reference to the 
nomenklatura’s place in it has to be analyzed. This is very crucial to understanding the post- 
Soviet economic developments. Therefore, the first chapter will focus not only on the nature 
of the Soviet economy and its distortions in economic life but also the place of nomenklatura 
in the Soviet economic system.
As the Soviet system started to change under the impact of the Gorbachev reforms, so 
did the patterns of the elite advantage. As political positions became less secure guarantee of
Richard Sakwa., Russian politics and Society. (London: Routledge Press, 1996), p. 160
those advantages, the emphasis shifted to private property. Throughout the perestroika reform 
process, the nomenklatura elite by capitalizing their assets, by converting privileges into 
property, got prepared themselves for the post-Soviet struggle to retain their economic and 
political status. Therefore, with special reference to above-mentioned facts, Gorbachev 
reforms will be analyzed at the first chapter as well.
At the second chapter, the evaluations of Western academics and economists on the 
Russian economy and their policy prescriptions will be put forward. The economic policies 
that were advised to the Russian government by Western commentators and the followed 
economic policies share the responsibility in the Russian economic failure. The Western 
policy makers failed to grasp the dynamics of changes in the last years of the Soviet Union. A 
substantial literature concerning transition from a command economic structure to the market 
economy emerged in 1990s. On a number of points a broad consensus prevailed among 
Western and East European economists. First, the transition must be achieved rapidly if it is to 
stand a chance of success. Second, the transition must imply a comprehensive switch to a 
fully-fledged market economy with a strict macroeconomic stabilization policy, together with 
a comprehensive domestic and external liberalization. The domestic liberalization should 
comprise the freedom of entrepreneurship, production sales, purchases, and pricing. Foreign 
trade needs to be liberalized which requires a unified exchange rate. Differences remain on 
whether the exchange rate should remain floating or be fixed in order to serve as an anchor for 
the stabilization.^ Some other issues such as privatization were subject to extensive criticism. 
The economic polices that were advised by the Western economist and academics will be 
mentioned in the second chapter extensively.
The third chapter will be look at what happened betweenl992 and 1995 in the Russian 
economy. In this part of the paper, the reform policies such as price liberalization.
 ^Anders Aslund, The Post Soviet Economy; Soviet and Western Perspectives. (London: Punters Publisher, 
1991), p.l68
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and economic relations with other former Soviet 
republics and how the ex-nomenklatura and mafia strengthened their place through the 
ongoing reform policies will be analyzed extensively.
At the fourth chapter, the results of Russian economic transformation and western 
perception of economic change in Russia between 1992-1995 will be analyzed. There will be 
an over all analyses of economic failure as well.
The aim of this study is study is to reveal how western economists and academics 
failed to grasp the nature and pre-existing features of the Soviet economic system. They failed 
to understand the role of nomenklatura and other forces such as mafia, corruption in the 
Russian economic and political system. For this reason, the economic and political policies 
that they proposed doomed to failure in the post-communist Russia.
CHAPTER I: THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND ITS DISTORTIONS IN THE 
ECONOMIC LIFE
As mentioned in the introduction part, if Russia is, today in severe economic and 
political difficulties, its root causes lie in the Stalinist model to a considerable extent. From 
this point of view, it is important to grasp its features not only to understand the current 
economic chaos but also to see how western commentators failed in their proposals 
concerning the amelioration of the economic conditions in Russia.
Soon after Stalin took over from Lenin, Stalin decided to embark on a program of a 
rapid industrialization. For ideological reasons he decided to do away with the profit and the 
market system. Therefore he decided on a new approach. Rather than take the time that would 
be necessary to build up light industry in order to stimulate heavy industry, Stalin concluded 
that if he first concentrated on heavy industry, in the long run he would be able to build up a 
much larger productive capacity. It was with such ends in the mind; Stalin sought build up the 
country’s heavy industry as quickly as possible. However to obtain the capital he needed for 
the heavy industrial sector, he had to cut back sharply on the resources which would go to 
agriculture, light industry and the consumer. Agriculture and peasantry were forced to finance 
the bulk of the accumulation needed for industrialization. In short, through the course of 
forced collectivisation of agriculture, Stalin aimed at accumulation of the necessary capital 
that would fund the rapid industrialization.
The most important institutions of the new Soviet economic system were state 
ownership of the means of the production and central planning. Nearly the entire productive 
capital and institutions were owned by the state. A highly centralized, hierarchical form of 
economic planning coordinated the system. At the top of the planning system was the agency 
called Gosplan, which had the difficult role of developing internally consistent economic plan 
for the vast country. Below Gosplan, there were government ministries for the major sectors
of the economy, which broke down the plan into more narrowly defined product targets for 
their area of specialization. Actual production took place at enterprises, each of which was 
under the authority of a particular ministry. At the enterprise level, the plan specified 
quantities of outputs, as well as the inputs to be provided. Gossnab, the supply agency, 
managed supply relations among enterprises. ‘
Under the new soviet economic system, the factory managers judged according to how 
much more they produced in the current year as compared to the year before. A good worker 
and manager was one who produced more tons and meters the current year compared the year 
before. Then larger the percentage-increase in production, the higher the wage bonus would 
be. In contrast, to the manager in a capitalist economy, quantities, rather than profits and 
return on investment, have been the major considerations to a manager in the USSR. The 
system stressed production for the production’s sake. As a consequence, there has been little 
concern in the Soviet economy about what was produced and very little regard for the quality 
and product variety. The workers’ and managers’ salaries generally have not been affected by 
such considerations.
Because the quantity-type of success indicators were essential in assigning the bonus 
to the enterprises and the premiums to the managers, such a system led to enormous waste and 
distortions. The classic example is the nail producer whose target was spelled out in terms of 
tons of production per month. He concludes he can most easily fulfil his production target by 
producing one large nail. When the planners try to correct for this specifying the target in 
numbers of nail produced rather than tons, the nail manufacturer simply switches his 
production to producing numerous tiny nails. Thus the heavier product, the more gross ruble-
Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System, (Boston:Allen and Unwin, 1986)
value the enterprise will be able to claim, and the quicker the firm will be able to fulfil its plan 
and collect bonus.^
The Soviet planning system stressed not only intermediate production targets but also 
performance and service. These are also measured against some quantitative target. For 
example, geologists who were assigned to drill for oil were rewarded with premiums if they 
managed to drill a specified number of meters each month. As a result, as Marshal Goldman 
pointed out, “there were geological expeditions in the Republic of Kazakhstan that had not 
discovered a valuable deposits for many years but were counted among the most successful 
expeditions becau.se they have ftilfilled their assignment in terms of meters.”^
Money and finance played a strictly secondary role in the Soviet economic system. 
Once enterprises received its production assignment, the state banking provided it with the 
necessary financing to enable it to pay for the labour and material inputs specified in the 
economic plan. It was the plan’s production orders, which set economic activity in motion, 
not the possession of money and credit. Such type of financing the enterprises and industries 
led to enormous distortions in the Soviet economy. For example this was evident in the 
construction industry. Once the construction industry provided with the necessary capital, 
there was no need to complete the construction. As a consequence, Soviet leaders periodically 
called for a moratorium on new construction in order to finish up the old construction. One 
another related problem with finance, the Ministry and Gosplan officials id not deal with 
banktrupcy. It was easier to authorize a subsidy and thus avoid a shut down of facilities.
The Stalinist model of economic development served effectively to build up a massive 
industrial and military infrastructure. All economic decisions were made to grow at a rapid 
rate while simultaneously reducing rewards allocated to the consumer. There was an
 ^Marshal Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System. (New York: WW. Norton 
Company, 1983), p.46 
 ^ ibid.
overemphasis on heavy industry at the expense of light industry that would serve the 
consumer needs.
In the Soviet economic system markets played a secondary role. Consumer goods 
were partly distributed through retail stores at which consumer could buy from what was 
available, at prices regulated by the state. Since consumers’ needs have traditionally held the 
lowest priority, there was a shortage problem with regard to basic items such as food, soap, 
matches, socks and so on. This economic condition, built up over the years, was reflected in 
the precedent increase in the disposable income by Soviet consumers. The increase in the total 
savings deposits in the Soviet banks increased faster than the increase in the retail sales. It 
also served the birth and grow up of a black market and second economy.
One another shortcoming of the Soviet economic model that hinders the development 
was its ability to do away with old and obsolete technology. For example, they could not 
produce certain advanced products even after they had become obsolete in the West. Their 
ineptitude with computers and computer software was particularly striking in the 1980s. 
Managers were unlikely to be concerned about obsolescence or innovations since their 
premiums were primarily dependent on increasing production. Since factory managers did not 
have to concern themselves with the sales or market trends, they were under no pressure to do 
away with the obsolete. At the same time, the Soviet incentive system did not provide for any 
substantial increases in bonuses for the production of new goods. The Soviet planners were 
always reluctant to allocate money to such purpose of innovating new technologies.
The Soviets were able to innovate when it comes to producing military hardware. It 
was a matter of priority that was given to military sector at the expense of other sectors. Only 
the military industry was provided with necessary funds and flexibilities for the purpose of 
innovating new military technologies.'*
Joseph S. Berliner, The Innovation Decision Industry. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976)
1.1. The Soviet Nomenklatura
In order to understand why post-Soviet Russia’s economic reform policies failed to 
reach at its goals, one has to grasp the nature and the place of the Soviet nomenklatura in this 
rigid centralized economic and political structure as well. In the post-communist Russia, the 
term ‘nomenkalatura’ is often identified with corruption and self-enrichment at the expense of 
people. The term ‘nomenklatura’ is often used to mean everyone in authority or enjoying 
privileges in the Soviet times. The most important feature of the Soviet system was the 
monopolization of the economic and political powers by the party and state officials. They 
sought to control virtually every aspect of public life together with the political and economic 
life. As Alec Nove pointed out, “the multitude of administrative units and the overlapping of 
responsibilities created a phenomenon aptly described as ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ in which 
various agencies sought to defend their own interests.”^
The material privileges accorded to the Soviet elite ran counter to the egalitarian ethic 
of socialism. The Soviet elite was provided with the special access to consumer goods. There 
were special stores, open only to the elite, which carried high quality goods for the elite. At 
food processing plants, for example, there was always a workshop producing higher quality 
foodstuffs for the elite. Special construction enterprises built fine apartments for the elite. 
Factory managers in the Soviet Union were paid substantially more than ordinary workers. 
Privileges were strictly according to rank, and each rank in the nomenklatura ladder had its 
own list of benefits. They enjoy benefits associated with being part of the nomenklatura.In 
addition, there was a system of special nomenklatura education. The higher schools were 
generally concerned with training of local and regional level nomenklatura members. The
 ^John L.H Keep, Last of Empires; A History of the Soviet Union; 1945-1991. (Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p.210
Moscow Party School, the Academy of Sciences and Academy of the National Economy were 
the institutions where nomenklatura children had a special position to be recruited.^
1.2. The Shadow Economy
The ‘second or shadow economy’ refers to the economic activities that escape control 
by the state. The scale of the second economy was generally thought to have accounted for at 
least 10 per cent, and perhaps as much as 20-25 per cent of GNP -and as much as 30 to 40 per 
cent of total income.’
The basic reason for these activities was the shortage of essential consumer goods, 
which resulted from the over centralized system of economic management and distribution. 
The criminal mafias in line with political officials were principal actors in this arena. They 
operated in both consumer and producer goods. In the Soviet economic system, there was 
bartering of materials between enterprises to help each other to fulfil the plan. Such informal 
transactions was subject to exchange of favours, with or without payment, between those who 
had access to scarce commodities or services.^
The Black market was particularly important in both obtaining goods which are in 
short supply and illegally produced, imported (smuggled) or stolen goods. Black market 
operators were also in contact with the state officials especially in their transactions with 
regard to export the stolen commodities, import and smuggling. For example, in 1982, Deputy 
Minister of Culture Nikholai Mokhov was arrested for smuggling diamonds into the Soviet 
Union while about at the same time, Vladamir Rytov, the Deputy Minister of Fisheries was 
executed and two other employees of the Ministries of Fisheries were arrested for smuggling 
millions of dollar worth of caviar out of the Soviet Union.^ *
* Olga Khyrshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite”, Eurooe-Asia 
Studies. Jun 96, Vol.48, Issue 5, pp.3-4 
’ L.H Keep, op.cit.. p.219
*ibid.,p.218 
 ^Goldman, op.cit.. p.98
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Black market operators were also the important actors in alcoholic beverages because 
of the shortages in state stores. One another arena that black market was active, was motor 
vehicles. Many vehicles were sold through unauthorized channels. In this sector official 
corruption was prominent, for example, workmen at Gorky motor works smuggled out 
vehicle parts.'®
The high prices that prevailed on the collective farm markets where supply and 
demand more properly match, was another sign of the shortage of food supplies." It was 
another area that was filled by both black market and second economy operators. Because the 
Soviet system put enormous emphasis on the heavy industry at the expense of the light 
industry, the Soviet consumers had an increasing saving amount in their deposits. Since there 
was an enormous shortage in terms of basic foods and other items, the Soviet consumers’ 
deposits could not find its way back to the economy. This situation, in turn, served the 
acceleration of the second economy and black market throughout economy. The Soviet 
citizens, who were facing difficulty in finding what they want in state shops or collective 
markets, have made the second economy a basic part of their lives since they were loaded 
with large disposable sum of their money in their hands.
1.3. Mafia
Manchur Olson argues that it is small groups with a great deal at stake that are most 
likely to be well organized and effective defenders of their interests.'^ It was the members of 
the organized crime and the ex-Soviet nomenklatura, who were to be well organized and were 
the principal winners in terms of material and political privileges throughout the transition 
period at the expense of people in Russia.
10 Keep, op.cit, p.220
"Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture; From Alexender II to Khrusshchev.tHarvard University 
Press, 1970)
Manchur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (Cambridge, 
Massashussets: Harvard University Press, 1971)
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Organized crime was the most explosive force from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the transition period, the Russian mafia proved itself to be corporate power. The 
Russian mafia throughout the privatisation period together with nomenklatura purchased a 
majority of sate owned assets such as enterprises, banks and so on. On February 17, 1994 the 
Economist reported that private enterprises were forced to pay 10 to 20 percent of their 
earnings to criminal gangs, and that 150 such gangs controlled some 40,000 private and state- 
run companies and most of the country’s 1,800 commercial banks.
The formation of a criminal underworld in the Soviet era began inl917 as an 
expression of a political rejection of Bolshevik victory. Criminal activity took the form of 
counter-revolutionary banditry carried out by association of former capitalists and aristocrats. 
White sympathizers, and disillusioned revolutionaries who operated outside the new formal 
hierarchies. Their criminal activities were attacks on public enterprises and individuals. In 
1930s, the first informal set of rules governing the underground appeared among individuals 
calling themselves thieves bound by rules. Their ideological point was the total rejection of 
the formal Soviet economic system. However, up until WWII, they neither threatened 
statusquo nor were any potential benefits to the formal hierarchies. Therefore, the format 
hierarchies had no incentive to commit resources for their elimination or to engage with them 
in any compromise.
The post-war criminal actors were product of a devastated economy and turned into 
crime for economic opportunity and pure material gain. They started to establish connection 
with formal hierarchies. Their illegal activities ranged from theft, burglary, drug traffic and 
bank fraud to prostitution. At this stage of the development of organized crime, the 
relationship between the formal hierarchies and organized crime was restricted to bribes.
' Economist. 17 February 1994
12
One important development in Stalin’s era was the emergence of an informal system 
of management whereby managers turned into entrepreneurs. When the formal channels 
through which inputs were to be converted into out put failed to deliver products on time to 
meet the strict quotas of the central planners, channels of delivery had to be opened through 
informal arrangements that included reciprocal payoffs. Members of formal hierarchies who 
managed state enterprise developed entrepreneurial skills and established informal networks 
to ensure the provisions of supplies from other state-owned enterprises.''* This aspect of the 
Soviet economy prepared the grounds for organized crime members to infiltrate into the 
Soviet economy and to accelerate the developing connections with the formal hierarchies 
within the Soviet economy.
Throughout the Soviet economy, there were incentives for the formal hierarchies to 
cooperate with the organized crime members, laid at the core of distribution system. In the 
Soviet economic system the prices were set administratively and especially for the tradable 
commodities, the prices were highly below the international levels and market values within 
the country. The resulting differences between market values and administrative ones led to 
development of an underground economy whereby commodities were reserved by the 
members of the formal hierarchies and diverted to informal or foreign markets where they 
could be sold at higher prices.
During the Brezhnev era (1964-82) the informal underground economy developed 
enormously.'^ Underground factories and organized crime groups supplied what the formal 
economy failed to supply with the cooperation of the highest level of the formal hierarchies.'^ 
Theses informal activities cultivated a class of entrepreneurs who were in a position to amass 
wealth.
Thomas Mark, “Mafianomics: How Did Mob Entrepreneurs Infiltrate and Dominate the Russian Economy” 
Journal Economic Issues. June 98, Vol.32, Issue 2, p.567 
See for a detailed account, Arkady Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia. (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991) 
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Gregory Grossman of the University of California at Berkeley described the major 
form of illegal activities in the Soviet Union. He mentioned that stealing from state enterprises 
including collective farms was practiced “by virtually everyone,” providing extra income to 
employees and “an important, often indispensable, basis for the second economy.” Grossman 
cited that peasants were stealing fodder, workers were stealing tools and materials, physicians 
were stealing medicines, drivers were stealing gasoline, truck drivers were diverting freight, 
and enterprise managers were diverting goods either to black market or into barter channels 
for needed supplies.'^
The old communist system was really a kleptocracy. The 1970s and 1980s, for 
instance witnessed the upcoming scandals such as Cotton Affair in which party bosses in 
Uzbekhstan earned huge profits by falsifying the production reports. 1970s and 1980s were 
the years in which many large criminal organizations began to emerge and many mob leaders 
began to cooperate in tandem with the government officials. Russian began to use the word 
“Mafia” in these decades to describe the vast networks lurking inside regional central 
ministries.
Gifts or bribes to state and communist party officials accompanied all this illegal 
activity. There were close connections political administrative authority and second economy 
operators. Gregory Grossman pointed out that the process of bribery and graft was very 
institutionalized in the Soviet economic structure.
1.4. The Origins of Gorbachev’s Perestroika
The Soviet economy was beset by some nagging problems. While the quantity of 
goods produced increased rapidly, their quality was very low. Some products were high 
quality such as weapons, aircraft, metals, spacecraft, and so on. Many Soviet products 
particularly consumer goods not only were low quality such as televisions, private motor
Gregory Grossman, “ The Second Economy of the USSR ”, Problems of Communism. 26 (September- 
October 1977): pp.25-40
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vehicles, refrigerators and washing machines but also their spare parts and repair facilities 
were notoriously short.
Consumers faced with a retail distribution system, which did not cater to their needs. 
As a result, annual consumption started to decline throughout 1970s. According to Western 
estimates annual consumption grew on average by 2.9 per cent per annum during 1950s and 
1960s but fell to 2.2 per cent in the 1970s an to about 1 per cent in 1982. Since the Soviet 
economy operated with a perpetual shortage of goods, the result was an increase in the saving 
of Soviet citizens especially in the late 1960s and onward. The deposits grew by annual 
average of 19.9 percent in 1966-70 and 14.3 per cent in 1971-75.’^
Increasing shortages of goods and services widened the difference between official 
and black market prices The Soviet economy operated with a perpetual shortage of goods 
which led to an increase in the saving of Soviet citizen especially in the late 1960s and 
onward while creating enormous incentives for enterprise managers to divert goods to black 
market. The diversion of goods from government shops worsened the shortages and 
eventually led to breakdown of the retail distribution system.
Enterprises failed to use inputs efficiently. Fearing that essential raw materials or 
components would be unavailable, enterprises started to accumulate large stockpiles. The 
inflexibility of the Soviet planning system forced many enterprises to barter goods among 
themselves to fulfil the planned output levels.
Agriculture remained as a perennial problem throughout the 1960s, 1970s and onward. 
It was partly due to climatic conditions in the Soviet Union. However the nature was not only 
the cause. Despite pouring large inputs of labour and capital goods into agriculture in the post 
war years, the Soviet authorities had faced with difficulty in delivering a high quality and 
appealing diet to the citizenry.
Keep, op.cit..p.228
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1.4.1. Stagnation
It was inevitable that the extremely rapid growth rate which the Soviet Union achieved 
started to slower throughout 1970s. A sharp breakdown started to reveal in key sectors of the 
Soviet economic performance. The years between 1975 and 1985 were called ‘stagnation’ 
period. However one thing has to be taken into consideration that in between these years the 
Soviet economy did no actually did not stop growing, but rather its growing rate started to fell 
down. The sudden worsening Soviet economic growth was not limited to economic growth. 
There was also a slowdown in technological innovation around 1970s. Around 1970s, it 
appeared that the technological gap between the USSR and the West began to widen. It was 
one another dimension of the decline in the economic growth.
1.4.2. Reasons of Stagnation
There were many reasons, which led to the Soviet stagnation. Among reasons these 
were prominent. 1-Structural problems such as increasing difficulty in carrying out central 
planning effectively, a reduction in labour discipline and a decreasing rate in technological 
innovations. 2-Policy errors such as decision by the planning authorities to deliberately reduce 
the economic growth rate after 1975 and bottleneck that arose in key sectors of the economy, 
particularly rail transportation and oil production. 3-Uncontrollable developments such as 
unfavourable demographic trends and unfavourable weather conditions. 4- the large Soviet
military burden especially after 1980 to maintain military competition with the USA, under
20the Reagan administration.
There was an also increasing corruption and cynicism throughout the institutions of 
Soviet society. There was also growing sense of alienation, aimlessness and alcoholism was 
on the rise among the Soviet people. The weakening of observance of law and the growth of
Vladamir Kontorovich, “Economic Fallacy”, The National Interest, (special edition, 31, 1993), pp.35-45 
Edward A.Hewet, Reforinin2 the Soviet Economy; Equality Versus Efficiancy, (Washington DC: The
Brooking Institutions, 1988), pp.51-78
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corruption, both of which started in the economic sphere, gradually spread to all society. The 
last years of the Brezhnev leadership was marked by an increasing irresponsibility, 
lawlessness, bribery, protection rackets and growing protests. Thus the Soviet leadership that 
took power in 1985 was faced with declining rate of economic growth and increasing social
tensions 21
1.5. Gorbachev Era
After the short reign of Konstantin Chernenko and Yuri Andropov, Mikhail 
Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. 
Why did Gorbachev start Perestroika? The rapid US arms build up under Reagan 
administration posed a serious challenge to the Soviet Union. Gorbachev speeches reveal out 
this fact. Gorbachev’s first pragmatic speech reveals this fact “only intensive, high developed 
economy can safeguard a reinforcement of our country’s position on the international stage 
and allow her to enter the new millennium with dignity as a great and flourishing power.’’^ ^
This was a recognition that the USSR was losing out in the arms race because of 
insufficient economic strength. According to Gorbachev, there were three major reasons for 
the declining economic growth rate: faltering efficiency, technological development and 
quality:
‘The economic growth-rates fell to a level, which actually approached economic stagnation. We started 
evidently falling behind in one way after the other. The gap in the efficiency of production, quality of 
products and scientific-technical progress began to widen in relation to the most developed countries and 
not to our benefit.”
Gorbachev stressed two specific flaws in the traditional Soviet model, which caused 
the economic decline. One concerned the means of coordination of the various parts of the 
economic system. This flaw was the ‘rigid centralism’ of the system with its tradition of 
‘command’ from the center. The second flaw was the absence of the effective work
Padma Desai, Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet reform. (Princeton 
University Press, 1989), pp. 3-25
Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Economic Struggle for Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform Process, 1985- 
1988, (London: Pinters Publisher, 1989), p.l3
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motivation, -the lack of work discipline. Based on these assumptions, Gorbachev proposed 
solutions that entailed the radical restructuring of the Soviet economic system.
Gorbachev argued that the problems that the Soviet economy had faced could be 
overcome by setting higher targets for economic growth (acceleration) combined with a crash 
investment program to modernize and raise the technical level of industry, and by campaigns 
directed at increasing the labour productivity by increasing the factory discipline. The 
Gorbachev policy of acceleration based on a programme that aimed at increasing the rate of 
investment and economic growth. This was to be achieved by the more intensive use of 
energy, labour and raw materials. In practice, acceleration meant that enterprises were 
required to achieve higher gross output targets with a supply of inputs. '^* The increased 
investment, however, was largely financed by the state that in turn undermined the financial 
stability of the Soviet economy throughout the Gorbachev era. Between 1985-87 the deficit
25increased from 1 per cent to 7 percent of GNP.
Gorbachev government first effort was based on the campaigns against lax work 
efforts, corruption and drunkenness. One part of these efforts was the anti-alcohol campaign. 
Drunkenness was viewed as the major cause of the poor worker discipline. To combat with 
this problem, state productions of alcoholic beverages were sharply curtailed. This measure 
was largely unsuccessful partly because it led to illegal private production but also because 
the authorities failed to provide alternative consumption items to absorb the displaced 
purchasing power. Consequently, the campaign removed a major source of budget revenue; 
an estimated 20 billion rubles in tax revenues were lost and increased excess demand in retail 
markets.
”  ibid., p.l5
Alan Smith, Russia and World Economy; Problem.s of Integration. (London-New York: Routledge, 1993), 
p.103
"  Peter Mieszkowski and Ronald Sligo, “Economic Change in Russia: 1985-1995”, Problems of Post- 
Communism. May/June 1996, Vol.43, Issue 3, p.2
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To aid in modernizing the capital stock, twenty-three new scientific technical research 
complexes were established in 1986 87 to develop new technologies. The rate of growth in 
the production of new machines and other capital goods increased to double the level of the 
preceding decade (1975-85) during 1985-87. In terms of quality control, Gospriemka (the 
State Quality Control Board) was established in 1986 and was charged of bringing 95 per cent 
of Soviet manufactured goods up to world quality standards. Quality controllers inspected 
goods in the factories and accepted only those, which met the state quality standards. 
Managers and workers were held accountable on the basis that their premium and bonuses 
would not be paid if their products were to be below the state standards.
In the autumn of 1986, the Gorbachev initiated a wage reform which reversed the 
levelling tendencies of the industrial wage policies by increasing pay differentials between 
skill levels and raising the salaries of specialist and managers at higher rates than blue-collar 
wages. The resolution ‘On Improving the Wage System in Production Branches of the 
National Economy’ mandated an average wage increase of 20%-25% for engineers for 
workers, 30%-35% for specialists and 35%-40% for engineers. The reform would in principle
raise wages for all categories of workers and the raises were to be financed by the enterprises
26rather than by the state budget.
The second phase of the Gorbachev reform process is normally considered to have 
started when Gorbachev gave a speech to a Central Committee plenum, which convened to 
discuss the progress of economic reforms in June 1987. The most important development that 
was reached at the plenum in 1987 was the adoption of ‘Law on State Enterprises’, which 
would be effective in 1988. The basic provisions of the law were to make enterprises 
operating according to the principles of self-accounting, self-management and self-financing. 
Self-management meant that enterprises would become autonomous financial institutions.
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which would be expected to cover their variable costs from their revenues from the sale of 
output. Under this law, the investment would no longer to be provided as a free gift from the 
state. Rather, it would be financed by repayable bank loans. The most radical element of the 
law concerned the self-management. Enterprise managers and directors were supposed to be 
elected by their workers, who would also elect a work council that would confirm enterprise’s
27plans.
Enterprise autonomy meant abandoning the system of central determination of a 
detailed plan of inputs and input for each enterprise. Instead the center would issue ‘on- 
binding control figures’ giving a target for the value each enterprise’s output and for other 
indicators of enterprise performance. There would also be mandatory ‘state orders’ for part of 
the enterprise’s output. The remainder of enterprise output would be sold through ‘wholesale 
trade.’ This meant that enterprise would become relatively free to determine what they would 
produce and to whom they would sell their products.
The Gorbachev leadership both understand and insisted that price was critical to the 
overall project of perestroika. The 1987 plenum proposed that a radical reform of the whole 
system of wholesale and retail price system. The reform was to include higher industrial 
wholesale prices for fuel and raw materials, a large reduction in retail price subsidies and 
some decentralization of pricing quality. This recognition was important not only bring prices 
into line with production costs in order to allow introduction of self-financing but also to stop 
the existing system of price formation which had resulted in distortions, irrationalities. 
However, the leadership was cautious on this issue since it could lead to deterioration in 
working people’s living standards. In an attempt to ease the tensions, Gorbachev promised 
that living standards and purchasing power would be preserved by the payment of equivalent 
increase in the level of wages. Under the conditions of excess consumer demand, since this
26 Linda J. Cook “Social Contract and Gorbachev Reforms”, Soviet Studies. 1992, Vol.44, p.6 
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commitment required payment from the central budget, it led to fear among the reformers that 
the price reform policies could result in inflationary pressures. During these years, there was a 
heated debates on whether prices should be initially increased from one level to another to 
eliminate subsidies and to reduce wasteful consumption or whether an entirely flexible price 
system to bring supply and demand into a balance.
Beginning in the autumn of 1988, the state consumer sector was beset by rising prices, 
the disappearances of common, inexpensive goods and severe supply disruptions. Over the 
following year the situation grew worse. In this period, enterprises in the consumer good 
sector, which had been transferred to self-financing, often responded by raising prices for 
their goods. They also increased profits by phasing out inexpensive product lines, including 
many everyday items, which had been produced at low prices. Many enterprises used their 
limited autonomy to put into effect wage increases, which were not backed by productivity 
increases. These occurrences contributed to the acceleration of inflation and shortages.
By early 1989 the reformers had neither price stability nor a comprehensive price 
reform. Moreover, consumers who were already confronting inflation and shortages were no 
longer in support of the reforms, which in turn led to additional state-planned price increases 
and subsidy cuts. Price reform economically was necessary but politically risky, that's why, 
reformers retreated, postponed the price reform and moving back to strengthened 
administrative control over prices in late 1989.
Another important economic reform that took place during Gorbachev era was the 
realization of ‘Law on Cooperatives’ in May 1988. The measures of the law intended to 
allow and encourage private business activity. According to this law, the cooperative 
enterprises were supposed to be established by a group of workers who would use their labor 
and property to produce good or services or sales to the public. Cooperatives were allowed to 
operate restaurants, repair businesses, retail stores, wholesale trading company, bank or small
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consumer goods manufacturing businesses. The idea behind permitting such small private 
business was the recognition that the state-run economy had been poor at providing the kinds 
of services and small-scale manufacturing. Throughout 1989 the number of cooperatives 
increased rapidly and by July 1989 there were an estimated 2.9 million people working in 
133,000 cooperatives. Operating mainly in trade and finance some of these firms were able to 
take advantage of the rigidities and controlled prices of the Soviet System to make a great 
deal of money. Trading firms bought scare materials and resold them at much higher prices in 
world markets.^^ The Law on Cooperatives of 1988 significantly affected the underground 
economy. Some of the cooperatives were former underground enterprises that became legal.^  ^
Corruption increased immensely, for example, bribery was necessary to obtain office space in 
Moscow.^®
The opportunities to make a great deal of money in private business improved greatly 
after a decree was passed by the Council of Ministers in December 1988, called ‘On the 
Foreign Trade Activity of State, Cooperative and other Enterprises.’ Previously all foreign 
trade had been under firm control of the state. This decree allowed both state and private firms 
to trade directly with foreign entities. Restriction on foreign trade remained, one of which was 
that export and import licences from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations were 
required for many products. The decree on foreign trade of 1988 opened an important means 
for those people who wanted to become rich. The state-controlled prices made many Soviet 
goods especially oil and metals prepared the opportunities to be grasped by those people who 
wanted to become rich at the expense of the bulk of the population. After this decree opened 
up foreign trade to private firms, import-export companies were formed in the legal form of 
Cooperatives, which began to operate partly legal to grasp above-mentioned opportunities.
28Kotz and Fred, op.cit. p.93
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Over three thousands such firms were formed. Because exporting raw material required a 
licence from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the officials began to accept bribes 
in return for those licences. By 1990-91, a new group private capitalist had developed and was 
getting rich mainly through connections with the outside world.
The Gorbachev reforms throughout 1987-8 did not eliminate central controls over the 
economy, but it resulted in the losing of control over the enterprises to a considerable extent.
was to gradually replace the strict controls by a news system of democratised 
and decentralized planning together with a greater role for market relations. However, the 
design of the reforms carried serious internal flaws. First, it failed to create new institutions to 
coordinate the behaviour of the newly autonomous enterprises. The shifting of enterprises 
from state control to relative autonomy over the sales, purchases and financing would require 
new ways of operational rules. The result of the rapid shift to greater enterprises autonomy 
was increasing chaos in the enterprises sphere. Second, giving enterprises freedom to 
determine the allocation of enterprise income produced imbalances in the economy. The 
enterprises responded to releasing controls over them by increasing employee incomes. That 
means diversions of the enterprise income from investment to employee pays and benefit, 
which, in turn, undermined the plans about economic growth. Third, under the old system, the 
central government had no difficulty in obtaining revenues to finance its expenditures. The 
Central government's decision to allow autonomy to enterprises led to difficulties in 
extracting taxes. This, in turn, accelerated budget deficit throughout these years.
1.5.1. Crisis in Consumer Markets
These three problems in the Soviet economy in 1988-9 culminated in crisis in the 
consumer markets. During those years the Soviet economy experienced increasing shortages. 
The increase in household income is not equally matched by an equivalent increase in 
household consumption due to the shortages. Throughout these years private household
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consumption increased significantly by 3.9 percent in 1988 and 5.3 percent in 1989. Between 
1988-89 household incomes grew at an accelerating degree, far beyond the increase in
31consumer goods available.
To sum up, in the context of regulated prices, the growing consumer demand over 
goods available caused the shortages and disappearance from normal retail channels that were 
observed in 1988-9. Another factor behind the worsening shortages was the growing budget 
deficit due to the decline in tax revenues in these years. Additionally, in 1988-89, the effects 
of the 1987 Law on Enterprise produced a large budget deficit. This compounded the problem 
of excess demand for consumer goods, as the state employees were paid partly by means of 
printing new money. During these years, consumer goods enterprises responded to the excess 
demand by shifting production toward higher-quality, higher-priced items. Thus, basic goods 
that the lower income part of the population relied on became ever to find.
While the consumer market was in turmoil in 1988-89, another serious problem was 
declining net investment in the economy. The year 1989 witnessed a decline in net fixed 
investment by a 7.4 per cent and 6.7 per cent in 1989. This trend threatened the threatened the 
future productive capability of the economy.^^
1.6. Radicalization of the Debate on the Economic Reform
The year 1989 marked a critical turning point in the struggle over the direction of the 
economic reform in the USSR. The debate over the economic reform evolved in 1989 
centered on two key issues. The first was related to the degree of state's role in the economy. 
The second was related to the desirability of public or private property in the means of 
production.
As we have seen that Gorbachev 1987 called for an economy that would retain 
economic planning, but with the decentralization and a significant role for market forces
ibid. p.80
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within the planned framework. Starting in 1989 this conception was subject to increasing 
attacks and the term of ‘socialist market economy’ came into use. This term implied that the 
economy should become primarily a market economy with a planning system. In 1990 the 
term ‘regulated market economy’ came into use, which was a further step away from the 
conception of the economy as a socialist one.
The debate on property underwent a similar evolution, beginning in 1989. As we have 
seen, at first there were calls for a ‘mixed economy’ in which small-scale individual and 
cooperative enterprises would exist alongside state enterprises. The next step was the call for 
‘equal status’ of all forms of property. By 1990 the view that state ownership of enterprises 
was the root of the difficulties of the Soviet economy was openly argued in the press. The 
superiority of private over public ownership was asserted on the basis that only a private 
owner would manage enterprises efficiently.
The evolution of the terminology continued and many economists who are 
participating in the discussions dropped the term 'regulated market economy'. The final step 
was the call for a 'free market economy'. One example was Oleg T. Bogomolov, the head of 
the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, began to advocate a free market 
economy and privatisation by 1990. Another example was Stanislav Shatalin who was the 
head of the Economics Department of the Academy of Sciences, turned against central 
control, and upheld the free market and privatisation.
1.6.1. The Abalkin Plan of November 1989
By the middle of 1989 the economic situation deteriorated seriously. There was no 
clear consensus among economist on the methods of dealing with the crisis. The first sets of 
proposals were produced by the economist Leonid Abalkin (who in 1989 had been appointed 
as a deputy minister with responsibility for economic reform). The plan proposed that the
32 ibid.
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reform process was to be divided into three parts. The first, in 1990, was to be a preparatory 
stage. In the course of this year the requisite market legislation would be prepared. These 
new laws were to include measures on property, legalising various forms of entrepreneurship, 
a new tax system and a new banking system. The plan also proposed new measures to reduce 
budget deficit, limit the growth personal incomes and restrict credit. All loss-making 
enterprises were to be transferred to lease holding.
The second stage, from 1991 to 1992, was to include the new market mechanism. The 
share of free trade, that is, products produced above the state orders and sold at unregulated 
prices was to increase sharply. Wage determination was to be completely decentralized. All of 
the loss-making collective and state farms were to be closed.
The third stage would include an antimonopoly program and the introduction of a two- 
tiered banking system. By the end of 1993, 25-30 percent of state enterprises were to be 
transferred to lease holding, and by the end of 1995 as much as 30-40 percent of state 
property was to be transformed into joint-stock companies.
The plan was important on the ground that for the first time in the thirty-year history 
of Soviet reforms, a scheme of sequential changes was proposed. As Petr O. Aven explained 
“if it had been adopted, the government could have used the program basis for further radical
33and detailed proposals.”
The government of Prime Minister Nikholoi Ryzhkov rejected the Abalkin plan and 
presented its own program to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in December 1989. The 
government plan looked like the Abalkin Plan. The government plan put emphasis on the plan 
discipline and state orders. For the most industrial products the state orders were to reduce 
only from 100 per cent to 90 per cent. In addition, the Ryzhkov plan advocated new sanctions 
for unfulfilment of state orders and also rejected the principle of voluntary acceptance by the
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enterprises of the state enterprises. The government program also included a two-staged plan 
for administrative price reform.
The Ryzhkov plan was considerably more conservative than Abalkin's initial plan and 
placed greater insistence on the rigid state orders. Central controls over prices and wages were 
to continue while the budget deficit and the growth money supply were to be gradually 
reduced. Ryzhkov dismissed proposals for the introduction of private property and 
denationalisation. A stage-by-stage price reform would be introduced in 1991-92.
1.6.2. The ShataUn Plan
In 1990-91, the Soviet economy moved from a condition of severe problems to one of 
crisis. For the first time, the Soviet economy contracted, with the GNP falling by 2.4 percent 
in 1990 and about 13 percent in 1991. Net fixed investment declined at the outstanding rate of 
21 percent in 1991 and an estimated 25 percent in 1991.^ '* The money income of the 
population together with the budget deficit continued to increase throughout these years.
In August 1990, Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin who was the chairman of Russian 
Supreme Soviet, jointly named a team of economist to come up with a new economic reform 
plan. It was headed by Gorbachev advisor Stanislav Shatalin and Yeltsin advisor Grigory 
Yavlinsky was also in that group for the formation of the reform program. In early September 
the team reported the famous 500-plan.
The plan contained a timetable for the transition to a market economy. The Shatalin 
plan proposed that measures for privatisation and liberalization would be introduced, which 
would contribute to micro economic stabilization. The first hundred days of the programme 
were to be devoted to enacting legislation for reform about small-scale privatisation of smaller 
businesses retail outlets, cafes, restaurant, hotels, etc., which would in return absorb the
”  Thomas J.Richardson and Merton J.Peck, What is To be Done?; Proposals for the Soviet Transition to the 
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monetary overhang and create immediate improvements in supplies. The program of micro 
economic stabilisation would be completed in the first 250 days. There would be no growth of 
the money supply in 1991 and the budget deficit would be reduced to 2.5 percent of GDP in 
1980 and eliminated in 1991, which would be achieved by the elimination of virtually all 
enterprise subsidies and by major cuts in government expenditures on foreign aid, defence 
and the KGB and cuts in investment. There would be a rapid liberalization of wholesale prices 
(except fuel and raw materials) and state retail prices for 75.80 percent of household goods 
(except basic necessities) would be liberalised by the end of 1991. Rapid privatisation of 
large-scale industry would be concentrated in the 250.500-day period, so that 70 percent of 
large scale industry would have been privatised by day 500.
The most radical feature of the Shatalin plan was given role to be played by the Soviet 
Union itself. Under this plan an economic union of independent republics with common 
external tariffs and customs would maintain a single currency and the two tier banking system 
within an independent central bank. The republics were assumed to have the sole authority to 
raise taxes and would decide on allocating revenues to the central budget to finance defence 
policy, state-wide social welfare programs and so on. Republican authorities would control 
their own mineral wealth and resources and property privatisation. Republican law would take 
precedents over Soviet role. The strength of this plan made it obvious that the Union had 
already been in disintegration.
In the end Gorbachev rejected the program, although Yeltsin obtained its approval by 
the parliament of the Russian Republic. In October 1990 Gorbachev submitted a compromise 
plan to the Soviet Parliament. This plan, known as the 'Presidential Plan', retained the goals 
and brought features of the 500-day plan such as the eventual phasing out of most price 
controls, privatisation of industry, and the creation of a market type system. It eliminated the 
500-day timetable, called for a more gradual transition.
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In June 1991 Grigory Yavlinsky together with a group of Harvard University 
economists proposed another plan for speeding up the transition to free markets and private 
business. In the media, it was called as ‘the Grand Bargain’ because of the commitment that 
the West would provide Russia with $100 billion in economic aid if the plan was adopted. In 
July 1991 the process of dismantling economic planning reached at its climax when the 
agencies of Gosplan and Gossnab were abolished. No new effective ones were developed in 
their place. Later that month, Gorbachev shocked the world by applying for Soviet 
membership in the IMF and the World Bank, which were two pillars of capitalism. The 
intention to integrate the Soviet economy in the world capitalist system was now clear.
1.7. An Evaluation of Gorbachev Era
1.7.1. Conununists Became Capitalists
During the period of Gorbachev's rule, as we have seen, Soviet legislation banning 
private business activity was gradually loosened. In the Gorbachev era, many of the party- 
state elite, gradually, came to support the transition to market economy. By 1990 many 
capitalist enterprises were operating in the USSR. There was an increase not only in capitalist 
firms but also capitalists. Some were technical specialists-scientist, engineers, technicians, 
who were operating out of the state-run system. In these years the success in business required 
not only technical knowledge but also connection in their ability quickly seize opportunities 
when they arose. Connections were necessary because the rules for private business 
necessitated powerful friends in the position of authority. Connections were also only the way 
to get financing, in the contexts of the absence of private banks. The opportunities that were 
faced by them in the Soviet Union in 1987-91 were not primarily in production of useful 
goods. To do that, an entrepreneur would have to compete with state enterprises, which sold 
at low controlled prices. The potential profit was in two areas. One was trade, both domestic 
and international. With growing shortages and controlled prices an operator could buy goods
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from state enterprises and resell them in the domestic market at much higher prices. One 
another larger profit could be made by getting cheap Soviet materials and exporting them at 
world market prices.
The new private businessmen came largely from the group that had the best 
connection and could clearly see the growing opportunities in trade and fmance-the party- 
state elite. Russian sociologist Olga Khrhostanoskaya who studied the Russian elite for many 
years made a research on the most influential entrepreneurs during 1992-3. The findings of 
this research are significant in terms of showing the choice of ex-Soviet nomenklatura for 
capitalism. In her research, she displayed that 62 percent of the most influential entrepreneurs 
came from Komsomol, industrialists, bankers, and elite families -represent the parts of part- 
state elite. Scientists or technicians were only 15 percent and another 5 percent were others. 
18 percent were coming from the group of those people who are engaged in criminal 
activities.^^
Khrstonavskaya's research team also studied the new political leadership of the 
independent Russia. They found that 75 percent of the leadership circle around President 
Yeltsin came from the former Soviet elite. Yeltsin's government was made up of 75 percent
n / l
from the Soviet elite.
The findings of the research are important in that it showed why the transition to 
capitalism in Russia was bloodless. As it could be seen the ex-Soviet nomenklatura had made 
their choice in favour of capitalism. The reason why the members of the party state elite 
favoured such a choice lies in their pragmatic approach rather than ideological. The great 
majority of the Soviet elite had joined the Communist Party because it was necessary to 
advance their career. Their presence in the Soviet administrative structure was important for 
pursuing of material privilege and power. The careerists who made up the great majority of
ibid., p. 118 
ibid., p. 126
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the Soviet party state elite in 1980s had seen the possible direction of change in the USSR. As 
we have seen, Gorbachev and his allies wanted to democratise and decentralize the Soviet 
system. Workers were supposed to become masters of their enterprises and the public would 
have political sovereignty over the state. This direction of change threatened to reduce the 
power and material privileges of the party state elite. That is why in the early years of reform 
process they resisted change. The members of the party state did have significant material 
privileges that flow to them by virtue of their membership in that elite. They had high salaries. 
Through their job they had the use of luxury automobiles. They had access to better housing. 
They could obtain better quality food, drinks and other consumer goods through special 
arrangements for the elite. However the subsequent reforms such as the Law on Enterprises, 
the Law on Cooperatives and the reforms concerning the foreign trade provided them with 
better opportunies in terms of material and political advantage and they began to rally around 
Yeltsin’s pro-capitalist group.
Throughout the Gorbachev era the command economy was gradually replaced by a 
'bargaining economy.' Enterprise managers were increasingly able to use their informational 
advantage to bargain with central planners over output targets sand input allocations, which 
led to soft budget constraints. The center's dependence on firm-supplied information and the 
development of bargaining gave rise to branch lobbies that used their power to obtain greater 
resource allocations for their constituency. Weakened control led to more corruption, 
appropriation of state property for private use and widespread inefficiency, particularly in the 
use of investment resources.
Economic reforms promulgated by the Gorbachev government followed a pattern that 
aimed at attempts to improve the existing system. As a result of decentralized economic 
decision-making and loosening control over enterprise income, enterprises granted workers 
wage increases that exceeded productivity. By 1991 real wages had increased 80 per cent
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compared to 1985 levels. Since output prices were held constant, enterprise profit declined 
and increasing firm losses were financed by bank credits or direct subsidies from the central 
government. The central government increased wholesale prices in 1989 but was reluctant to 
pass theses increases on to the customers. This action further increased the budget deficit of 
the central government since subsidies were necessary to compensate firms widening gap 
between their output and input prices.
The increase in nominal wages without a corresponding increase in the supply of fixed 
consumer goods led to problem of excess demand. Increasing shortages of goods and services 
widened the difference between official and black market prices, creating enormous 
incentives for enterprise managers and local officials to divert goods to black market. As 
goods disappeared from government shops, shortages worsened and eventually the retail 
distribution broke down.
Declines in energy production and exports combined with deterioration in the credit 
worthiness of the USSR to produce a balance of payment crisis in 1991. The 1991 collapse of 
trade among countries of the Council of Economic Assistance (CMEA) further disrupted by 
the supply links for the Soviet enterprises and worsened the payment crisis. The Soviet Union 
subsequently defaulted on its foreign debt. As result of these factors, Soviet imports dropped 
from $83 billion in 1990 to $45 billion in 1991. Because some imports were essential as 
productive inputs, the decline of foreign creditworthiness affected both the production and
37import of consumer goods.
By 1991 the economy was in a severe state of crisis. Industrial output had fallen 8 per 
cent compared to 1990 levels. The budget deficit of the central government had risen to 30 per 
cent of GNP. Shortages were rampant. The monetary overhang was on the scene. There was a
Peter Mieszkowski and Ronald Sligo, “Economic Change in Russia: 1985-1995”, Problems of Post- 
Communksm. May/June 1996, Vol.43, Issue 3, p.3
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collapse of the soviet monetary system and economic agents increasingly resorted to bartering 
and hoarding.
With the decline of in the internal convertibility of the ruble for consumer goods, 
barter trade was increasing. Consumers were exchanging goods and services with one 
another. Barter trade was also common among enterprises throughout the Gorbachev years. 
Many enterprise managers were offering their output for materials to keep their enterprises 
running. Barter trade extended beyond enterprises and consumers to include republics and 
local governments. With the breakdown of distribution, heads of government have acted 
jq protect their residents and local enterprises. They have taken control of local 
production and then concluded agreements with other localities to exchange that production 
for materials and consumer goods. One example, the mayor of Leningrad traded textiles for 
milk with the head of the Estonian Republic.
Another important development that has taken place throughout the Gorbachev period 
was the immense increase in political and economic corruption. There were many reasons that 
led to that immense increase in political and economic corruption. The main reason was the 
reform attempts' fruits such as growing shortages, increasing nominal incomes of the Soviet 
incomes and so on. One another prominent reason was the decline of Soviet institutions. The 
destruction of the Communist Party's monopoly on executive, legislative and judicial power 
and the new legality of private economic activity provided an opportunity for the protective 
services of organized crime. The decline of the Soviet government as coercive power to 
maintain order created a power vacuum, which was tried to be filled criminal elements in the 
society.
From 1977 to 1993 reported crimes increased by over 339 percent; since the start of 
perestroika in 1985 to the end of 1993, the rate of increase was staggering 300 percent. The
ibid.
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number of'organized groups' who engaged in criminal activity increased from 775 in 1990 to 
4352 in 1992 and nearly 5700 by the end of 1994. The Russian Mafia, named as the 
‘vorovskoi mir’ in the ex-Soviet era, controlled many transactions such as transactions in 
spare parts, timber and gems, which were equivalent to a value of 110 billion rubles ($60.5 
billion) in 1992.^°
What make Soviet type organized crime groups extremely menacing is their political 
connections with the bureaucracy and politicians. Fearing the loss of their privileges, the 
formal hierarchies called for laws that would allow them to legal private access to state 
enterprises by participating in the cooperatives and enterprises. They are, in turn, began to 
cooperate with the informal hierarchies and organized crime groups who had the necessary 
capital necessary to transfer of private property.
Typically, in the West organized crime groups operate in the area of controlling 
markets for illegal goods and services such as prostitution, gambling, and drugs and the 
extortion of legitimate businesses. However, today, in Russia today starting from the late 
Soviet times, the organized crime groups controlled not only the export natural resources, the 
smuggling of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons but also controlled and managed the 
privatisation process, banking sector and another related economic spheres.
As Marshal Goldman pointed out “as Gorbachev began to permit cooperatives and 
other private activity in 1986 and 1987 in order to protect the state sector from total collapse, 
he limited who was permitted to participate. Others, those who became the mafia exploited 
these limitations for their own benefit and succeeded in gaining control of an estimated 70 to 
80 percent of the private sector.”'*’ The entire reform process since 1986 has in many ways 
succeeded in legitimizing the ‘shadow economy.’ Those who were previously black 
marketers became legitimate businesspersons and earned huge profits especially by exporting
40 Cameron Half, “The Russian Mafia: The Challenge of Reform”, Harvard International Review, Summer
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goods that are so cheap when compared to international prices. The 1987 Law on Enterprises 
gave independence to state enterprises and allowed joint ventures. This in turn led to an 
immense increase in connections between the formal hierarchies and organized crime groups. 
Soon after, the 1988 Law of Cooperatives lifted restrictions on types of activities of 
companies, profit, size and pricing. This allowed cooperatives to establish joint ventures with 
foreign firms, which in turn opened legal passages to Western banks, through which 
laundered money could find its way back to the economy.'^^ The combination of new laws, 
access to foreign capital and infiltration of organized crime groups into the economy gave rise 
to a formation of elite entrepreneurs. These elite groups operated the major enterprises and 
together with the organized crime groups prepared for the struggle to gain ownership of the 
enterprises in the post-Soviet era especially through the privatisation of enterprises.
As we shall see, on the basis of the lack of legal reforms, these groups would face 
immense opportunities to gain the control over the economy. In post-Soviet Russia, the lack 
of legal reform such as on the property rights would make it impossible the business life to 
operate in a legal context. Business would operate in between legality and illegality and in 
many cases the existing laws would contradict each other. As a result, for example, as we will 
see criminal groups would take the advantage of the situation in many occasions. Without a 
clear legal framework, the concept of free enterprise would serve as an incentive for the 
development of criminal activity.
The existence and the growth of organized crime groups would put a constraint on 
economic growth since the money that they extracted from the irregularities of the existing 
order would not find its way back to the economy, rather flows abroad. Since enterprises 
would pay up to 30 percent of their profits to the criminal groups as protection money, they
1997, Vol.l9, pp.52-57 
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would show their economic far below the true levels to the officials. This situation, in turn, 
would mean declining tax revenues of the state, contributing to the budget deficit.
By the end of 1991, after the attempted coup and the break up of the Soviet Union, the 
government of Russia and other republics had to struggle with severe repressed inflation, a 
breakdown in the economic coordinating mechanism, a disruption of interrepublic trade, 
weaker central political control and widespread corruption and theft of the state property.
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CHAPTER II-THE DEBATE IN THE WESTERN WORLD ON THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
2.1. Contending Reform Ideas on the Russian Economy
The economists and other intellectuals produced enormous literature on how to 
convert centrally planned socialist economies into capitalist market economies in 1990s. As to 
the necessary economic reform policies to replace the commanded economic structure with a 
market economy, a broad consensus prevailed among Western, East European and Soviet 
economists. First, transition must be achieved rapidly if it is to stand a chance of success. 
Second, the transition must imply a comprehensive switch to a fully-fledged market economy 
with a strict macroeconomic stabilization policy, together with a comprehensive domestic and 
external liberalization. The domestic liberalization should compromise the freedom of 
entrepreneurship, production, sales purchases and pricing. Foreign trade needs to be 
liberalized which requires a unified exchange rate. Differences remain on whether the 
exchange rate should remain floating or be fixed in order to serve as an anchor for the 
stabilization. * Some other issues such as privatization were also subjected to extensive 
dispute.
There was a little disagreement among writers on transition policy about the need to 
move quickly to a market economy. The critical question was the sequencing and the speed of 
the transition. Socialist economies had so many problems, and they were so interconnected, 
that reformers were unsure where to begin. Should they start with the budget, with 
privatization, with property reforms, with capital markets, with reducing subsidies, with 
freeing the ruble, or what? Should reform begin with budget reform so as to prevent a price- 
wage-price spiral when prices are decontrolled? Or should price inflation and wage controls 
be used to reduce real aggregate demand? Should there be a first step to get prices close to the
' Anders Aslund, The Past Soviet Economy; Soviet and Western Perspectives. (London: Punters Publisher, 
1992), p.168
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market before letting prices go? Or is it hopeless to try to guess the "right" market price? 
Should prices be decontrolled now, so that incentives to production are enhanced? Or should 
the monopolies be broken up first to prevent the exercise of monopoly power? Should 
governments avoid political peril by postponing an increase in the prices of necessities 
(housing, food, and energy)? If so, will the resulting queues and inefficiencies restrict labor 
mobility, impede adjustments, and reduce incentives to work and bear risk? This list could be 
multiplied indefinitely.
In western world, two opposing approaches to economic reform in socialist economies 
have developed in the 1990s. These were shock therapy (big bang), and an evolutionary 
approach. Shock therapy as a standard approach to economic reform in socialist economies 
developed in 1990s, on the basis of both experience, especially in Poland, and analysis.
2.1.1. The Case for Gradual Transition
Evolutionists such as Peter Murrel (1993) were skeptical of top-down reforms and 
emphasized the limited ability of economists or government officials to know the final shape 
of institutions that would be appropriate for any economy or the policies to get there. Policy 
and institutions should evolve as the economy transforms."
Supporters of gradual transition were more sympathetic to an extended period of state 
intervention. This could take the form of price and wage controls, fixed exchange rates, 
delayed privatization, or state-sponsored construction and nurturing of market institutions. 
Gradualists, who on the whole tended to focus more on institutional context as opposed to 
analysis based purely on a historical, orthodox economic theory, contended that the post- 
World War II recovery of Europe and the early development of capitalism in the West were
 ^David Lipton, and Jeffrey D.Sachs, “ Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,” in 
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity. 1990, (1), 75-13. See also, Alan Gelb, ‘The Process of Socialist 
Economic Transformation,” fmirnal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1991,5, 91-106
 ^Peter Murrel,. 1993. “What is Shock Therapy” What did it Do in Poland and Russia? Post Soviet Affairs 9 No; 
2, 1993, pp. 111-40
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the result of gradual processes, and that inertia would mitigate against the effectiveness of any 
too-rapid transformation process.'*
For some in the gradualist school, rapid reform would be impractical to implement. 
Simple economics dictates the ineffectiveness of shock therapy. Liberalization of exchange 
rates will lead to price increases for imports, which is a problem due to the lack of potential 
exports for transitional economies. Freed interest rates will lead to decreased investment at a 
time when human and physical capital improvements are necessary. And if wages are allowed 
to climb, unionized labor will be too expensive for international competitiveness; non- 
unionized wages will be too low to provide adequate levels of aggregate demand. ^
Gradualists argued that a dismantling of the old system before enough of a new one is 
in place would lead to chaos and uncontrollable disruptions. Gradualist argued that popular 
support of social groups is the only way to ensure the long-term success of transformation. "It 
is a genuine task of a post-communist State to organize social consensus which aims at broad 
social cooperation in the process of socio-economic reconstruction."^ Gradualists argue that 
the big bang's enactment in both Poland and Russia "was a radical departure from a natural 
progression."^
2.1.2. The Case for Shock Therapy
The shock therapy strategy of economic transformation, which Poland and 
independent Russia adopted, is often identified with a trilogy of specific economic policies: 
liberalization (that is, freeing) of prices, stabilization of the economy through monetary and 
fiscal policies, and privatization of state enterprises. Shock therapy ‘s name derives partly
Thomas W. Hall, and John E. Elliot, “Poland and Russia one Decade After Shock Therapy,” Journal of 
Economic Issues. June 99, Vol.33 Issue2, p.305
 ^ ibid, p.306. See also, Islam Shafigul, “Russia’s Rough Road to Capitalism: Metamorphis of an Old Debate,”
Foreign Affairs. Spring 1993, Vol.72, Issue 2, pp.57-63
^bid,p.307
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from one of its most important features: the call for a rapid transformation of the economy. 
The huge job of transforming the state socialist system into a capitalist market system was to 
be carried out as rapidly as possible-within few years.
Shock therapy advocates differ in several major ways from gradualists: intellectual 
genealogy, policy recommendations, views regarding the role of politics, and assumptions 
about the nature of the state.^
The intellectual antecedents of shock therapy include neo-liberal thinkers such as 
James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek. This perspective is based on an 
uncompromising defense of market economy and private property relations combined with a 
"repudiation of the liberal-democratic welfare, regulatory, and interventionist state."'“ For the 
shock therapists, state activity is generally considered to be predatory-government 
interference in markets and is often associated with rent-seeking and other economically 
deleterious acts.
The shock therapy approach is based upon the premise that spontaneous generation of 
markets and market institutions will occur (and will do so rapidly), given the absence of state 
interference. The state, which was much too large (and too interventionist) during the era of 
state socialism, should essentially exit the economic arena. The government’s basic 
contribution was to abolish the old central planning system, privatize its assets, and draft a 
new legal framework appropriate to markets and private property. It was left to private 
initiative to create the new market relations and restructure existing businesses, with little 
government guidance or regulation of the process. This feature of shock therapy was based on 
the belief that a market economy will spring up more or less automatically if the state simply *
 ^Murrel, oD.cit., p.130 _  _
* David M. Kotz and Fred Weir,(1997), Revolution From Above: The Demise of the Soviet System. (London: 
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goes away. Liberalization will lead to the development of market allocation of resources- 
capitalism-and thereafter to rapid economic growth. "Economic problems solve themselves: 
markets spring up as soon as central planning bureaucrats vacate the field."*'
Among shock therapists there was a surprising amount of agreement as to what should be 
done. The standard reform prescription can be summarized in five basis recommendations:
1. Price liberalization
2. Corporatization or Privatization of State enterprises
3. Macroeconomic Stabilization
• Reduction of government spending to achieve balanced budget
• Strict limits on the growth of money and credit
4- Removal of barriers to free international trade and investment
5- Moderating social cost of unemployment
These measures were presented as a comprehensive program. As Merton J.Peck 
emphasized “we consider these five steps the minimal conditions necessary for creating an 
effective market economy. The success of each depends on the others. If adopted singly or 
over time, they are likely to fail; if adopted promptly and introduced simultaneously on what 
we call D-day (D for deregulation), they promise a resolution of the present crisis.” '^
The main differences of opinion within this camp concern timing. Should these 
reforms be implemented simultaneously in the form of a big bang*'* or in some more gradual
10ibid
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sequence?'^ The major disagreements are whether governments should reduce budget deficits 
and stabilize the economy before decontrolling prices and liberalizing the economy, and 
issues of privatizating the larger state-owned enterprises. There was little disagreement that 
small-scale firms, especially retail and service firms, should be privatized quickly. As to 
privatization, there came out two basic issues here: First, should state-owned enterprises be 
sold to private investors or distributed to the population at a nominal, if any, price? Second, 
should privatization of the large state owned enterprises occur early in the reform plan or 
should firms be restructured before disposal? Gradualists emphasized the revenue aspects of 
privatization and favoured the restructuring of firms before they are privatized.'®
2.2. Individual Components of Shock Therapy
2.2.1. Price Liberalization
The Soviet governments had tried to increase both wholesale and retail the prices 
through administrative means. According to shock therapists, administrative reform attempts 
Were a complete failure on the grounds that: first, administrative reforms typically failed to 
raise prices to market clearing levels. As a result, consumers were not compensated for 
increased prices by goods becoming plentiful on the shelves. Second, it was simply 
impossible to calculate the correct set of relative prices for several thousand commodities; 
economic conditions simply changed too often, and in unpredictable ways, for a correct 
administrative reform to be possible. Third, administrative reform resulted in a succession of 
price Jumps; before each jump, which would be much discussed in the parliament and media, 
consumers would anticipate the price increases by hoarding. The result would be periodic 
shortages that would further strain the public’s patience. In contrast, freeing market prices
 ^ Ronald McKinnon, “ Financial Control in the Transition from Classical Socialism to a Market Economy.” 
lournal nf Economic Perspectives 5: 1991, pp. 107-22. See also Janos Kornai, “ Transformation Recession: 
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would result in thousands of frequent and small price adjustments that consumer and 
producers would not anticipate with extensive hoarding.'^
2.2.1.1. Recommendations
The first item on the list, price liberalization meant the freeing of both wholesale and 
retail prices from state control, leaving their determination to the interaction of supply and 
demand in markets. Thus freeing prices means goods in the shops, albeit at higher prices. It
also means sellers will set prices that will cover their costs, so that they will no longer require
18state subsidies to operate.
As Alfred E. Kahn and Merton J. Peck pointed out the intention behind price 
deregulation was that “sellers throughout the economy, with the limited number of 
exceptions, be allowed to set their prices wherever they choose -or wherever the market will 
permit -free of direct state control. Along with our corporatization proposal -that is, 
simultaneously converting the present state enterprises into financially and managerially 
independent organizations -  we would expect the liberated enterprises to be guided, in setting 
prices, by the profits they would be expected to produce: ideally, their goal should be to 
maximize profits.”'^
2.2.1.2.The Benefits of Deregulation
According to Shock therapists, comprehensive price liberalization was very important 
on many grounds. First and foremost, by freeing prices to equate the supply and demand, 
liberalization would mean that people’s rubles would be able to buy things. Free prices would 
make the ruble once again convertible into domestic goods.
Peter Mieszkowski and Ronald Soligo, “Economic Change in Russia: 1985-95”, Problems of Post- 
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Second, liberalization would make an important contribution to stabilization. 
Stabilization required reducing the growth of money incomes. That required first reducing the 
government deficit that is financed by printing more rubles. On this ground, price 
liberalization would eliminate or reduce the need for subsidies for enterprises, which made up 
a large part of government expenditures. Finally, price liberalization would set the stage for 
greater economic efficiency, by giving enterprises the incentive to serve the consumers, on 
whom they will be totally dependent. They would no longer need to obey the Ministries who 
provided their subsidies and who paid for whatever they produced. Competition among 
enterprises would begin top develop, leading to improved productivity.
According to shock therapists, price deregulation was very important and necessary 
condition to pursue all the other reforms, which in turn were necessary to make the price 
deregulation effective.
2.3. Corporatization and Privatization of State Enterprises
Item 2, the privatization blank, called for immediately turning enterprises into private 
businesses. The privatization reform was subjected to great debate among Western 
intellectuals and institutions, such as IMF and World Bank experts. In 1990 the IMF experts 
had proposed ‘commercialization” that is, “the establishment of the enterprise without 
necessarily implying private ownership.
As mentioned above, there was a little disagreement that small-scale firms, especially 
retail and service firms, should be privatized quickly. The experience of Eastern Europe had 
showed that small firms, especially in retailing and services, could be privatized very rapidly. 
There were two basic issues: First, should the larger state-owned enterprises be sold to private 
investors or distributed to the population at a nominal price? Second, should privatization of 
the large state-owned enterprises occur early in the reform plan or should these firms be
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restructured before disposal? As to the second aspect of the issue, for example, Alice Amsden 
and Joseph S. Berliner argued that restructuring Russia’s enterprises, rather than quickly 
privatizing them, would be a wiser policy.
Privatization was seen as an essential policy that would be very crucial to the 
development of capitalism in Russia.Throughout Gorbachev period, many control rights over 
the assets of state enterprises have been transferred to their managers. In many cases, these 
managers enjoyed their new power and independence, and were in no rush to privatize. When 
they considered privatization, they favored spontaneous privatization, since it would provide 
them with more power than before. In addition, political pressures led to a transfer control 
over privatization of many enterprises to the local governments. Many of the local 
administrators view this control as the right to manage the state enterprises rather than 
privatize them. Russia was in grave danger that firms would move toward local administrative 
control rather private ownership. The first essential step to prevent this development was 
mandatory commercialization (or corporatization) of all the enterprises.^^
It was a necessary condition for liberalization of prices that requires enterprises be 
converted into independent, self-financing and profit-maximizing organizations. Once state 
enterprises are corporatized, they would no longer be under the direction of the Ministries or 
dependent on the government budget for subsidies and investment fimds. '^’
In short, the aim was to make enterprise to stand on their own feet, financially making 
profit or failing to do so on the basis of their own success in satisfying market demand. While 
a tax on corporate profits would be a uniform rate across enterprises, non-negotiable with tax 
authorities and would be set at levels that would leave a significant reward for success. In
ibid.,p.59
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policy prescriptions shock therapists also assumed that the managers would know that 
unprofitability would result in bankruptcy for their enterprises and economic ruin for 
themselves. On this ground, they believed that the possibility of bankruptcy would make 
enterprises efficient. That’s why; they firmly insisted that bankruptcy laws must be enacted in 
the transitional period in Russia.
To sum up, corporatization would require the elimination of both government 
subsidies and differential taxes. The former was an extremely important component of any 
program of overall economic stabilization
2.3.1. Preconditions for Corporatization
Several additional measures would be required if the newly created joint-stock 
companies were to play their proper role in a market economy. As to this important fact, 
shock therapists proposed a list of recommendations. These were:
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
Government must enact and enforce laws of property and must respect property rights in their own 
actions. The legitimizations of private ownership and rules providing for its transfer are necessary if 
capital markets are to develop; legal methods must be provided for the enforcement of contracts, 
including obligations of debtors to creditors, voluntarily entered upon.^^
Rule must be promulgated for the treatment of enterprises that go bankrupt -  for the orderly settling of 
creditors’ claims, either by restructuring those obligations to permit the firm to continue to operate, if 
there is reasonable prospect of its being able to do so successfully, or for the distribution of its assets, if 
there is no such reasonable prospect.
Banks must be available to provide credit, but only on commercial grounds; specifically, they must 
refuse to issue credit to enterprises that are not financially viable, in their strict commercial Judgment, 
unlikely to be able to repay.^’
Governments -at the union, republic, and local levels -must cease to subsidize the enterprises, whether 
with direct subsidies or soft credits, except as part of limited and targeted programs, such as we have 
already described, to protect low-income families and ease the transition to a market economy.^®
30 to 40 percent of total industrial output in the USSR was accounted by products for which there were 
a single manufacturer.^’ This fact put an undeniable dilemma for market economy advocates in their 
advocacy of comprehensive and immediate decontrol of most prices, because it meant that such a policy 
would open the door to a considerable amount of monopoly exploitation. The IIASA economists had 
proposed that “demonopolazation should precede privatization, since otherwise shareholders in firms
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with undue market power will attempt to block procompetitive policies. Moreover, the privatization 
process itself will be hampered by uncertainty over an anticipated antimonopoly program.“
6- A bankruptcy law must accompany the privatization process. With the establishment of the principle that 
the enterprises must cover their costs by the revenue from their operations, there is no reason to allow 
enterprises that are losing money to survive. Provisions for enforcing contracts and providing damages 
in the event of nonperformance must also accompany privatization.^'
The purpose of all these measures was to place the enterprises under stringent budget
constraints.
2.3.2. The methods of Privatization
There was an extensive debate on the methods of privatization. During that time, 
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal republic, and Bulgaria were moving towards free 
distribution of shares to the general public, whereas Hungary and the former German 
P^emocratic Republic favored selling shares.
In selling the stock, the primary device would be the public auction. Stock would go to 
^he highest bidder. Anyone could buy- individuals, foreign investors, other Soviet enterprises, 
managers and workers in the enterprise, and banks and financial institutions. Auctions must 
^  widely publicized in advance, and the publicity must provide the necessary financial 
information to stop doubt on the fairness of the process.
Another method is to issue public vouchers representing potential claims on the shares 
of enterprises to be privatized. Foreign bankers or mutual fund managers would be invited to 
i^ id for the public vouchers. The public would then trade their vouchers in return for shares in 
Ihe mutual funds that appealed to them.
As a second alternative to auctions, the IIASA economists proposed worker and 
management ownership. They argued that partial ownership of enterprises by either group 
Could be valuable in promoting identification with the long-run success of the firm. They 
proposed that workers could be given 10 percent of the shares. Regarding managers they
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proposed that management could be given even more priority in distributing shares in order to 
give them some of the incentives of owners.
This might be done by making shares available to managers only after the enterprise 
proved successful, after three years, as an addition to their salaries. The knowledge that these 
shares will be available could strongly encourage managers to make the economically 
profitable decisions that shareholders would have made; in other words, the interest of
m35managers and shareholders would be somewhat the same.”
Although they said much for the partial ownership by workers and managers, they 
stressed the strong case that either of them could pursue their own self-interests.
“Workers have their greater interest in wages, and thus prefer immediate wage increases over the long­
term commitment of funds to capital formation and research and development. Thus worker control has 
proved largely failure as the dominant form of ownership in such countries as Yugoslavia. Management 
likewise has a greater interest in their immediate salaries and bonuses than in the long-term success of the 
firm.”^^
The IIASA economists argued against management and workers becoming the dominant 
power.
‘To assign property rights over all such past investment to those who happen to be the present managers 
or workers ignores the Soviet citizen as a whole have made in their industry. It would particularly favour 
those who happened to be employed in the profitable sectors at the time of privatization. A related 
problem has arisen in Poland and Hungary, where the manager of state firms have contrived to sell their 
enterprises either to foreigners or to themselves as private owners. This spontaneous privatization has 
proven to be extremely unpopular and has been referred to as nomenkaltura capitalism, reflecting the 
relatively privileged political status of these managers under the old socialist system. To permit this sort 
of asset transfer would mean effectively assigning initial ownership rights to the old management, and for 
reasons of equity and efficiency we strongly oppose it.””
2.3.3. The Monopoly Problem
Many of the Russian state enterprises were monopolies. Freeing them from 
government restraint, the combination of corporatization and price decontrol would create the 
possibility of monopolistic behavior and monopoly prices. The western analysers produced
36
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set of policies to prevent such outcomes in the economic sphere. One remedy was 
encouragement of competition itself. The most crucial element of such policy was to ensure 
legally free entry of enterprises into whatever markets they wish to enter. It was argued that 
introduction of foreign competition will be the most effective and immediately available 
method of restraining the exercise of monopoly power for tradable goods. One another policy 
recommendation was the introduction of laws like American antitrust laws, prohibiting 
enterprises from combining or agreeing among themselves to limit competition.^** Anti- 
monopoly enforcement agencies were assumed to be established to foster competition as well.
2.4. Stabilize Government Spending and Restrict Credit
2.4.1. The problem
In addition to the microeconomic issues of pricing, Russia faced a huge and growing 
budget deficit, the acceleration in the growth of incomes, a continued deterioration in the 
growth of output, and, a flight from ruble. Since most retail prices were fixed in the Soviet 
Union, the increased demand had manifested itself in barer and barer shelves in state stores 
and lines that got longer and longer. Under these circumstances, black market prices had risen 
so sharply and second economy operators became very influential in Russian economic life. 
The Communist regime left behind an enormous financial chaos when the Soviet Union 
disintegrated at the end of 1991. The Russian government inherited a disastrous legacy.
2.4.2. General Policy Considerations
Shock therapists, in designing their recommendations for economic stabilization, they 
acknowledged the fact that the major threat to economic stability would be the threat of a 
severe inflation when prices were liberalized. In addition, they talked about a period in which 
there would be irreducible frictional unemployment would take place as people were 
deployed from their jobs.
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The program that they designed aimed at ameliorating the chances of hyperinflation. 
Item 3 in the list, macroeconomic stabilization, was aimed at curtailing inflation. It had two 
main parts, one involving the government budget and the second the money and credit policy 
of the central bank. Large reductions were called for in virtually every category of public 
spending, including military spending, subsidies to state enterprises, social programs, 
education, and public investment. The second part of the stabilization policy called for the 
central bank to sharply reduce the growth of money and credit, so the central bank was in a 
position to directly restrict credit availability to enterprises simply by curtailing its loans to 
the banks.
2.4.3. Fiscal Policies
Regarding fiscal policies that the first priority was to reduce the budget deficit. A 
balanced budget would effectively control the growth of incomes. If the budget was not 
controlled, incomes would continue to rise, and price-wage spiral might begin. The most 
important action in the short-run would be to liberalize prices and remove subsidies.
More generally, shock therapy advocates focused on spending reductions and tax 
increases. As Anders Aslund pointed out: “in more general terms, public expenditures (around 
50 percent of GDP in the USSR) could be substantially reduced, because the state ftmctioned 
poorly and used funds inefficiently. Furthermore, public expenditures were quite high given 
the actual level of Russian economic development. On the revenue side, substantial changes 
were required. First, the individualized turnover tax would have to be either evened out or 
replaced by a value-added tax (VAT). Foreign trade taxes would then need to be changed to 
ordinary, limited fixed t ar i f f s .This  step would prevent the erosion of real taxes as price
rise.
Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market economy. (The Brooking Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 
1995), pp. 180-81
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2.4.4. Monetary Policies
Reform advocates believed that a substantial tightening of credit was essential to 
subject enterprises to hard budget constraints. In their view, it was neither possible nor 
necessary in the short-run to privatize the banking system in order to have credit policies. In 
the long run, however, creating a banking system was presumed. In the near term, they 
assumed Gosbank to make enterprises financially independent by extending credit only to 
firms that could repay; this implied curbing credits to unprofitable enterprises. In addition, the 
banking system must place overall credit limits on the enterprise sector. They envisioned that 
banks would charge high interest rates to enterprises under a regime tight credit. In the period 
surrounding liberalization, real interest rates (equal to money interest rates less the rate of 
inflation) must be positive.
International financing was also necessary for the implementation of macroeconomic 
policies. As Anders Aslund pointed out, “first, Russia had run out of international reserves; 
international credits could replenish them, giving Russia an opportunity to build reserves in an 
orderly fashion. Foreign credits were also needed to finance any possible budget deficit, to 
stabilize the domestic price level. Russia also craved balance of payments support to rise its 
collapsed imports to a reasonable level once again, thus salvaging falling production and 
reducing the social cost of the collapse of communism. Furthermore, the conditional nature of 
an international agreement on stabilization would be an important lever for the Russian 
reform government to use in defending its reform domestically.”'” The International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank were seen as principal actors to provide Russia with 
stabilization funds, which would be necessary to stabilize the Russian economy in the 
transition period.
ibid.
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2.4.5. Creating a Banking System For a Market Economy
In a market economy, the banking system is the key institution for providing credit to 
enterprises and achieving macroeconomic equilibrium. These two roles are assigned to 
different entities in market economies, creating what is termed a two-tier banking system. The 
central bank would set monetary policy through its controls over the commercial banks; the 
commercial banks would collect deposits from individuals and enterprises and would make 
loans, primarily to enterprises.
The Soviet system had consisted of Gosbank, the major institution, and set of 
specialized banks serving with loans and deposits to the specific sectors indicated by their 
titles. These specialized banks were: the Industrial Construction Bank (Promstroibank), the 
Social Housing Bank(Zhilsotsbank), the Agricultural Bank(Agrobank), the Bank for Foreign 
Economic Relations(Vneshekonombank), and the Saving Bank (Sberbank).
Gosbank, the existing State Bank, was proposed as the most obvious candidate for the 
role of central bank. The specialized banks were assumed to be the best candidate to become 
commercial banks.
One recurring issue in the Soviet Union was whether each of the fifteen republics 
should have its own central bank. Regarding this aspect of the issue, the IIASA had put 
forward the following statements.
‘The Federal Reserve System, the central bank for the United States, has twelve separate banks. Monetary 
policy, however, is set largely by what is called the Open Market Committee whose members are seven 
Federal Reserve governors in Washington and five members chosen from the heads of the twelve separate 
banks. The system operates as a single central bank. There can be only one monetary policy with a single 
currency. Monetary policy can be set centrally or with the participation of the central banks in the 
republics, but there must be a single currency. To maintain a single currency the Soviet Union must have a 
single monetary policy and hence a single, coordinated central banking system.”''^
Reform advocates, especially shock therapists strongly opposed to any idea that would 
support each republics to have its own central bank. When the Common Wealth of
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Independent States formally succeeded the USSR, there had arisen much confusion over the 
economic implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union. One important confusion point 
was over the issue of currency area and monetary authority within the Common Wealth of 
Independent States.
As Anders Aslund pointed out: “the heart of the problem in trying to form a new 
relationship between the former Soviet Republics was an inconsistency between currency area 
and monetary authority. The only remaining Soviet institution was the Soviet ruble, which 
was used in fifteen different republics. However, the State Bank of the USSR was dissolved at 
the end of 1991 and divided into fifteen new central banks. Each central bank could expand 
the money supply by issuing ruble credits. But only the Central Bank of Russia could issue 
cash all of the printing press for Soviet rubles was in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, 
credits were also money. This lack of unified responsibility over monetary policy made 
Russian Federation to impossible to begin with monetary stabilization. Either the ruble zone 
had to be broken up, with one monetary authority in each currency area, or the central banks 
would have to merge into a single monetary authority.”“*^
The IMF advocated the maintenance of the ruble zone and threatened that countries 
that launched their own currencies would not receive any IMF support. IMF experts believed 
that this was the necessary condition to implement a single monetary policy and to sustain 
trade among former Soviet republics.''“’
One another important issue was independence of the Russian Central Bank. The 
Central Bank of Russia was under the control of the Russian parliament. The chairman of the 
CBR was appointed by the parliament and CBR policies were subject to approval by the 
parliament. History shows clearly that the legal arrangements surrounding a central bank play 
a critical role in determining central bank policies. The independence of the German,
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Bundesbank from direct political interference, for example, has been a central reason why the 
deutsche mark has consistently been a stable currency. That is why, it was proposed that 
Russian Central Bank should be independent.
2.5. OPENING THE ECONOMY INTERNATIONALLY
Foreign trade was also formidable area of discussion. The IIASA economists had 
assumed that the Soviet Union would continue as a free-trade area and as a currency area 
within roughly its present boundaries. From an economic point of view, maintaining free trade 
among the different regions would contribute to an efficient division of labor and use of 
resources. As an example, the existence of the USA as a continental free trade zone and the 
EU attempts at a free-trade region were put forward. They had not addressed the pressing 
political question of the sovereignty of the republics within the Soviet Union, some of which 
raised the possibility of instituting separate currencies and establishing restrictions on 
intraunion trade.'*^
By the opening of the economy, it was meant allowing the sale of foreign goods and 
services within the Soviet Union, later in Russia promoting exports to the rest of world, and 
encouraging foreign firms and individuals to invest in Russia Federation. The lack of currency 
convertibility was a major factor contributing to the failure of Gorbachev’s attempts to open 
economy to foreign investment and to decentralize foreign trade rights to enterprises and 
cooperatives. The absence of external convertibility meant that the ruble outside the Soviet 
Union and foreign trade activities had to be conducted either in convertible currencies or on 
the basis of bilateral agreements. Foreign investors had no incentive to produce for the Soviet 
market, as ruble earnings could not be converted into hard currency to pay for imported 
capital and inputs, or for the repatriation of profits. Domestic producers could not exercise 
their legal rights to import equipment and materials because of their lack of access to hard 
currency to pay for them.
Peck and Richardson, op.cit., p.l68
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The Russian government inherited a complicated mixture of multiple exchange rates, 
imports and exports licenses and quotas, differentiated retention quotas, and limited foreign 
currency reserves to defend a convertible currency. Since major exports items, such as oil, 
cost less than 1 percent of the world market price, the state tried to control exports through 
licensing. First the Ministry of Foreign economic Relations would issue quotas for the export 
of particular goods. Then exporter would conclude a contract with a foreign partner and the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations would issue an export license, essentially to check 
that price was correct. The state tried to control exports through licensing, but export licenses 
were easily acquired through bribery.'*®
Retention quotas, which required exporting enterprises to surrender a proportion of 
their hard currency earning (normally 40 percent) to the central authorities at the official 
exchange rate, contributed to capital flight by giving exporters an incentive (illegally) keep 
hard currency earnings overseas or to fail to declare hard currency earnings. Similarly, ban 
was imposed on barter trade, which was used by enterprises to avoid retention quotas, or to 
avoid restrictions on exports of subsidized or underpriced scarce goods.'*^
Imports were controlled through the centralized allocation of hard currency at an 
unrealistic exchange rate of rate of 1,6 rubles per dollar, or 1 percent of the market price. 
Essentially, the government bought goods on the world market and sold them to a Russian 
enterprise at a small fraction of world market price. The Russian, in turn, sold the 
merchandise at domestic price, pocketing most of the subsidy and using the rest for bribes. In 
1992, 45 percent of Russian imports were centralized and thus subsidized. According to IMF 
figures, total imports subsidies correspond to a 17 percent of Russia’s GDP inl992.'*®
The USSR had no unified exchange rate but hundreds of currency coefficients. When 
the USSR disintegrated, Russia inherited a disastrous legacy. The recommendation was.
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moving to a convertible currency, removing import and export restrictions, and introducing 
convertibility. Opening the economy would provide consumer goods, would speed the 
introduction of foreign technology, would ensure that prices reflect competitive market prices 
and would restrain monopolistic forces inside the country.
2.5.1. Concrete Steps
The commentators on the Russian economy economists proposed that the ruble should 
become freely convertible into other currencies for all transactions. By convertibility they 
meant that all Soviet enterprises and households would have access to foreign exchange for 
the purchase of foreign goods or services, but not for the purpose of buying assets abroad or 
holding foreign currency. One interesting approach was that they talked about a system of 
monitoring, which would be required to assure that foreign currency was used for permitted 
purposes. As Richard N. Copper pointed out:
“In practice, this is likely to require a limit on the amount of foreign exchange that Soviet citizens can 
require for foreign travel. It also implies a need for Soviet residents to be authorized to open limited 
foreign currency deposits. It will be necessary, however, to have some procedure for Soviet enterprises to 
invest abroad in distribution and servicing channels for the sake of promoting exports.”'”
As to fixed versus flexible exchange rates, the commentators pointed out:
“In the long run, it would be desirable to have fixed exchange rate for Western currencies. In the near 
term, this will not be feasible, because of the prospect of severe inflation. It is therefore recommended the 
ruble be allowed to float, although the government will want to intervene to prevent excessive short-term 
exchange-rate fluctuations. A freely floating ruble will initially move to a level between the official rate 
and the black-market rate. Thus depreciation upon floating is both inevitable and desirable. A lower 
exchange rate will balance supply and demand for foreign exchange; will ensure that enterprises can buy 
foreign goods and services to consumers.
They warned against an overvalued exchange rate.
“It would be better to have the ruble priced too low than too high. An undervalued ruble ensures that 
doing business in Russia would become a bargain, and foreign firms and technology would be attracted to 
set up production there.
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2.5.2. Commercial Policy
As to the formulation of commercial policy, the proposition was a trade policy, which 
would involve a uniform tariff duty covering all imports. They recommended replacing all 
quantitative restrictions on imports with a uniform tariff P They emphasized that tariffs were 
more evenhanded than quotas as a way of protecting domestic industry. In addition, tariffs 
could provide a source of valuable government revenue.
They envisaged the possibility that a few items might bear higher tariffs for the sake of 
additional revenue, or to discourage consumption. In particular, when the aim was to 
discourage the consumption of luxury goods, excise taxes that would apply to all luxury 
items, whether imported or domestically produced, should be applied rather than tariffs. The 
excise taxes would penalize both domestic production and importation of the goods whose 
consumption was to be discouraged and single out goods whose consumption can be taxed to 
raise substantial revenue.
They also emphasized the importance of transitional tariffs for those products, which 
would live a sudden shock of competition;
“We can envision transitional tariffs higher than the uniform rate to avoid a sudden shock of competition 
to enterprises that are not initially competitive at the chosen exchange rate but have a prospect of 
becoming competitive in the long run. These transitional tariffs on products should be fixed at 20, 40, and 
60 percent, depending on the calculation of initial competitiveness of enterprises by product and should 
decline over a period of five to seven years to the long-run uniform tariff.”*^
Since most international trade takes place in intermediate products, raising the price of 
imports through tariffs also raises costs to domestic enterprises that purchase them. To avoid 
blunting the incentive to export at the new exchange, the formulated proposition was a system 
of import drawbacks should be introduced, whereby the tariff was rebated when a product 
containing an imported input was exported.
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There were two other areas, however, where special attention should be paid to the 
impact of the currency devaluation on domestic prices. The first concerned oil and gas, the 
second grain and vegetable oils. The Soviet Union, later Russian Federation was a large 
exporter of the former and large importer of the latter. Regarding this aspect of the issue, the 
suggestion was:
“It may be desirable to subsidize importation as well as domestic production of some of food products, 
such as bread and vegetable oils, which are exceptionally important to households. Energy exports, 
particularly oil and gas, may need to have a temporary export tax to cushion domestic consumers from 
large price increases, although permitting domestic energy prices eventually to increase to world levels- 
which we strongly recommended- will free up resources for exports and generate an important source of 
export earnings.” ■*
It was estimated that when markets linked through trade to foreign markets and 
domestic prices determined by supply and demand, the domestic price of energy would rise to 
the world price. The magnitude of the increase implied in their proposal, however would be a 
major shock to energy-consuming enterprises. In order to spread this shock over time, they 
proposed the introduction of a duty on export of crude oil, gas, and petroleum products. The 
export duty would raise revenue for the government, again facilitating stabilization.^^
2.6. The Role of the West
The Western commentators highly believed that Western financial assistance can 
probably play an important role in raising the chances for successful transformation. The G-7 
countries put the IMF in the lead in coordinating the Western assistance. The IMF was given 
to main tasks in Russia: to provide technical assistance; and to help mobilize international 
financial assistance, conditional on the implementation of reform measures. Unfortunately, it 
has done poorly on each task, and thereby contributed to the current Russian economic 
failure.
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The World Bank was proposed that it should help to mobilize funds for significant 
restructuring of the key sectors of the economy, including military conversion, financial 
services, and communications and transport.
At the same time, the EBRD was given the task to support the rapid development of
the private sector. As Jeffrey Sachs pointed out:
“One promising model is the US enterprise funds that have been established for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland. These funds capitalized by a budgetary appropriation and managed by private US firms, spur 
private-sector activity in the three Central European countries by making large numbers of small-scale loans 
and taking direct equity positions in local, private start-up firms. In addition, the enterprise funds work with 
relevant governmental structures to help an adequate level environment for the growth of the private sector. 
The EBRD could establish similar operations in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union.” ’^
2.7. Moderate the Social Cost of Unemployment
The common expectation about the most adverse consequence of the essential reforms 
among Western advisers on Russian economic transformation would be a sharp increase in 
open unemployment. As a solution to this problem, they proposed unemployment 
compensation system. Such a system would provide workers who are laid off with temporary 
support. However, that support must be substantially below the wages of those who continue 
to work and should decrease with the length of unemployment, in order to preserve incentives 
for workers to relocate, retrain, and accept alternative employment.
2.8. How Russia Came to Adopt Shock Therapy
The pro-capitalist coalition, which developed in the Soviet Union during 1989-1991, 
was determined to bring capitalism to the country. But the problem was no one was sure 
exactly how to do it. Should it be done gradually, or would a rapid transformation be better? 
Advocates of the rapid transformation had been frustrated by the Gorbachev attempts at a 
gradual transformation.
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By 1991 the Soviet economy was rapidly contracting, under the impact of the 
dismantling of central planning and the weakening of interrepublican economic ties. The idea 
that some drastic action had to be taken quickly acquired great influence. At this point 
Western economic thought began to play an important role. Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs 
had begun advising the new post-communist government of Poland in 1989.A few years 
earlier Sachs had developed a set of policies to resolve Bolivia’s inflation and foreign debt- 
repayment crisis, and he adapted those same policies for Poland. Thus shock therapy was 
bom. In 1990 shock therapy was applied in Poland and widely publicized as the best way to 
make the transition from state socialism to capitalism. The IMF began to promote shock 
therapy as the right solution for the problems of Eastern Europe. It was the Polish experiment 
that had a significant impact on the economists close to Yeltsin.
After the failed coup of August 1991, Yeltsin faced a great opportunity to implement 
his own ideas for Russia. During that time Yeltsin was looking for a new government and 
encouraged the competition over the reform programs.
In the fall of 1991, Yeltsin aide Gennady Burbulis introduced Yegor Gaidar to Yeltsin. 
While other leading liberal economists in the Soviet Union, such as Grigory Yavlinsky, were 
hoping to preserve Soviet Union in some form, Gaidar favored a strategy of Russia going it 
alone. This appealed to Yeltsin and his aide Gennady Burbulis.^^ Gaidar had studied reforms 
in Eastern Europe in detail and had concluded that the best economic medicine for Russia was 
shock therapy of Polish type.^ ® The liberal team of Yegor Gaidar’s was the victorious one 
among other competing groups..
Anders Aslund, Jeffrey Sachs, and David Lipton, moved to Moscow in the fall of 
1991. Later on, they became leading advisers to the Russian government on the
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implementation of shock therapy. Other Western economists, who were in an advisory 
capacity, were Marek Dabrowski, Jacek Rostowski, Andrei Shleifer and Richard Layard. As 
soon as the government was appointed, the IMF started to hold meetings with Gaidar and 
other Russian government leaders. The IMF officials put emphasize on drastic actions such as 
rapid full liberalization, stabilization, and privatization. They suggested that Russia should 
follow Polish type of shock therapy in order to solve the ongoing economic problems.^'
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CHAPTER m-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SHOCK THERAPY
3.1. Price Liberalization
At the beginning of 1992, comprehensive price liberalization took place in Russia. 90 per 
cent of retail prices and 80 per cent of wholesale prices were freed from state controls. To 
ease the cost of the transition, few commodities were excluded from price liberalization. 
These exclusions ranged from producer goods such as energy and transportation prices to 
consumer goods such as bread, milk, sugar, oil, vodka, medicine and energy, collective 
transportation, rent, and public utilities. '
Price liberalization aimed at rehabilitating ruble by eliminating the huge monetary 
overhang. Gaidar decided to attack problem through liberalization of prices and economic 
activity, combined with restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. Russian economics minister 
Andrei Nechaev warned the IMF visiting team of specialist that the prices might double in the 
first month or go up more. Thomas Wolf, member of the IMF ream, in turn assuring him that 
prices would rise by 70 per cent in January.^The price jump exceeded not only the IMF’s 
predictions but also the government’s predictions. Prices rose by about 250 percent 
immediately.^
When prices were freed from the state controls, shortages started to diminish and 
many commodities appeared in the shops. Meat, sausages, bananas, fruits, and color 
televisions appeared. The arrivals of new commodities, however, were slow, since domestic 
trade remained regulated.
On January 29, 1992, freedom of trade was announced through a presidential decree. 
According to this decree, enterprises regardless of their ownership, and citizens were allowed
' Anders Aslund, (1995), How Russia Became a Market Economy. (Washington, D.C.Brooking Institution, 
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to engage in trade. The purpose of the presidential decree was to encourage the trade to 
overcome the monopolism in the retail trade. Now, anyone could engage in street trade and 
anything could be bought and sold in the street.
The public reaction to this decree was overwhelming. The central streets and squares in 
big Russian cities became crowded with street traders. This was the one aspect of the story. 
Street prices were higher than those of state shops. The street traders were primarily reselling 
commodities bought in the stale shops. As mentioned above, according to the original 
December decree, regional authorities and shopkeepers were ordered to impose maximum 25 
percent mark-ups for consumer goods. The method was to buy from state shops and resell 
them at the market at higher prices. Organized crime was very active and acquired complete 
control in this trade as well. For instance, they were very active in subway stations. They were 
not only selling the items that they took from state shops but also high value added items, 
such as alcohol and foreign cigarettes.
According to the December 1991 decree, the government ordered the shopkeepers, 
who have no experience of market, to take a fixed mark-up of 25 percent of wholesale prices.'' 
This decree also granted regional authorities the right to regulate the prices primarily of food 
in their region. These regulations became a source of corruption and led to the strengthening 
of local mafia. Here, the trick was to gain access to these commodities and selling them at 
high prices in the market.
“Even in Moscow, gasoline prices remained under local control, prompting hour-long queues outside gas 
stations, even in 1994. This led to a highly criminalized black market for gasoline.”^
At this stage of the reform, and during the meetings between IMF officials and 
Russian reformers, some differences revealed out on the implementation of price 
liberalization. For example, Gaidar refused the IMF objections to include the oil in the price 
liberalization of January 1992. Gaidar reportedly agreed that freeing all prices reasonable but
Economist. 8 January 1992
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warned that if oil prices were freed from immediately, political pressures force the 
government to provide enormous subsidies for agriculture and urban households to cover the 
greatly increased cost of tractor fuel and home heating oil, which would break the 
stabilization objectives of the shock therapy program.^
3.1.1. Energy Prices
From the beginning of reform, liberalization of the energy prices was a formidable 
area of discussion. The problem was that Russian energy prices were enormously low -less 
than 1 percent of the world market prices. Energy was perceived as a price standard. State 
industry leaders as well as the general public believed that energy prices determined the rate 
of inflation. The government also feared that if energy prices were liberalized this would 
further disrupt production. Therefore, they advocated regulated prices. One another reason 
why energy prices were not liberalized fully was the facts that the energy industry was a 
strong lobby within the state.
On February 27, 1992, the Russian government and central bank, working with IMF 
specialists, issued a policy statement called the Memorandum of Economic Policies, which 
embodied the entire shock therapy program. It envisioned freeing nearly all remaining 
controlled prices, achieving a zero-budget deficit by the end of year, a sharp reduction of 
subsidies to enterprise, tight credit, commercialization followed by privatization of state 
enterprises, elimination of state orders, and commitment to a convertible ruble.’ However, this 
program was far from being followed. Soon after this Memorandum was on the agenda, they 
started to criticize the government extensively. Extensive criticism from state managers 
convinced the President Yeltsin not to allow any liberalization of prices. Although the *
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Russian government committed itself to liberalizing domestic prices of fuel and energy before 
20 April, the government because of President Yeltsin’s opposition took no action.*
The energy lobby only wanted cheap credits and tax exemptions. It was conservative 
and rent-seeking. Lx)w domestic prices required strong export controls. However, such 
controls were far from being implemented. This situation not only led to enormous fortunes 
for corrupt officials but also torpedoed the government’s efforts on a balanced budget.
Their extensive criticism gave its fruit in April 1992. Boris Yeltsin sacked Gaidar’s 
reformist minister of fuel and energy, Vladamir Lopukhin, because he advocated free energy 
prices. Instead, the former Soviet minister of gas industry, Viktor Chernomyrdin, joined the 
government as deputy prime minister of energy.^
When Chernomyrdin was appointed as deputy prime minister for energy, his first task 
was to create a huge gas monopoly. All enterprises dealing with natural gas were incorporated 
into one big concern, called Russian joint stock company Gazprom. Because gas production 
remained high, Gazprom kept gas prices so low in order to sell its all output. Even Gasprom 
kept up its deliveries to customers in Russia and CIS although they failed to pay back. As 
Anders Aslund pointed out: “ Presumably, the management of Gazprom was convinced that 
Chernomyrdin would guarantee them state subsidies for their deliveries.”'*’
The Russian gas industry, Gazprom received not only subsidies but also exempted 
from many taxes. Gazprom enjoyed production, gas pipeline, and export monopolies. Its 
exports were subject to licenses, quotas, but Gasprom itself was exempt from export tax, some 
import tariffs, and VAT. Investment in the gas industry was financed through tax exemption 
of gas exports, which worth $4 billion in 1993. "As a result, Gazprom became one of the most 
influential rent-seeker in Russia. As Anders Aslund pointed out;
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“Conversely, the thoroughly monopolized gas industry has insisted on keeping the lowest prices. It might 
appear strange that the energy industry was not in the least enthusiastic about price hikes. However, 
because it was rent seeking and not profit-seeking, it focused on exacting rents from the state, not on 
making profits. Moreover, the managers were in charge of the enterprises and were probably able to 
channel more rents profits into their own pockets, considering that rent-seeking minimized 
transparency.”'^
When Boris Federov took charge of the energy prices in 1993, Russian energy policy 
changed considerably. Through the excise taxes on energy, he tried to increase state revenues. 
He threatened the CIS countries that if they do not pay for deliveries in time, the deliveries 
Would be cut off. After the winter in 1993, Boris Federov tried to raise energy prices. The 
price of gasoline was liberalized on May 25, 1993, but local prices regulations remained 
common. In the summer of 1993, the price of natural gas was raised by 123 percent.'^
The liberalization of coal industry was another problematic area. The major customer 
of the coal industry was metallurgy industry. The coal industry feared that if the prices were 
to be liberalized, the demand for their product would fall. The result would be increasing 
arrears between enterprises. Both industries threatened the government that if the prices were 
liberalized, they would call for strikes. The government gave in to these demands and 
continued to subsidize them. In 1993, however, the government implemented price 
liberalization on coal industry. This deregulation led to great differention in coal prices 
between different coalfields and breaking up the alliance of the entire industry. The coal 
monopoly was crushed and the prices of coal started to rise.
Although the Russian government tried to liberalize energy prices, their efforts 
doomed to failure. The government was only able to increase energy prices through 
administrative methods. The prices, however, were far below world market prices. Failure to 
liberalize the energy prices at the beginning of the reform process was an important failure. 
Politically it costed the reformers a great deal. Anti-reformists used the energy price policies 
to consolidate their political power to shaken the government’s efforts on liberalization.
ibid., p.l61 
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3.1.2. Monopoly Problem
As mentioned before, the Western observers perceived that antimonopoly monopoly 
policy was very crucial for the sake of economic transformation in Russia. In October 1991, 
this Antimonopoly Committee was ordered to establish a register on monopolistic enterprises 
and then regulate them. Antimonopoly Committee set up many sub branches in each region 
and localities. Antimonopoly Committee and its sub branches have not worked as it was 
presumed. They did not only break the up the enterprises but also play a regulatory role.
Concerning the monopolies, the Presidential decree on price liberalization in 
December 1991 included also regulatory provisions, which were reflecting ex-Soviet type of 
administrative measures.
‘The presidential decree on price liberalization in December instructed the Russian government to 
regulate the prices of product from monopoly enterprises. Subsequently, sets of legal guidelines were 
issued on the regulation on monopolies, focusing on old administrative measures such as compulsory 
deliveries. However, the essence of antimonopoly regulation became price control, including fixed prices, 
maximum prices, maximum rates of profits, and notification of free prices. In practice, indirect price 
deregulation came the fore. The markup allowed suspected monopolists were restricted, usually to 25 
percent. Regional and Local Antimonopoly Committees could rule arbitrarily. They tended to control 
prices with food industry for the dubious benefit of the Russian people. In many regions, price regulations 
(enforced primarily at the regional level) harmed the development of a national market, reinforced 
regional market segmentation, and incited officials to extortion. The “antimonopoly” policy was in fact 
an antimarket policy, and its price deregulation was used by conservatives to impede reform.”'“'
Although the old Gossnap structures were split up, several wholesale organizations 
started and continued to fight to maintain their monopolies. Their managers insisted on price 
deregulations, which was very important to exact subsidies from the state and for the 
enrichment of themselves.*^
As to the natural monopolies, although their price remained regulated officially, there 
were also some monopolistic prices. For example, a ride on metro, Moscow’s subway system, 
which cost 5 kopeks (0.005 roubles) in 1991 had risen to 400 rubles by June 1995."*
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In Russia, the elements of continuity from the old system were carried out through 
price liberalization efforts. The above-mentioned regulations constituted one undeniable such 
continuity in the old Soviet-style. Another institutional example was the old State Price 
Committee. Although it was scaled down, it was not abolished. In the pursuance of the price 
liberalization, this committee created many troubles.*^
Freedom of enterprise was also one another problematic area. The local authorities 
interfered improperly with the emerging new private enterprises. The local authorities 
officially demanded licensing in order to impose order. In reality, this demand was for the 
sake of exacting more bribes. On May 27, 1993, the government issued a decree, which 
provided the local authorities with the right to license all kinds of activity. This decree not 
only violated the freedom of enterprise but also provided the local authorities with immense 
opportunities to exact more bribes from the newly emerging private enterprises.
3.1.3. Liberalization of Foreign Trade
In 1992, the foreign trade crisis constituted a major place in the Russian economic 
crisis. Foreign trade liberalization was a formidable area of discussion when the reform 
government came to power in 1992. Variety of groups played immense role in the making of 
foreign trade policies. Domestically, there were few main producers of main of vital export 
items, such as oil, natural gas, and metals. That is why; they possessed a strong bargaining 
power.
The Russian export policy was far-complicated story. In the sphere of foreign trade, 
the problem lied in the fact that the prices of many Russian export product, such as oil, natural 
gas, coals, metals, fertilizers, certain other chemical products and timber was very low when 
compared to the world prices of such products. This difference between domestic price and 
the world price was the area of contention. When the government tried to introduce taxes on
Aslund, op.ciL. p.l44
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the export of such products, the government met with vehement criticism. As Anders Aslund 
pointed out:
“A novelty for 1992, however, was that exporters of regulated items had to pay export tariffs, which were 
set in the European Currency Units (ECU). The export tariffs were supposed to tax most of the difference 
between the domestic price and the world price, but these tariffs met with vehement opposition. Exporters 
were so powerful that they could blackmail the government into exempting them from export taxes by 
threatening to stop exporting. The government tried to improve its monitoring by introducing a category 
of “special exporters” restricting the right to export strategic goods to a limited group, but this device did 
not work either. The MVES was bogged down because of pressure from enterprises demanding to 
become special exporters, and their numbers multiplied quickly. Leading special exporters also exploited 
their clout by lobbying members of government for tax exemption.”'®
The only solution to these entire problems was to liberalize the domestic prices of 
export goods. However, such policy was far from being implemented, since government 
lacked the necessary credibility and power to implement such policies. As a result, tariff 
policies adjusted five times in 1992. Export quotas were only in the interest of small group 
who were granted them, because resistance from the corrupt beneficiaries of the old 
nontransparent system has hindered them from being effective. Since 1994, export quotas 
have been limited to oil and oil products, natural gas, coal electricity, nonferrous metals, 
cellulose, wheat, liquor, fish, and timber. However these products accounted for 70 percent of 
Russia’s exports.'^
In the sphere of foreign trade, tax evasion also became a problem. The numbers of 
controllers were small and thus easily bribed. To sum up, the preconditions for bribery in the 
sphere of foreign trade were excellent and the opportunities utilized very well.
In January 1992, substantial liberalization took place in the foreign trade arena. 
Although, all enterprises were given the right to engage in foreign trade, the government did 
not move to the currency convertibility until July 1992. The reason behind this inaction was 
the fear that hard currency earning of the Russian exporters would be kept abroad. It was a 
serious problem, since Russia’s reserves of foreign currency were depleted.
ibid.
■’ ibid.
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During the first half of 1992, Russia had no import quotas or tariffs. This situation led 
to awakening of protectionist pressures from some domestic producers. Especially, IMF 
forced the Russian government to implement tariff policies for the sake of fiscal policies. In 
July 1992, Russia introduced a low unified import tariff, which rose to 15 percent in 
September. When Sergei Glaz’ev succeeded Petr Aven, as minister of foreign economic 
relations from December 1992 to September 1993, he attempted to implement more 
protectionist policies, under the influence of various lobbies.
The subsidized centralized imports were the major problem. In 1992, 45 percent of 
Russian imports were centralized and thus subsidized. According to IMF figures, total import 
subsidies corresponded to an extraordinary 17.5 percent of Russia’s GDP in 1992. Most of 
this was not budgeted but financed (and in fact caused) by 12.5 billion in commodity credits 
and exports extended by Western countries to benefit their own farm lobbies.^® These credits 
and import subsidies only helped enrichment of a group of people, who in turn Justified these 
subsidies as an important component to reduce the social cost of deregulation.
In the spring of 1993, Boris Fyodorov and IMF joined forces to reduce both the 
volume and the degree of subsidization of centralized imports to a few percent of GDP in 
1993, and to abolish subsidization of such imports in 1994. '^
3.2. Macroeconomic Stabilization
The Russian reformers regarded the huge inherited budget deficit and its monetary 
financing as the chief causes of the extreme suppressed inflation and rapid open inflation that 
they had inherited. They therefore devoted much effort to trying to draw up a balanced 
budget.^^Yegor Gaidar focused on two major measures; far reaching liberalization of prices 
and balancing of the consolidated budget.
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The major reductions were in budget expenditures concerned defense, investment, and 
subsidies of all kinds. Arms procurement was initially cut by 85 percent, while military 
salaries were kept high. Many subsidies were kept and state investments minimized, but social 
expenditures were maintained.
On the revenue side, the chief components of the new tax system were introduced. 
These were, a value-added tax (VAT) at a rate of 28%, excise taxes on a wide range of price 
inelastic or luxury consumer goods (alcoholic drinks, tobacco, cars, furs, chocolate, and so 
forth), a progressive personal income tax with a top rate of 60%, a corporation tax with a 
standard rate of 32%, export tariffs, and a variety of other taxes. In addition, all import taxes
24were eliminated.
In the first half of 1992, government spending was decreased by some 40 percent, 
realizing a budget surplus of 0.9 percent of gross domestic product.^^For the year as whole, 
government spending fell to 38.7 percent of GDP in 1992, from its estimated rate of 47.9 
percent of GDP. The initial price increase was 245 percent. Although it was a highly high 
rate, the monthly inflation rate started to fall.* The ruble appreciated significantly in real 
terms, and the exchange rate was relative stable, notwithstanding the high inflation. That is 
why, the average monthly wage, measured in US dollars, rose from $7 in January to $40 in 
1992. However, real wages fell steeply in statistical terms to about two-thirds of their pre­
crisis level in the mid-1980s.^^All bank savings eaten was by inflation, which turned many 
people, especially those who were elderly against the reform government.
Then Russian central bank’s monetary policy was extremely strict at first. While 
consumer prices jumped highly, the real money supply fell from 77 percent to 25 percent of
23
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' 38 percent in February, 30 percent in March, 22 percent in April, 12 percent in May, and finally 9 percent in 
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GDP between December 1991 and January 1992.^  ^ Economic consequences of this strict 
monetary policy generated huge discontent among the Russian state enterprise managers. One 
another source of discontent originated from Supreme Soviet. They, together with the state 
enterprise managers, increased their criticisms and turned against the reform government. The 
complaints resulted in a political storm at the sixth Congress of People’s Deputies in April 
1992. Finally as a concession to the Congress and the industrial lobby, three state enterprise 
managers were appointed as deputy prime ministers in May and June 1992. These were: 
Viktor Chernomyrdin -  as the minister of energy, Vasily Barschuk -as the minister of 
finance, Viktor Gerashchenko -  as the chairman of the central bank. Thus, the reform 
government turned into a coalition between economic reformers and state enterprise 
managers. When subsidies were issued in early April 1992, the government’s effort at 
macroeconomic stabilization began to loose its strength. The government was forced to make 
compromises with the barons of the agriculture and industry, offering massive subsidized 
credits.
One another result of the strict monetary policy was increasing arrears among the state 
enterprises. As Richard Sakwa explained:
‘The major problem, however, was the arrears accumulated by firms that were unable to sell their goods; 
by June 1992 huge debts had been run up between companies huge debts had been run up between 
companies, primarily between the old state industries and the military-industrial complex, amounting to 
the staggering total of more than a trillion rubles (5.5 billion pound). Debt arose because they could not 
sell goods to consumers, who had no spare cash, and because they had been unwilling to sack workers or 
to cut down on overheads, but they above all because they in effect gained credit by not paying for goods 
received.” ®^
The state enterprises stopped paying each other, and arrears mounted up. The Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE)* and parliament insisted that the Central 
Bank should provide them with credit. The state enterprise managers vehemently started to
“  Aslund, op.cit., p.l88 
’^ ibid.
^*Richard Sakwa, Russian politics and Society. (London: Routledge Press, 1996), p.l59 
’ The RUIE was largely made up of the directors of the large state enterprises who favored a slower pace of 
reform and more government subsidies. Arkadi Volski headed it. Many of them were monopolies and they took
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demand additional credits. Their job was easy to accomplish their goals, since there was no 
effective threat -neither Job loss nor bankruptcy- to use in disciplining managers. As a result, 
during the second half 1992 money supply started to increase. By May 1992, enterprises 
started demanding prepayment from each other. Since the legal system was so weak, the only 
effective collection mechanism was to demand payment before delivery.^^
The beginning of the stabilization policy was not accompanied by a fixed exchange 
rate. The reason for this lied in the fact that there was no international financing by the 
Western countries and institutions. The exchange rate floated but was not subject to any 
particular policy.
There was also no income policy as well. Shock therapists had argued that an integral 
part of the macroeconomic stabilization plan was a system of control on wage increases in the 
state sector. The intention behind such consideration was the fact that wages rose less than 
prices; hence prevent a wage price spiral. Yegor Gaidar had predicted that it was impossible 
to control incomes without a fixed exchange rate.^'ln the end, together with the profound 
economic crisis, the Russian stabilization policy was on a difficult road.
One another problem was interest rates. One of the most important feature of the 
Polish 1990 stabilization plan was an interest rate policy that was intended to ensure positive 
real interest rates, thereby preventing from financing cost push inflation and hoarding stocks 
by cheap banks loan and forcing them to control costs and raise revenues by sales of their in 
the market to eager customers. Such a policy was not introduced in the first half of 1992, 
despite the fact that the government recognized the importance of raising real interest rates to 
a nonnegative level. The reason lied in the fact that the Central Bank of Russia was
advantage of the liberalization to raise prices and cut production, the opposite of the reform policies were meant 
to achieve. Some of them also opposed to privatization, since this would deprive them of their power.
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responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The central bank had its own policy, which aimed at the 
stability and survival of both banks and the real economic systems well. Under the conditions 
prevailing in the first few months of 1992, positive real interest rates (that’s interest rates 
exceeding the rate of inflation) would have generated the viability of a large part of economic 
activity. Given that the country was already in a deep depression, the central bank considered 
that a depression accelerating policy would have been completely absurd.
As a result of insufficiently credible stabilization policy in the first half 1992, a 
number of problems came out. Interenterprise arrears mounted up, and Russia suffered from 
an acute cash shortage.*  Credits to CIS countries and the government’s failure to liberalize 
energy prices undermined the macroeconomic stabilization efforts. As mentioned before, 
import subsidies was also another concern to be considered as a devastating factor in the 
macroeconomic stabilization efforts. According to IMF figures, total import subsidies 
corresponded to an extraordinary 17.5 percent of Russia’s GDP in 1992. Most of this was not 
budgeted but financed (and in fact caused) by 12.5 billion in commodity credits* and exports 
extended by Western countries to benefit their own farm lobbies.^^ Anders Aslund criticizes 
these commodity credits as such: “Ironically, the foreign credits designated as humanitarian 
aid disqualified Russia from IMF support for macroeconomic stabilization. '^* All these
RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.l, No. 34, 28 August 1992, p.50
* “Although rapid inflation has reduced the demand for money (that is, increased the velocity of circulation), the 
growing demand in nominal terms for money resulting from the rapid increase in prices has greatly exceeded the 
quantities printed. As a result, wages and pensions have often been paid out only many weeks after they were 
due, which has generated widespread popular discontent and a large number of strikes or threats of strikes. The 
government has explained that the limited capacity of the printing presses and the delay in introducing new, 
larger coupon notes are responsible for shortage. Some observers explain the shortage as the result of using a 
large part of the money-printing capacity to build up stocks of a new currency to be used after a monetary 
reform.” (See, RFE/RL. Research Report. Vol.l, No.34,28 August 1992, p.51)
* These credits were primarily for food imports. These centralized import of grain were subsidized 99 percent; 
the exchange rate used was just 1 per cent of the market exchange rate, but it was financed by commodity 
credits. As a consequence, the IMF assessed Russia’s “enlarged fiscal deficit” on a cash basis at 25 per cent of 
GDP during the first quarter of 1992, although the domestic budget showed a surplus. (See Aslund, op.cit.. 
p.l50)
^  Aslund, op.cit., p.l90 
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devastating developments torpedoed the government’s effort at macroeconomic stabilization 
effort in the first half of the 1992.
3.2.1. The Second Half: June-December 1992
In June 1992, the reform government’s effort at macroeconomic stabilization came to 
an end with the flowing of credits to agriculture, industry, and to the former Soviet republics. 
The domestic budget deficit reached during the third quarter of 1992 at 14.6 percent of GDP 
on a cash basis. The most important development of this period was the appointment of 
Viktor Gerashchenko* as the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia by the Supreme Soviet. 
He insisted on letting the monetary supply explode to revive production. Money supply 
increased about by 28 percent during the five months from June to October 1992. Thus in 
1992, in order to maintain production, state enterprises could regularly borrow at a 20-80 
percent annual rate, while inflation was running over 20-25 percent per month. The Russian 
Central Bank, with the support of a majority in the parliament, maintained this policy to
35support production and employment.
The loose monetary policies faced with happiness by the industrialists and the other 
segment of the old elite -nomenklatura. As Anders Aslund pointed out, however, it did not 
stop the ongoing decline in industrial production. In the third quarter of 1992, the economy 
was flooded with credits, but industrial production fell by 24.2 percent compared with the 
already low level in the third quarter of 1991-that is twice as much as in the first half of the 
1992.The argument that the economy needed monetary stimulation had been tested, and it did
not hold water.’,36
* Viktor Geraschenko had been the head of the state bank in the Soviet days. His father had been a central banker 
under Stalin. Gerashchenko was popular among the old elite because he gave everyone the cheap aedits they 
asked for and kept the refinance rate very low. V. Geraschenko saw inflation as the result of price liberalization, 
not of financial imbalances. That is why; he blamed planned liberalization of energy prices for causing inflation 
by arousing inflationary expectations. He focused on declining production and neglected finances. He sought to 
cure the problem through additional credits.
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In this period, capital flight gained momentum, because there were few investment 
opportunities in Russia. A standard estimate is that capital flight amounted to $1 billion a 
month in 1992. The exchange rate fell from 135 rubles to the dollar on June 30 to 309 rubles 
to the dollar on October 1,1992. Dollarization gained momentum, as dollar deposits in 
Russian banks grew from 34 percent of money supply at the end of April to 119 percent of 
money supply at the end of November 1992. The average wage in US dollars fell from $40 in 
June to $25 in November 1992.^’
As a result of the credit expansion from June to October, monthly inflation reached 25 
percent during the last quarter of 1992. On October 7, 1992, the president issued a decree on 
the formation of a Government Commission on Credit Policy. The commission was made up 
of reformers and aimed at coordinating and control the credits. It was the only positive 
development that took place in the second half of 1992.
To sum up, in the first half of 1992 the strict monetary policy alienated the powerful 
sectors of the economy, and it quickly became apparent that the political base to support 
Gaidar’s effort was very weak. Conservative critics of these policies —lobbies representing the 
military—industrial complex, agriculture, and other industries -quickly organized and were 
successful in getting Yeltsin to dismiss several reformers from the cabinet as early as May 92 
and to appoint new deputy prime ministers. These included Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was 
head of Gazprom, the huge state gas company, and a strong supporter of the industrialists. In 
July, Viktor Gerashchenko, was appointed as the head of the Central bank of Russia and 
reversed the policy of denying easy credits to state enterprises. This policy accelerated the 
inflation in Russia in the second half of 1992. By October, Yeltsin was forced to fire Gaidar 
and to replace him with Chernomyrdin, who soon was openly encouraging a policy of easy
37 ibid.
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credits for industry and agriculture. Thus, the monthly inflation rate, which steadily declined 
about 10 percent by August 1992, began to accelerate once again.
The Central problem confronted the Russian reformers was that they were trying to 
bring democracy and capitalism to a country with an outdated constitution, governed by an 
enduring cast of autocrats and communists. In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, popular 
movements led by former dissidents overthrew the communist from the center of power. But 
no such revolution took place in Russia, where the Supreme Soviet (the standing parliament), 
and the Congress of People’s Deputies were still infested with old communist party bosses 
who continue to fight to preserve their vested interests in the old order.
3.2.2.1993-95
The situation deteriorated in the first quarter of 1993 as subsidies to incomes and 
agriculture rose. The deficit of the consolidated budget deficit was about more than 9 percent. 
At the beginning of the 1993, Russia faced with a risk of hyperinflation.* The reform group 
regained influence in January 1993 when the leading economic reformers in the government, 
Anatoly Chubais and Alexander Shokhin managed to convince the president and the prime 
minister that Boris Federov should be appointed as the minister of finance. In the early 1993, 
the prime macroeconomic task was to control credits. Firstly, Boris Federov activated and 
reinforced activated and reinforced the Commission on Credit Policy. According to new 
measures, the commission had to approve the credit allocation. Federov pushed the Central 
Bank of Russia to raise its interest rate. Second major concern was extensive cheap to the 
other CIS countries, which had been distributed by the CBR. Federov succeded in regulating 
financial relations with other CIS states, and after August 1993, only limited and properly 
regulated state credits were issued. Thirdly, Federov focused on huge import subsidies.
Islam Shafigul, “Russia’s Rough Road to Capitalism: Metamorphis of an Old Debate,” Foreign Affairs. 
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Federov managed to reduce these subsidies by about half of their volume between 1992 and 
1993, and they were to be abolished in 1994. Another important group of macroeconomic 
measures undertaken by Federov centered on raising energy prices. Petroleum and coal 
prices were liberalized. The prices of natural gas and electricity were raised in the summer of 
1993, and energy taxation through VAT and excise taxes rose.^^
One another important development in 1993 was the fall in tax revenues. The reason 
behind such fall was that the VAT had been reduced from 28 percent in 1992 to 20 percent in 
1993. Another reason behind such a fall was the tax exemptions that had been awarded to 
strong industries such as Gasprom. The expansion of private sector also created problems for 
tax collections."* *^
One important positive development in this period was increase in the both nominal 
and real exchange rate. The rising interest rate was the main cause of the steadier exchange 
rate. Real wages averaged slightly.
These efforts, however, did not have the support of the Central Bank or Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdyn, and as a result, not much progress was made. The Central Bank of 
Russia under Viktor Geraschenko actively advocated policies leading to macroeconomic 
stabilization. Geraschenko continued to insist that the issue of large subsidized credits to old- 
state enterprises and agriculture and other CIS countries would stimulate production. 
Agriculture continued to resist at any attempt at deregulation or lowering its subsidization. 
Credit ceilings for the third quarter if 1993 were broken under pressure from the agricultural 
and other state enterprises. An explosion of interenterprise credits also accompanied this. The 
inetrenterprise arrears continued rising to over 7 trillion rubles at the end of April 1993, but 
then fell back to 1.8 trillion rubles due to the tightening of monetary policy, and a growing
* During the week of New Year 1993, the weekly inflation rose to 10 percent since consumer demand for goods 
increased. This weekly rate corresponded to a monthly rate of 50 percent. The rate of during January 1993, 
inflation increased 55 percent at a monthly rate. (See Aslund, op.cit.. p. 193)
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threat of bankruptcy* proceedings. As a result, in the second half 1993, interenetrprise debt 
rose again. This period revealed on fact that it was impossible to abolish or diminish 
subsidized credits.
In September 1993 Gaidar returned to the government as first deputy Prime Minister 
in charge of the economy, as Yeltsin’s confrontation with the parliament was escalating. 
Gidar appointment was important in tipping the balance within the government in favor of 
reform. On September 21, 1993, President Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet and 
Congress of People’s Deputies and called for new election and a referendum on a new 
constitution. Now, a new period of offensive reform started to take place for a short time.
On September 1993, Gaidar abolished all subsidized credits via government decree. 
Second, through number of decisions, he succeeded in deregulating agriculture, and the price 
of bread, grain and baby food was liberalized. The state stopped procuring food, leaving its 
trade to the market. Federov also reinforced the budgetary policy, keeping the planned budget 
deficit at a somewhat high 9.5 percent ot GDP. He did this refusing to pay out the new 
expenditures.“”
The reformers tried to sack the conservative head of the CBR, but Chernomyrdin 
saved him. Geraschenko, however, under the pressure from the reformists, gave in to the 
reformist policies. In October 1993, the monthly refinance rate was raised to 17.5 percent. As
40 ;ibid.
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bankruptcy laws on the ground that they could lead to widespread closing of enterprises. On November 1992, the 
Supreme Soviet finally adopted the Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Enterprises. Until March 1994, only 
about 50 bankruptcy cases went to court and only ten cases were declared bankrupt. A new bankruptcy law went 
into effect in March 1993, and Ministry of Finance pressured the Russian Central Bank to enforce on those who 
do not pay their debts. In May and June 1994, the government undertook new efforts to speed bankruptcies. A 
State Bankruptcy Agency was established. However, the Bankruptcy Agency did not see its role as one 
promoting bankruptcies, but rather as instructing enterprises, and it became an additional hindrance. As a result, 
the number of bankruptcies remained small. (See Aslund, op.cit.. p.265)
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a result, in November 1993, it rose above the interbank lending rate for the first time, and 
Russia experience a positive real interest rate for the first time/^
In the third quarter of 1993, significant changes took place in Russia. Aslund Anders 
evaluates this period as one in which Russia was on the right direction towards free market 
economy.
“Monetary policy became major instrument of monetary stabilization. By the end of 1993, Russia was 
prepared to adopt to adopt a full-fledged stabilization policy. The necessary institutional changes had 
been undertaken. At long last, Russia’s monetary policy had become a responsible one. Russia had 
positive interest rate and credit ceilings, and the ruble was the national currency. Fiscal controls were in 
place. For monetary stability, the main remaining task was to reduce budget deficit to 6 percent of
,43GDP.’
Anders Aslund emphasized that reducing the budget deficit could be done through 
targeting three lobbies. One possibility was to abolish the tax exemption granted Gazprom. 
The second option was to abolish export restrictions for oil. This would lead to a doubling of 
the oil price, and much of the oil price could be taxed. A third possibility was to eliminate 
subsidies to agriculture. Anders Aslund estimated that any of these options could reduce the 
budget deficit by 3 to 4 percent of GDP.
In short the reformers were briefly strengthened in the last quarter of the year as a result 
of Yeltsin’s Sep dismissal of parliament and his call for new elections. Their resurgence 
came to an end when the reform parties failed to do well in December elections.
In January 1994, following the opposition victory in the December 1993 parliamentary 
elections, Yeltsin shuffled the government in favor of former industrial managers. Yegor 
Gaidar again left the government, along with Finance Minister Boris Federov, who had been a 
leading proponent of strict adherence to the shock therapy guidelines. Former Soviet minister 
of Metallurgy Oleg Soskovets was named first deputy prime minister, and he took the 
military-industrial complex under his control. One another figure was Deputy Prime Minister 
Alexandr Zaveryuha, who had been elected a deputy in the Duma for the pro-communist
ibid.
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Agrarian Party. Chernomyrdin, who had served as prime minister since December 1992, 
appeared to emerge with greatly enhanced power in January 1994. He himself represented the 
oil and gas lobbies, which were under favorable treatment. The new government looked like a 
government Russia’s strong industrial lobbies.'*'*
On January 20 Chernomyrdin gave a widely publicized speech that seemed to signal a 
sharp change in policy. He announced, “ The period of market romantism is over.” While 
staing that “ Russia will not return to past “ and is not “turning away from a market 
economy,” he observed “the mechanical transfer of Western economic methods to Russian 
soil has done more harm than good.”'*^ He promised that an activist policy to combat the 
collapse in production and living standards.
He advocated nonmonetary measures for fighting inflation, by which he implied wage 
and price controls, as well as state support for investment. Chernomyrdin insisted on keeping 
Geraschenko, and appeared supportive of giving huge state subsidies to the agricultural
46sector.
Although Viktor Chernomyrdyn was viewed as an enemy of the capitalist 
transformation'*^, initially he perpetuated the Federov’s policies considerably. He furthered the 
reduction in state expenditures. Consequently, the budget deficit stayed at 9.5 percent of GDP. 
In the first quarter of 1994, money supply was expanded by approximately 7 percent a month. 
The refinance rate remained high, and in March 1994 the real positive annualized interest rate 
peaked at an incredible 200 percent. The CBR began conducting monthly credit auctions on
February 28, 1994 48
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As a result, monthly inflation fell from 18 percent in January to a low level of 4.6 
percent in August. During the first half of 1994, industrial production fell by 26 percent, twice 
as much as during the first half of 1992. In this period, as combined result of increased 
stabilization and successful voucher privatization, foreign portfolio investment began pouring 
into Russia, peaking in August at an estimated $500 million. These developments which took 
place in 1994, were seen as an evidence of successful Russian transformation to free market 
economy by some leading Western commentators in the West.“*’
Especially in the third quarter of 1994 there were, however, some negative 
developments due to diversion from strict monetary policy. For instance, the real exchange of 
the ruble did not appreciate, and nominal exchange rate continued to depreciate approximately 
at pace with inflation. In September 1994, the exchange rate started to fall considerably. 
Finally, on “black Tuesday”, on October 11, the ruble lost over 20 percent its value in one 
day. It recovered at the following day. Although the CBR announced that the fall was due to 
insufficient international reserves to support the ruble, there were humors that it was due to 
the machination by bankers. There were also allegations that the CBR had sold rubles. This 
exchange rate crisis resulted in political crisis in Russia. In the aftermath of the currency 
crisis, the government survived a vote of no confidence with a slight margin. However this 
development was assessed as a positive development in Russia by outside observers. For 
instance, Anders Aslund pointed out:“ That currency crisis could almost bring the government 
down shows that Russia had really become a market economy.” ®^
Although monthly inflation fell 4.6 percent in August 1994, the government did not 
further squeeze it. As a whole, annual inflation was about 100 percent in Russia in 1994. 
Consumer prices rose 224 percent in 1994. At the CBR, Viktor Geraschenko continued 
advocating subsidized credits to industry to revive the production. In the third quarter, the
Anders Aslund, “Russian Success Story: Chernomyrdin Pull it Off,” Foreian Affairs. Sep/Oct94, Vol.73, 
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government issued large credits to the agriculture sector and the northern territories. The CBR 
gradually lowered the high interest rates in April, and by the end of September it approached 
to zero.^' Meanwhile, monetary expansion continued to increase and real interest rate became 
negative in October. As a result of the currency crisis and monetary expansion, monthly 
inflation rose to 15 percent in October 1994. Foreign portfolio investment fell from $500 
million to $100 million from August to November. The dollarization gained momentum.^^
The subsidies to agriculture increased gradually over the year, and no attempts were 
made to tax the gas and oil industry effectively. During 1994, there was a huge debate over 
the liberalization of oil exports. In 1994, the domestic wholesale price of oil had fallen from 
42 percent of the world level in the first quarter to 27 percent in the fourth quarter. The 
domestic market was flooded with oil, while export quotas blocked exports. This continued 
the immense opportunities for those who could buy oil at domestic prices and export it at 
world prices. The inability to liberalize the oil prices not only torpedoed the stabilization 
efforts but also accelerated the further development of criminality and corruption in Russian 
socioeconomic development. As Anders Aslund pointed out: “ If oil export were liberalized, 
the domestic oil price would probably rise to 80 percent of the world price, because of the 
transportation costs should warrant a lower oil price in Russia. Much of this price increase 
could be taxed, and the additional tax revenues could amount to as much as 4 percent of GDP, 
which would be sufficient to achieve stabilization.”^^
Tax system was another problem. Basic tax rates for ordinary enterprises were quite 
high. Russian enterprises suffered from the high cost of corruption and extortion. Regional 
authorities created problems as well. As Anders Aslund pointed out: “ For instance, one 
enterprise reported that it had to pay a basic profit tax of 38 percent. This was in addition to a
Aslund, op.citl., p.205 
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municipal tax of 1 percent of the profit, 3 percent for garbage collection, 2 percent in property 
tax, and 10 percent in ecological tax, amounting to a total tax of 54 percent of its profits. In 
other cases, the basic profit tax could much higher. The taxes were collected by tax inspectors 
as well as by independent tax police, both of whom worked on the commission. In practice, 
enterprises found it difficult to defend themselves legally against the tax authorities. As a 
defense, enterprises increasingly evaded taxes.” '^*While state expenditures increasing, the 
revenues continued to decline. The Federal budget deficit rose from 9.4 percent to an 
estimated 10 percent of GDP in 1994.
One another important development throughout the early reform years was the 
situation of republics, and regions of the Russian Federation. Regionalism a political trend 
gained momentum throughout 1992 and 1993. They demanded local autonomy and certain 
privileges such as tax exemptions, from the center. For example, in June 1993, Kalingrad 
oblast suspended federation tax laws as violating the rights of locally declared free-trade 
zone.^  ^The republics of Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia) challenged the tax laws and collection 
procedures as well. By the end of August 1993, thirty regions and republics were withholding 
taxes.^^Barter trade among the regions and republics accelerated throughout 1992 and 1993.
Regarding the tax issue, a new kind of fiscal federalism was introduced at the 
beginning of 1994. Previously, the allocation of taxes revenues had been designed arbitrarily, 
because of the ongoing strife between the President Yeltsin and the parliament.* As a result of 
negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the 88 regions, the new system was formed. 
As Anders Aslund pointed out:
“Basically, the new system introduced clear rules. A certain share of taxes was to go to regional 
authorities and another share to the federal treasury. The responsibility for expenditures for expenditures
Aslund, OD.citl.. p.204 
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RFE/RL. Daily Report. 27 and 28 October 1993
* For example, Tatarstan gained more certain privileges from than other republics.
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was correspondingly clarified. Transfers from the center to regions in need were supposed to amount to a 
couple of percentage points of GDP. However, complaints arose that transfers were based more on 
political considerations than actual needs, and strong regions demanded that taxes be redistributed to their 
advantage.”
3.3. Managing the Ruble Area
When the USSR fell apart, one of the immediate questions was how to find an optimal 
form to maintain economic relations between the former Soviet Republics. The State bank of 
Ihe USSR was dissolved at the end of 1991 and divided into fifteen new republican banks. 
The problem was due to the fact that the only remaining Soviet institution was the Soviet 
ruble, which was used in fifteen republics. Each central bank could expand the money supply 
issuing ruble credits. But only the Central Bank of Russia could issue cash, for the simple 
reason that all of the printing presses for Soviet rubles were in the Russian Federation.
This issue led to enormous discussions among leading Western economists and 
institutions. Leading figures of shock therapy, such as Jeffrey Sachs and David Libton 
^rnphasized:
“In our view there is no realistic possibility of controlling credit in a system in which several independent 
banks each have the independent authority to issue credit. The reason is simple. Pressure is overwhelming 
in each of the slates to “free ride” by issuing ruble credits at the expense of the rest of s^tera. It is a
neirlv self evident nroposition that single currency area should have a bank of issue. As Milton Friedman 
nearly selt-evident Proposmo ^g ^cy  area is that it has at most one central bank with the power
argues that the ^ u ^ ^ ^  bank is needed with a pure contmodity eurreucy. The US
w S ' K ^ t S l y i n a s  twelve regional banks, but there is only one central authority (The Open
Market Investment Committee) that can create money.
Anders Aslund assumed the credits, which were issued by the other former Soviet 
Republics, to be money and would destabiiize the macroeconomic efforts for a balanced-
'>bdget in Russia. He mentioned about two options as a solution to the issue.
aiurr monev This lack of unified responsibility over monetary policy made it 
‘Nonetheless, credits J stabilization. Either the ruble zone had to be broken up, with one
next to impossible to begi Central banks would have to merge into a single
monetary authority in each cu y
monetary authority.”
■' 0»T d ?e»ey Sachs, Prospect For Russia's Economic Reforms, Broddni; F a g s  o .  Ecuom ic
|£iiyitj,i992, p.7
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was correspondingly clarified. Transfers from the center to regions in need were supposed to amount to a 
couple of percentage points of GDP. However, complaints arose that transfers were based more on 
political considerations than actual needs, and strong regions demanded that taxes be redistributed to their 
advantage.”
3.3. Managing the Ruble Area
When the USSR fell apart, one of the immediate questions was how to find an optimal 
form to maintain economic relations between the former Soviet Republics. The State bank of 
the USSR was dissolved at the end of 1991 and divided into fifteen new republican banks. 
The problem was due to the fact that the only remaining Soviet institution was the Soviet 
ruble, which was used in fifteen republics. Each central bank could expand the money supply 
by issuing ruble credits. But only the Central Bank of Russia could issue cash, for the simple 
reason that all of the printing presses for Soviet rubles were in the Russian Federation.
This issue led to enormous discussions among leading Western economists and 
institutions. Leading figures of shock therapy, such as Jeffrey Sachs and David Libton 
emphasized:
“In our view, there is no realistic possibility of controlling credit in a system in which several independent 
banks each have the independent authority to issue credit. The reason is simple. Pressure is overwhelming 
in each of the states to “free ride” by issuing ruble credits at the expense of the rest of the system. It is a 
nearly self-evident proposition that single currency area should have a bank of issue. As Milton Friedman 
argues that the key feature of a unified currency area is that it has at most one central bank with the power 
to create money—“at most” because no central bank is needed with a pure commodity currency. The US 
Federal Reserve System has twelve regional banks, but there is only one central authority (The Open 
Market Investment Committee) that can create money.” ®^
Anders Aslund assumed the credits, which were issued by the other former Soviet
Republics, to be money and would destabilize the macroeconomic efforts for a balanced-
budget in Russia. He mentioned about two options as a solution to the issue.
“Nonetheless, credits are also money. This lack of unified responsibility over monetary policy made it 
next to impossible to begin monetary stabilization. Either the ruble zone had to be broken up, with one 
monetary authority in each currency area, or the Central banks would have to merge into a single 
monetary authority.
Aslund., op.cit.l., p. 199
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As mentioned above, the critical danger of a common ruble area was that attempts by 
the Russian government to implement a tight monetary policy could be nullified by excess 
credit emission by other republics over which the Russian government over the supply has no 
de facto or de jure control. Without strict control over the supply of money, a common 
currency area provides member governments with an incentive to run budget deficit in the 
expectation that other republics will finance them, which is inherently inflationary. That was 
the case that happened in the ruble zone throughout 1992.
As Juilet Johnson mentioned, the problem was the lack of coordinated credit creation 
among the new central bank of the Soviet successor states. Ruble credits issued by one 
central bank could be used as a means of payment throughout the ruble zone, and enterprises 
and governments in various republics could count on easy credit. The most troubling news 
was Ukraine’s announcement in June 1992 of its intention to expand credit between R300 
billion and R600 billion in order to settle interenterprise arrears. This massive amount of 
credit threatened to worsen the inflation in Russia. The only viable solution was quick 
separation of Russian and Ukrainian money.^ *^
The principle of a single currency area, which would involve Republics that wanted to 
join the ruble zone maintaining accounts with the Central Bank of Russia and coordinating 
their monetary policy, was maintained in Russian Memorandum Economic Policy. As 
Anders Aslund rightly assessed that:
“Its core supporters were the industrial lobbies both in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. The 
industrialists were against arduous restructuring to market conditions. The conservatives, on the contrary, 
wanted to minimize both systematic and structural changes in inter-FSU trade, in the hope that the fall in 
the production would be minimized. They also wanted subsidies from the Russian government, which the 
ruble zone facilitated. Conservative governments in other republics had a double incentive to preserve the 
ruble zone: Both their country and their state enterprise managers -their key constituency -  would money 
at Russian expense. The old-rent seeking elites, both in Russia and the former Soviet republics, saw the 
nontransparency of the CIS arrangements as an excellent veil for exacting subsidies from the Russian 
state.”
“  Mieszowski, Peter;Soligo, Ronald., “Economic Change in Russia: 1985-95,” Problems of Post- 
Communism. May/June96, Vol.43 Issue 3, p.27
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One another group was Russian neoimperialists and nationalists, who favored the ruble 
zone as well. Even the liberal Grigory Yavlinski has consistently favored monetary union. As 
Anders Aslund rightly assessed that the nostalgia for empire of the old seemed to be in their 
subconscious.^^
The IMF also advocated the maintenance of the ruble zone and threatened that 
countries that launched their own currencies would not receive any IMF support. Convinced 
at first that the best way to preserve interstate trade was to retain as large a ruble as possible, 
the IMF early in 1992 urged all independent states to remain in the ruble area. The IMF plan 
included the following proposals:
“First, each republican central bank would agree to set limit on the expansion of its net domestic assets. 
Second, the monetary authorities in all states would agree to set uniform central bank lending rates and 
reserve requirement; to establish a common, unified exchange system; and to facilitate the settlement and 
clearance of payments throughout ruble area. Fourth, the CBR will agree to provide enough ruble 
currency to the central banks of other states in the ruble area to satisfy the demand for currency in these 
states.” ^
It was not only IMF but the European Commission supported the maintenance of the 
ruble zone. As Anders Aslund said in his book:
‘The EC ambassador to Moscow, Michael Emerson, drew far-reaching parallels between the CIS and the 
European Community, arguing in the press: “Economist argue whether a common market really also 
requires a common currency. I believe it does. A single monetary unit more fully uncovers the advantages 
of economic integration, according to my view.
The leading figures of the shock therapy criticized the IMF attempts at supporting the 
ruble zone. For instance, Anders Aslund criticized the IMF proposals in the following right 
manner: “Under this plan, every central bank would have been permitted to issue rubles, with 
no effective control on compliance.”^^  The result would be an increase in money supply, 
which in turn would lead to inflationary effect throughout Russia.
“  ibid., p.llO 
“  ibid.
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Jeffrey Sachs furthered the criticism as such: “ When faced with the question of how 
the ruble area should be managed, IMF has been extremely unhelpful. Once the inadequacy 
of budget and credit policies in certain states became clear, the IMF worried that the new 
currencies might be unstable and encouraged the states to delay the introduction of their 
moneys, ignoring the inescapable implication that macroeconomic policy mismanagement 
outside of Russia would only to serve to undermine the ruble stabilization effort
The main incentive for the non-Russian republics to stay within ruble zone lied in the 
fact that they could maintain the transfers from Russia; either by importing energy on more 
favorable terms than could be obtained in trade outside the CIS and/or by effectively forcing 
the Russian government to subsidize their budget deficit. *  Most Former Soviet Republics 
and Russian state enterprises wanted subsidies from Russia to maintain production. The 
subsidization took several forms. The main form of subsidization has been the exchange of 
energy products from Russia for manufactured goods from other republics at terms of trade 
that substantially underpriced the energy in comparison with world markets. According to 
IMF calculations. If Russia’s interrepublican trade had been valued at world market prices 
rather than actual domestic prices in 1990; Russia would have gained 37 percent in terms of 
trade in relation to the other former Soviet republics. A second form of has been the extension 
of credits to other republics through the banking system to finance chronic budget deficit of 
many of the other republics. For example, in mid-1992 Russia provided the CIS countries 
with 650 billion rubles in credits, 250 billion rubles to Ukraine alone. By January 1993, total 
debt of other CIS countries to Russia exceeded 1.2 trillion rubles and it kept growing in early 
1993. A third form of subsidization has been the provision of foreign exchange to other
“  Lipton and Sachs, op.cit.. p.8
* For instance, under Soviet rule, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics received substantial grants from 
the union budget, on the order of 15 to 20 percent of their GDP. Another financial flow arose from internal 
Soviet trade. Certain Republics (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine) had had persistent trade 
surpluses within the USSR. This had in turn benefited Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Republics, which had
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republic, at a price in terms of rubles far below the market price. Only the third form of
subsidization has been eliminates substantially eliminated in 1992.^^
The general conclusion among the leading shock therapists was that it was vital to break
up the monetary area. This would prohibit various other central banks from issuing the same
currency, which would thus prevent extreme inflation. As Anders Aslund emphasized:
‘The only sensible alternative to the ruble zone was the introduction of independent national currencies 
that should be made convertible on current account. Such a solution had all advantages. It would create 
the basic precondition for macroeconomic stabilization: one monetary autliority responsible for monetary 
policy in each currency area. The financing and liquidity problem for interstate transaction would be 
solved, because payments could be made in one of the new convertible currencies. The problem of lack of 
trust could be best handled between enterprises in different states; under convertibility, they would be 
able to make direct payments to one another. Convertibility would naturally render trade and payments 
multilateral and was by no means unattainable.”
Anders Aslund gave the collapse of the Habsburg Empire after World War I as an 
example to draw a historical parallel to support his ideas on this issue of monetary 
stabilization.
“Only the country that arose from the former Habsburg Empire acted appropriately with regard to 
national currency policy, namely Czechoslovakia. At the earliest instance, over a two-week period in 
February and March 1919 while the borders were closed, Czechoslovakia stamped the Austro-Hungarian 
notes circulating within its borders. Its currency was made fully convertible from the outset, and 
Czechoslovakia pursued highly conservative fiscal and monetary policies. While hyperinflation erupted in 
the other states that were formed from Habsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia pursued deflation. Its economy 
flourished between the world wars, while those of other Central European states foundered. 
Czechoslovakia was also the only country in the region that maintained full democracy until it was 
occupied by Germany.”^^
One another significant issue, linked to the break up of the USSR, was both how to
conduct the foreign trade between former Soviet Republics and find a suitable exchange rate
mechanism. The leading proponent of shock therapy favored free prices and free trade. On
this aspect of the issue, Jeffrey Sachs proposed the followings:
“In our view, each of the independent states should quickly introduce its own currency by substituting 
new banknotes (or coupons) for the rubles in circulation on the state, and by redenominating bank 
balances, contracts, wages, and prices in the new currency at a uniform exchange rate between the ruble 
and the new currency. Trade between the state and Russia could continue to be conducted in Russian 
rubles, but the state would have to earn the rubles by its own exports or by explicit credits from Russia, or
total internal trade deficit on the order of 12 percent of their GDP in 1987-89. That is why. Central Asian 
republics, especially Kazakhstan, were keen on the maintenance of the ruble zone.(ibid., p.lO)
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get them by selling foreign exchange for rubles. If the sate wanted to maintain close monetary 
harmonization with Russia, it could peg its currency to the ruble. Otherwise, the sate could let its currency 
float against ruble (and perhaps peg it to something else, such as a Western convertible currency.)”’®
Regarding the trade between former Soviet republics, although there was a broad 
consensus among the Western economists that free prices and free trade must prevail, there 
was, however different ideas about currency and payment arrangements. The problem lied in 
the fact that there was liquidity shortage to encourage payments between former Soviet 
republics. Regarding this aspect, the payment mechanism, which was another important 
issue, had to be resolved throughout the former Soviet republics. On this aspect of the issue, 
a payment union or multilateral clearing was favored, in line with the European Payments 
Union (EPU), which existed from 1950 to 1958. '^
As mentioned above, the argument for a payment union lied in the fact that the focus 
was the shortage of liquidity for foreign trade transactions. According Anders Aslund, the 
basic problem was different.
‘The basic problem was a lack of trust at all levels: between the FSRs, between enterprises in these states 
and between the states and enterprises. This lack of trust was compounded by the absence of both 
transparency and legal sanctions. In addition, very high inflation and minimal interest rates made the 
incentives to delay payments overwhelming; under these conditions, it was simply irrational for an 
enterprise to pay a bill.”
The idea of payment union was not viewed by the former Soviet republics a viable
solution to the payment problems. As Anders Aslund rightly assessed:
“Although many Western economists favored a payments union, this view found little support in the FSU, 
which knew how badly multilateral clearing had functioned within the CMEA. Any surplus from one 
country had been a cheap credit to other countries with deficits.
Bilateral clearing was never considered a plausible option by anyone. Payments in hard 
currency were also not a viable solution. Because hard currency was in short supply, there 
was too little liquidity to encourage such payments. In the absence of other payment
™ Lipton and Sachs, oExit., p.7
” The idea was first presented Eastern Europe, when Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trade 
system collapsed in 1991, and it was even more strongly advocated for the FSU. (For details, see, Aslund, 
op.cit.l.. p.l ll )
’■ ibid., p. 112
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mechanism, barter trade within and between the FSRs developed to grow up after the 
collapse of the old command system throughout 1992. Barter trade facilitated evasion of 
taxes, thus torpedoed the macroeconomic stabilization efforts in Russia.
The break up of the Soviet Union disrupted the trade relations among the republics. 
Export barriers were set up by republics and regions partially in response to their policy of 
continuing to subsidize many commodity prices. Export barriers were set up because many 
goods were sold domestically at low, fixed, subsidized prices. Barter trade agreements 
between Russia and the other states were maintained throughout 1992. Russia has continued 
to oblige its energy producers to deliver oil and gas far below market levels. In some cases, 
these oil shipments have in fact been reexported to world markets, allowing enterprises in 
other states to capture enormous rent.’^
As result, it became appear that the notion of ruble area was far from creating any 
advantage. It generated irresponsible monetary policies and high inflation. It did not provide 
a proper payment mechanism. The ruble zone came to an end in July 1993 when the Central 
Bank of Russia announced that Russian banknotes issued before 1993 would become 
worthless. Only after than, one of the basic conditions for macroeconomic stabilization 
started to take place in Russia. This reform extensively covered in the Western press as a 
positive development in reaching to macroeconomic goals.
‘This had the positive effect of reducing the drain on Russian resources from other CIS states, but at the
cost of undermining confidence in the ruble as a store of value and medium of exchange.” *^’
3.4. Privatization
The privatization of industries, which created enormous discussion outside and inside 
of Russia, was one of the important components of the Russian economic transformation. As
”  ibid, 
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discussed in the second chapter, the main purpose of the privatization was to break the 
dependence of enterprises on state budget and to make the market economy irreversible by 
creating a class of property owners while at the same time making firms more efficient and 
market oriented.
When the reform government was established in November 1991, the job of designing 
and implementing the Russian privatization was given to Anatoly B.Chubais. He was 
appointed as minister of privatization in November 1992. His top aides were Dimitry Vasiliev 
and Maxim Boycko. Vasiliev served as deputy chairman of the privatization ministry, with 
responsibility for implementation of the program. Boycko served as the Russain economist 
working on policy with Chubais’s American advisory team, directed by Andrei Shleifer. ’’
During the first half of 1992, an intense debate over privatization was on the agenda in 
Russia. The primary question was who was going own the enterprises. The debate 
concentrated on the work collectives: How much should they receive, and should their shares 
be individual or collective? In his speech of October 28 1991, Yeltsin initially stated that 
enterprise shares would be divided between the state and work collectives or employees. On 
December 29, 1991, a presidential decree on “Basic Provisions of a Program of Privatization 
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation” was adopted. This preliminary 
privatization program acknowledged the fact that a substantial share of the ownership was to 
be given to employees in enterprises to facilitate the privatization. As Anatoly Chubais 
explained: “ If we did not accept that the workers collectives would hardly support 
privatization. But now they have ‘suddenly’ shown an interest in the law and started to egging 
on the administration.” *^ The shares given to workers would be the individual property. The 
government hoped that workers would keep illicit privatization* by managers in check. As
”  Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse, op.cit., p.35 
Aslund. op .citl., p.230
'In  1991, Gorbachev inadvertently opened the door to one form of hijacking when he removed the power of the 
big soviet cabinet ministries over the individual general directors of thousands of enterprises. Once Gorbachev
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Anders Aslund pointed out: “In some cases this process, this process was used as a means of 
insider privatization; in other cases the result was the decapitalization of the state firms to the 
benefit of these insiders. There was a fear among Gaidar team that if privatization were 
delayed there would be little left to privatize.”^^  That is why, to the reform team, the speed at 
which ownership was transferred was of primary importance.
This issue was expressed in Yeltin’s famous reform speech on 28 October 1991: “ For 
impermissibly long, we have discussed whether private is necessary. In the meantime, the 
party-state elite has actively been engaged in their personal privatization. The scale, the 
enterprise, and the hypocrisy are staggering. The privatization in Russia had gone on for a
long time, but wildly, spontaneously, and criminal basis. Today it is necessary to grasp the
>»80initiative, and we are intent on doing so.”
Workers opposed to any significant role for domestic or foreign investors because they 
feared that outsiders would drastically cut employees, and managers feared outside owners 
would fire them or curtail their power. This was one of the main considerations, prevailed 
throughout the reform years, got workers and managers together in their struggle for the 
formation of Russian privatization program.
The top managers wanted to control the enterprises and own a large amount of the 
shares as well. They wanted the enterprises in their areas of responsibilities to be organized 
into production associations, holding companies, or financial-industrial groups. The third 
group of claimants was the regional authorities and the present and former bureaucrats in the 
ministries wanted to retain the old privileges as much as possible. This situation left a lot of
removed cabinet supervision from the top managers, they were free to do what they pleased. They started to treat 
the enterprise as their personal property. This process was called spontaneous privatization. Certainly the gap 
between domestic prices and world market prices gave them many opportunities. Before a factory privatized, the 
top managers had started smaller related corporations and joint ventures with foreign or domestic producers. 
Before they had a board of directors looking over their shoulders, they began to the simple physical transfer of 
equipment to these daughter companies. They sold them goods or services at low rates and used their financial 
accounts to transfer funds to them. Managers and their families now own significant parts of these new 
corporations. (Blasi, Kroumova, Kruse, op.cit.. p.30-34)
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room not only for negotiation and compromise but also for corruption. One another group was 
the population, which constituted the key group to awaken the general support not only for 
privatization program but also for general reform as a whole. Not only the foreign observers 
but also Russian reformers acknowledged this fact in the sense that if these groups were not 
given a strong incentive to participate, they could stop privatization.*'
Advocating another approach, liberal Russian economist, Boris Federov, and Grigory 
Yavlinsky wanted to sell the enterprises to the highest bidders who would bring capital 
necessary to restructure them. Yavlinsky and some Western economists predicted that any 
significant role for employee ownership would doom privatization because workers would 
take over the board of directors, vote for themselves huge wage increases, and never invest 
profits in the future of the firms. Other economists hoped that foreign investors would be the 
ones to supply the necessary capital. Some looked to the privatization of Czechoslovakia, in, 
which vouchers distributed to every citizen. An individual could use the vouchers to purchase 
a few shares in enterprises or group of citizens could deposit their voucher in mutual funds, 
which could then buy bigger blocks of shares in companies.
While the reform team assessing these alternatives, the managers and the former and 
present government bureaucrats were not waiting for the government to take action. As 
Joseph R. Blasi said:
“During 1991 and 1992, they tried to get their hands on whatever assets they could or to position 
themselves for a form of privatization that would favor them. Our evidence indicates that about 8 percent 
of the companies had negotiated some kind of special deal under Gorbachev or Yeltsin. In most of the 
cases, the employees were allowed to lease the enterprise with an option to buy it if privatization ever 
went forward. The general director of a large high technology firm in Southern Russia proudly told 
visitors that before the official privatization program went into effect he got a decree signed by a high 
government official allowing him to privatize his company the way he wanted.”"^
“  Aslund. op.cit.. p.35
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The reform team spent 1992 weighing the alternatives. They finally settled the 
central principles of the privatization to guide the assignment of property rights to the Russian 
people. The central key principles were:
“First, privatization had to be proceed quickly, before the window of opportunity closed, the possibility of 
rapidly separating the economy from the state power disappeared, and the stealing of assets developed 
from an art into a science. Second, each interest group would be offered enough potential ownership to 
persuade the Supreme Soviet to pass the privatization law. Third, the privatization process had to be 
simple, because the state bureaucracy was incapable of managing anything efficiently and there were 
initially 1,500 enterprises to put on the auction block. “Simple” meant giving incentives to all the 
participants to implement privatization on their own, without governmental approval. Fourth, 
privatization would occur only if Russian citizen wanted to do it. No one could force them to take part in 
it. Russia had no legal regime, no corporate or related law to speak of, no real independent judiciary, no 
culture of law, and no way for the courts or the police to enforce government orders. Last, most of the 
shares in the enterprises would have to be given away or sold at very low prices because ordinary citizen 
would not have enough money to participate otherwise. Citizen would have to be given some type of 
“currency” that they could use to “buy” their shares.””
The decision to sell Russia’s large industrial enterprises at low prices to the population 
became one of the most politically controversial aspects of the program. For the reform team, 
the speed at which ownership was transferred was very important on the ground that if it was 
not proceeded quickly, the managerial elite and criminals would increase their advantage with
each month passed.
3.4.1. The Privatization Program
On June 11, 1992, the Russian parliament passed the new privatization program and 
Yeltsin signed it into law. The terms of the privatization program were strongly determined by 
the need to obtain political support for the reforms from important stakeholders such as 
managers and workers. The plan was put forward by the reform team was a political 
compromise. The central aim of the plan was to distribute property rights to most of the big 
firms in about eighteen months, fro January 1993 to June 1994.
As a starting point, the Russian privatization program divided firms into those that 
could be sold for cash, and those would go to the mass privatization. Most small shops and 
smaller enterprises were immediately allocated to the local governments in this way. Indeed,
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there had been extensive disagreement over how to sell off more than 170,000 small shops 
and retail outlets. For instance, Larisa Pyashcheva, the head of privatization for the city of 
Moscow, had argued for turning over all the shops to their workers. In the end it was decided 
that they would be sold at simple auctions. Revenues from auctions were to be kept by the 
local authorities that carried out sales. It was the main incentive that led to speedy 
privatization with regard to small-scale firms and enterprises. Ultimately, the workers and 
managers were able to win large number of these auctions.*“* As second step, the program 
divided large firms into five subgroups; those subject to mandatory privatization, those could 
be privatized on a voluntary basis, those subject to the permission of the Privatization 
Ministry, those requiring government approval for privatization, and those whose 
privatization was prohibited. Mandatory privatization included firms in the “light” industries, 
such as textiles, food processing, furniture and so on. Major firms in most strategic industries, 
such as natural resources, defense and steel could only be privatized with the agreement of the 
whole government. As third step, all large and medium-sized firms were to be corporatised. In 
other words, they were to be registered as joint-stock companies.
At this stage, all of the enterprise’s shares were owned by the state. The managers and 
employees of each state-owned enterprises were required quickly submit papers to turn their 
enterprise into a corporation with shares owned by the state. The shares of the stock were 
considered property of the state and were handed over to the Russian Property Fund until they 
are sold. They calculated the value of all assets aside from the land at book value and divided 
the sum by 1,000 rubles to arrive at the number of shares in their enterprises. The workers and 
managers then selected a board of four members: the general director with two votes a 
representative of employees, and one representative each of the local and federal 
governments. The corporatization step was designed to bar well-placed members of the
ibid., p.38 
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Communist Party, enterprise managers and state bureaucrats from interfering with the shares 
of the companies under their control. Once an enterprise had been corporatised, the ministry 
in Moscow lost any control over it. The top manager was freed from the ministry’s 
supervision but constrained by the other board members, and found it expedient to cooperate 
with the workers to buy the enterprise.®^
3.4.2. How the Program Worked
When a firm was corporatized, its managers and workers were allowed to choose 
between three privatization options. The first option gave workers 25 percent of the shares of 
the enterprises for free, made these shares non-voting. The top managers got 5 percent at a 
nominal price. Additionally, the workers could get another 10 percent of the shares at a 30 
percent discount from book value. Option 1 resulted in minority employee ownership. It 
allowed 40 percent of the shares to be sold to employees, while 60 percent would be sold at 
auction or held by the state for later sale. The second option gave managers and workers 51 
percent of the equity, all-voting. Option 3 was a management buyout by a group that promised 
to restructure the firm. Indeed, the managerial lobby in the parliament imposed this option, 
allowed the managers to buy up to 40 percent of the shares at very low prices if they promised 
not to go bankrupt.
The principal method in which the sales of the rest of shares took place was either 
through the auctions of shares for voucher, or investment tenders or cash auctions later. Every 
person in Russia was offered a privatization voucher, which had a denomination of 10,000 
rubles. It could be traded, but government prohibited the stores from accepting vouchers in 
exchange for goods and services. In theory, anyone -a rich person, a new business started by a 
smart entrepreneur, a Mafia organization, a foreign company -  could buy vouchers and come
85 ibid., p.40
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to voucher auctions. Citizen had to pay the equivalent of about 8 cents for a voucher. This 
voucher was the sole means of payment in auctions of shares of privatizing enterprises. The 
law specified that at least 29 percent of the shares had to be sold to bidders, who could include 
citizens, companies, and the employees and managers. The auctions often left 10 to 20 percent 
of the shares in the state’s hands to be sold at investment tenders or cash auctions later.^^As 
Joseph R. Blasi pointed out, this was the golden share, which was to be sold after the initial 
privatization program completed in 1994.
The architects of the privatization program wanted to encourage the creation of core 
shareholders, block holders who would own more than 5 percent of an enterprise’s shares. 
The hope was that theses big investors would take a more serious interest in the enterprise, 
push to get on the board of directors, and monitor the performance of the old Soviet 
management closely. In order to start the formation of such blockholders investors, the 
government licensed voucher investment funds to function like mutual funds. A citizen could 
hand over a voucher to the fund, and the fund would select the companies and group the 
shares in order to pressure management for performance and demand board seats. At least 29 
percent of every company was supposed to be sold for vouchers to ensure widespread citizen 
participation and keep the value of the vouchers high.
When this privatization program was accepted, it led to an extensive criticism 
throughout the transition years in Russia. For example, the economist Tatyana Koryagina, a 
former colleague of Gaidar who later become a key adviser to Gennady A. Zyuganov, said, 
“Whether the government likes it or not, the privatization program will be beneficial only to 
foreign business and domestic shadow business (the Mafia).” Pravda called privatization “a 
crime against nation” and said that it emerged as a result of the Yeltsin government’s links to 
the new rich. Pravda accused the government of deliberately impoverishing people. “ In a
86 ibid.» p.42
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situation where 80 percent of the citizens do not have enough money to buy meat and butter, 
it is easy to suggest that the vouchers will end up in the pockets of rich tycoons.”*^’ A common 
argument against voucher privatization was that people would not value their vouchers but 
would sell them too cheaply.
The foreign observers severely criticized the program from their own perspectives. 
Some viewed that the government should focus on only freeing prices completely, so that 
state-owned firms could compete with one another; privatization could come later. Andrei 
Shleifer, who was the foreign adviser to the Russian government on the issues of the 
privatization, fiercely opposed this view. The privatization experts Roman Frydman and 
Andrzej Rapaczynski questioned whether giving insiders so much control amounted to real 
private property ownership. They doubted that workers would be more interested in profits 
than in safeguarding their employment and wages, and whether a manager would be more 
interested in restructuring than in continuing the search for subsidies.^*
Optimist looked to the privatization program as the motor for driving Russia into 
market economy. For example. Professor Richard Layard of the London School of Economics 
and an adviser to the Russian government argued that giving shares to the people would build 
up popular support for the reforms and result in efficiency. Another advisor to the Russian 
government, Anders Aslund favored the most rapid allocation of state assets to the people in 
the reform process in the sense that this would not only provide popular support for the 
economic reforms but also would make the reform irreversible. The American management 
consultant John Simmons argued that employee ownership would restructure the companies
more efficiently. 89
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3.4.3. Ownership
The objective described in the privatization law was to form a group of owners who 
would contribute to the mergence of a socially oriented market economy by making the 
enterprises more efficient and attracting foreign and domestic investment. From this point of 
view, it is important to assess who owns Russian industry after privatization on the ground 
that it matters whether the majority of the owners of a privatized company are the employees 
of the firm, only its managers, or outsiders, or whether the company has no controlling block 
owners. Since privatization was supposed to distribute property among citizens, it is important 
to know how much property ordinary citizen got.
The true paradox of privatization was that it allowed the members of the nomenklatura 
to achieve something they could not have hoped for even under communism.The privatization 
program placed most state owned enterprises in the hand of their employees and former 
managers. It was reported that insiders have an average of 65 percent of the shares, with top 
management owning 8.6 percent. Of the remainder, the government holds 13 percent and 
outsiders hold 22 percent. Of the shares held by outsiders, 11 percent were held in blocks 
greater than 5 percent.^ (See figure 1.1 and 1.2 in appendix A)
From the beginning, it was clear that these insiders would be against outside 
ownership. They were afraid that outsiders would control their companies. Because their 
companies were in need of capital and technology, those resources only could come through 
outsider ownership, namely investment funds, commercial firms, banks or foreign investment. 
The insiders, namely workers and management were afraid that if outsiders were involved in 
privatization, the result would be loss of control over their company and massive cuts in 
employment. This was the fear that insiders got together and severely resisted outsiders 
ownership. As Joseph R. Blasi said.
9 0 ;ibid., p.l93
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“Shares prices were so low that many employees had money leftover after paying for their shares, so they 
went as individuals or in groups to the voucher auctions and bought additional shares with their personal 
savings, their voucher, and the vouchers of family members, friend, or other sources. One manager told of 
employees who went to the subway stations and nascent Moscow stock exchanges to buy up vouchers. 
The general directors of the companies made it clear in interviews that thy opposed to the sale of stock to 
unknown outsiders, and some top managers admitted they worked closely with local privatization officials 
to block the participation of outsiders. In fact in the winter of 1994 about fifth of all the firms we visited 
had no outside ownership whatever.” *^
In a report, which was made Joseph R. Blasi, a manager of automobile plant said:
“About 70 percent of the stock is owned by the employees and I own 5 percent myself. Among the 
outside owners, two investment funds bought 5 percent of our shares. The activity of this investment 
company is rather dangerous. In our city, they took over a chemical plant and fired the top management. 
To prevent this, we set up our trading company that’s owned mostly by our company and partly by one 
individual. This trading house buys employees’ shares. It is accumulated about 12 percent of them by 
now. In Soviet times the state constantly gave us money to develop new products, but now we have only 
our profit for capital investment. Outside investors are the only other source of capital, but if they come 
in, they could seize control.”’^
One another highlighting example,
‘The manager of a Belgorod trucking company with 600 employees observed, “The psychology of the 
employees is that they simply cannot understand that they are now the owners of this company. They are 
afraid the privatization program will stop and it will all be taken away from them. We are doing 
everything possible to keep control of the shares inside the enterprise. We are afraid that new 
businessmen who made a lot of money in some commercial deal will try to buy shares from the 
employees. If that happens, employees will finally understand that it is not good to sell the shares.
The managers looked for an ownership that made sense to them, provided them the
capital they needed to modernize, was nonthreatening. As mentioned in a report, which was
made by Joseph R. Blasi, the head of a 1,6000-employee machine building plant in the
Bryansk region said:
“We lack cash. There are delays in paying wages. The state owns just over a tenth of our shares. We are 
looking for a foreign investor to buy it, but if we do not find an investor ourselves, the state will auction 
the stake and we will lose more control. Our largest outside shareholders are a local bank and a Moscow 
investment fund. They do not interfere with our life and they are not going top make nay changes here.”^^
Although top management acquired about 9 percent of the shares through mechanism
Chubais established, and workers ended up with 56 percent, shortly afterwards managers
resorted to a series of measures designed to increase their stakes. They virtually wanted to
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own most of the shares, if possible, all shares.* They started buying up workers’ shares while 
at the same time preventing workers from selling to outsiders. Those who resisted were 
threatened with dismissal.
‘The general director of a large plant in Astrakhan region told us that 30 percent of the shares in his firm 
had been resold by the employees in the last year. When we asked who the main buyer was, he acted 
confused and avoided a straight answer. Later a local government official told us that his office had 
received complaints that the general director had bought all the shares himself Top managers seldom 
admit to participating in other companies that serve as fronts for their ownership of their own firms.”’’
An employee, who was fired, received nothing. Where do the shares go? Top
managers stepped in and bought them. The corporation law had no provisions to protect the
shares of those who were fired from their job.
‘The authorities in the Mordovia region tried to establish a committee defend employee shareholders 
against pressure exerted by general directors to sell their shares to the top management. An employee who 
resigns is likely to be instructed to sell his or her shares to the boss. Most workers do not know their 
rights and do as they are told. General directors in this region strongly opposed the creation of such 
committee, just as some advisers to members of the government with ties to general directors opposed a 
provision in a draft law on corporations in 1995.”’
The managers resorted to some methods in their attempts to acquire the shares of the 
firms. One prominent method was that the managers set up companies, which they or their 
families controlled, and siphoned them money. Under soft budget constraint, it was easy to 
get money from the state channels. Because the top management controlled the records of 
shares, they simply refused to record the share transactions they disapproved. If an outsider 
they disliked bought shares, they could simply refuse to register the new ownership. An 
employee, who wanted sell shares had to get management’s approval before the transaction 
could be registered. If an outsider wanted to start accumulating shares with the hope of
’ In February 1993, the managers’ frustration took an alarmingly political character. In February 1993, about two 
hundreds large and mid-sized enterprises had been sold. The managerial lobby in the Supreme Soviet offered an 
amendment to the privatization program to create an additional option: every enterprise could aeate close to 100 
percent employee ownership by getting a low-interest loan from the Russian government to buy back the share 
that the privatization program had systematically sold off to outsiders. Since inflation was very high that year, 
the low interest rate the loan essentially gift. The government, however, managed to defeat the legislation. (See, 
ibid., p.64)
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gaining control of the company, the general director could simply refuse to reveal the 
current’s owners.^’
Open trading of stocks allows shareholders to buy and sell shares according to their 
view of stock’s prospects. In Russia, open trading of the shares was far from being a reality. 
The general directors and their lobbies in the Supreme Soviet and industry associations 
bitterly opposed to this concept because they realized that even if insiders dominated the 
initial stage of privatization, outsiders could eventually enter their companies. In addition, 
they did not provide the outsiders with accurate financial disclosure.*  As Joseph R. Blasi 
mentioned, furthermore, hyperinflation made most companies financial information virtually 
useless.
“...the companies could decide themselves which outside shareholders should receive financial 
information and which ones they wanted to boycott. Furthermore, hyperinflation made most company 
financial information virtually useless. If in 1992 the inflation rate is 2,323 percent, for example, what is 
the dollar value of sales of 1 billion rubles in 1992? In 1992 the price of a dollar rose from 198 rubles to 
415 rubles. Thus financial information was not only improbable, it was impossible. Since investors could 
not tell whether a stock was a good deal, only favored investors had much incentive to buy it. I 1993 and 
1994, many managers echoed the general director Marina Tikonove: “Our financial statements are our 
commercial secrets.”’*
Regarding the corporate governance, one problematic area was the area board of 
directors. Although outsiders owned 21 percent of the stock of the average firm in 1993 and 
1994, they were denied on the board of directors. Insiders used their control of a majority of 
shares to outvote the outsiders.^  ^Throughout 1993 and 1994 Russian managers spoke openly 
about a tactic to thwart outside ownership. The trick was to issue new shares to managers and 
other employees but charged them only a minimal amount. This tactic effectively reduced the 
power of the outside shareholders. If a voucher investment fund owns 20 percent of your 
company and you issue enough new shares to insiders, the fund managers wake up next
ibid., p.90
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morning to find that they hold 10 percent of a company that received no money for the shares 
that reduced the fund’s ownership.As an example:
“In 1994 the first well-publicized serious violation of shareholders’ rights in a new issue of stock took 
place at Komineft, one of largest oil companies. Komineft has reserves of over 2 billion barrels of oil and 
is the country’s thirty-sixth largest company by market value. Without giving adequate notice to its 
outside shareholders, the company called a meeting, and shareholders present approved a very large 
issuance of new shares. Several key outside shareholders were not notified of this action and were not 
allowed to buy the new shares if they did hear about it.
As mentioned by Joseph R. Blasi, there was no law requiring new share offering to be 
offered equally to all shareholders, not just to insiders, or requiring immediate payment for 
shares. The solution to the stock buyback trick would be to prohibit a company form using 
corporate funds for a buyback without the approval of a majority of shareholders or to 
require insiders to pay a fair market price for any shares they buy. Even if an outsider freely 
bought shares, somehow gained access to the shareholders register and financial information, 
and secured a seat on the board of directors could still vote for a share issue or a stock 
buyback to reduce that outside shareholder s power.
As a result top management moved swiftly gained control over workers votes. Top 
managers, who were dependent on the general director for senior positions, represented 
insiders on the board predominantly and top managers took control of register rights. 
Theoretically, groups of workers and their trade union could have meaningful independent 
power on the company boards. The Russian trade unions, however, have no tradition of 
independence; they have always been creatures of the companies, which in turn were once 
creators of the Party and the state. Now the managers rule supreme.*®^
3.4.4. The Struggle for Ownership
The end of voucher privatization of mid-sized and large firms in July 1994 was not 
end of privatization. One of the goals of the privatization program was to subsidize the 
federal and regional government’s budget with the proceeds of the sales of shares for cash.
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At the end of voucher privatization, some state ownership still remained among the 15,000 
companies included in that program. In 1996 the average state ownership among mid-sized 
and large firms was 9 percent, but it was still more than 20 percent in a quarter of privatized 
companies and more than 32 percent in a tenth of them. The state ownership in the fifty 
largest Russian corporations was about 38 percent, and many other firms had not been 
privatized, because enterprises with more than 10,000 employees could not be privatized 
without government permission. The government devised special rules for these larger firms. 
In the oil and gas sector, the government kept 38 percent ot the shares for three years and 
allowed the others to be privatized. It retained majority control over these key strategic
firms. 103
On July 22, 1994, President Yeltsin issued a decree on the second stage of 
privatization: the remaining state holdings were to be sold for cash at competitive auctions, 
with part of the proceeds going to the companies as capital for their restructuring and the rest. 
The land under the privatized enterprises was to be sold to the enterprises. The government 
hoped to raise many many billions ol dollars to finance its budget deficit in a noninflationary 
way. And it wanted to allow outside investors to build up larger blocks of shares so that they 
could increase their role in corporate governance.
This second stage of privatization was a failure on many grounds. As Joseph R. Blasi 
explained:
“In early November 1994 Yeltsin promoted Anatoly Chubais to the position of first deputy prime minister 
in charge of overall economic reform. The man Yeltsin chose to replace him at the privatization ministry, 
Vladimir Polevanov, scared off potential investors with talk of renationalizing companies and criticism of 
privatization before he was fired. In the first nine months of 1995, 7,000 companies were slated to sell 
their remaining shares. The government hoped to raise about $2 billion. The procedures for the auctions 
were issued late. Little information about the enterprises was made available, and few investors were 
interested in buying shares. Plans to sell the shares through nationwide auctions and the stock market did 
not live up expectations. By November 1, shares in only about half of the companies had been sold for 
about $500 million, because of a depressed stock market and opposition from enterprise management and 
regional government officials to introducing outside owners.”'®
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In late 1994 and 1995, only 9 percent of the enterprises had investment tenders for their 
shares and only 24 percent had cash auctions, at which smaller stakes were sold. 
Commercial firms that had little to invest bought the shares cheaply. Many of these firms 
promised additional investments that they were not able to deliver. The voucher auctions for 
these firms were dominated by the insiders.
The Russian government needed seriously to increase revenues from privatization in 
1995. On May 11, 1995, President Yeltsin issued a decree that increased the proportion of 
privatization proceeds that was go to the central government at the expense of the regional 
governments. For this purpose, the Russian government tried to sell 25 percent of Svazinvest, 
a holding company that held 38 percent of the stock in the eighty-five regional 
telecommunication firms across the Russian Federation. The intent was to $1 billion to 
finance the budget deficit in a non-inflationary way. The Italian state telephone company
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STET was winner of the auctions.
On of the most controversial aspect of the privatization program, which is loans-for- 
shares scheme, came to agenda in 1995. The government was looking for revenues from 
privatization to support the budget deficit in noninflationary way. A consortium of banks 
suggested that they lend the Russian government funds and take large blocks of shares in the 
country’s giant companies. The banks would manage the shares. The banks also wanted to 
restrict the involvement of foreign investors in buying up Russia’s strategic companies. On 
August 31, 1995, President Yeltsin accepted a version of the plan that came to be known as 
the loans-for-shares scheme. Twenty-nine blue-chip companies would be auctioned 
separately to banks. The auctions would be open to all interested bidders, even to foreigners, 
and the bank that offered the largest loan to government would win each block of shares. The 
banks were required to hold the shares until September 1, 1996. After that date they could
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sell the shares and take a third of the capital gains. The bids of loans to the government 
appeared to be offers of assistance, but in fact the banks were simply looking for a way to 
acquire control of some Russia’s largest companies.
The implementation of the loans-for-scheme created a public discontent over 
privatization. The Russian citizens were simply excluded from the auctions. The list of 
companies participating was shortened, sometimes as a result of political pressure and 
lawsuits by managers of influential companies who opposed the sale of their shares to either 
banks or other outsiders. The participation of foreigners was seriously restricted. The banks 
were allowed to organize the auctions themselves and participate in them as both bidders and 
depositors for bids. In the end, only twelve companies were auctioned. The first farm 
auctioned was Surgutneftgas, the eight largest company in Russia, with oil reserves of almost 
11 billion barrels. An offer one bidder was disqualified on technicalities and the auction was 
won by the pension fund of Surgutneftgaz. The LUKoil Group, the largest corporation in the 
country, joined with Bank Imperial to win its own share auction after excluding foreigners 
and Russian corporations that cooperated with foreigners. Both deals helped to secure insider 
control of the companies. Oneximbank organized the auction for Norilsk Nickel, the sixth 
largest Russian corporation, and won the auction. Its bid of $170.1 million was just $100,000 
over the starting price. Oneximbank disqualified a competing bid for $350 million on 
technicality. Oneximbank then took control of Norilsk Nickel.
As mentioned before, the true paradox of privatization is that it allowed the members of 
the nomenklatura to achieve something they could not have hoped for even under 
communism. The best companies of Russia were channeled into the hands of ex-communists.
As Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapczynski mentioned.
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“But, the nomenklatura’s rape of those countries cannot compare with that of Russia, whose enormous 
wealth and natural resources fell prey to a few modern-day robber barons with a party pedigree. In what 
reportedly began as a conscious Soviet policy of placing various party officials into key economic posts, 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s prime minister, Nikholai Ryzhkov, made a switch “from plan to clan” (to use the 
phrase of sociologist Davis Stark) and is now chairman of Tveruniversal Bank. Before becoming the 
president of the Association of Russian Banks, which represents independent commercial banks, Sergei 
Yegorov was an official in the State Bank, at one time serving as the head of the Russian Republic office 
of the Bank. Connections to the often-corrupt new authorities can also yield fairly good results. For 
Avcmnif. lact November Russia’s huge Oneksimbank, a firm with close ties to President Yeltsin’s security
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chief and drinking buddy, Aleksandr Korzhakov, was victorious in auctions to control 38 percent of 
Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest producer of producer of that commodity (as well as of platinum and 
cobalt). Oneksimbank, which is partly owned by Norilsk Nickel, was named by the government to be its 
auctioneer. Oneksimb^k declared its own $170 million offer to be winning bid, despite the fact that it 
was only half that offered by a competitor and a mere $100,000 above the minimum bid level that it had
o,., ” 110 ^set.
In this sense, the situation of the Gazprom is another illuminating case to consider. The 
assets of the Gazprom alone were valued in the hundred of millions of dollars. Although 
Gazprom and other large energy companies were excluded from the official privatization 
program, 60 percent of the stakes in them have ended up in the hands of few insiders, favored 
politicians, and banks run by the ex-nomenklatura. Among the major shareholders of Gazprom 
is rumored to be its former boss. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Chemomirdin denies 
any involvement, but few believe his protestations, particularly as his son is building a lavish 
mansion within a wooded Gazprom estate.
At the end of the loans-for-shares auctions in which only a handful of bidders 
participated, Russia’s banks were openly struggling with each other to eat more of the cake. 
The banks that organized the auctions repeatedly disqualified their competitors and won the 
bids· most bids were fairly low; foreigners were completely excluded; some banks and 
companies used font companies to bid; and banks that were bidders, auction organizers, and 
bidding competitors helped each other with loans guarantees. In the end, the government
acquired over $1 billion.
"0 Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy, and AndreJ Rapaczynski, “Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face,” 
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This programme, since the government has no money to pay back the loans, has
provoked criticism, mainly because the banks selected to arrange the selloffs often end up
buying the assets for a fraction of their real value. To Communists and nationalists in the
Duma, the loans-for-scheme symbolized the whole privatization program, and they called for
for an investigation. For the supporters of shock therapy for Russia, the loans-for-share
program was considered as a key event in the insider-outsider struggle. In their words,
‘The loans-for-share program was considered as a key event in the insider-outsider struggle. Despite the 
low public participation in stock ownership under the loans-for-shares scheme, one new propertied class 
in Russia, the bankers, had finally succeeding in pushing the government to design a privatization scheme 
that did not uniformly favour insiders.”
3.4.5. How Much Property did Citizen Get?
The proposed aim or the essence of the mass privatization was free distribution of the 
assets to citizens. In the summer 1992, President Yeltsin decided to make privatization 
voucher a centerpiece of economic reform. As he mentioned that “ we need millions of 
owners rather than a handful of millionaries.”” '* To realize this end, the voucher auctions 
were to be held. The system was similar to the Czechoslovakian voucher scheme, although it 
was more populist. The administrative fee was smaller, even children could participate in the 
Russian scheme, and everyone got one voucher. In both countries, the intention was to let 
voucher privatization be massive enough to make it worthwhile and to undertake several 
issues of vouchers. An important difference was that the Russian vouchers were transferable 
and tradable. This was seen as a matter of freedom of choice. As Yeltsin pointed out: 
“Everyone will have equal opportunities in this new undertaking, and the rest will depend on 
ourselves... Each citizen of Russia and each family will have freedom of choice. The 
privatization voucher is a ticket for each of us to a free economy.”"^
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The Russian people, however, had a mixed opinion of privatization vouchers. They 
did not believe or support the idea of privatization vouchers as a way to free market 
economy. The attitude of Russian citizens toward voucher privatization was documented by a 
number of Russian polling organizations throughout the process. Public support for a move 
away from the Communist was obvious before 1992, but as time went on, Russians 
increasingly questioned privatization. The negative views were acknowledged in a series of 
polls conducted from June to September 1992 by the Russian polling organization VSIOM as 
the details of the voucher privatization plan for larger companies were being aired. Before 
the program was implemented, 43 percent of the persons polled thought it was a deception 
that would make some people richer and the rest poorer; 22 percent thought it would not 
change anything; 8 percent said it was a program to make people owners; 6 percent viewed it 
as an attempt to provide people with material assistance; and 21 percent had no opinion. It 
was clear that Russian people had differentiated attitudes toward voucher privatization.” ^
The voucher privatization program began in December 1992. By September 1994, 
when voucher privatization was half over, 30 percent of respondents thought privatization 
was necessary at their enterprise; 26 percent thought it was unnecessary; 6 percent were 
against privatization; and the rest had no opinion. At the same time, 1 percent felt that 
privatization had improved the economic performance of their enterprise; 20 percent believed 
it had made the performance worse; 69 percent saw no change; and the rest had no
117opinion.
This mixed views raises the question how exactly the vouchers were used and who 
the owners of the enterprises’ stocks actually were. As Joseph R. Blasi said in line with the
findings of the Russian polling organization -VSIOM,
“Of the roughly 149 millions citizens, about 12 million, or 8 percent, said they used vouchers to buy 
shares at their place of work. About 9 million, or 6 percent said they either sold their vouchers or gave
Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse, op.cit., p.76 
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them away. And about 45 million, or 30 percent, said they invested their vouchers in voucher investment 
funds, which then bought shares for them. No information was available on the remaining 17 percent, so 
these figures must be viewed with caution. What do these figures mean? Employees of the enterprises 
have reported that they used the enormous advantages offered to insiders the way -according to this poll-
21 million employees of the enterprises say they used their vouchers. They feared a redistribution of 
, . ^  »»118 ownership to managers.
As Joseph R.Blasi mentioned, despite the great publicity accorded with the voucher 
program, doubts, lack of information, or cynicism led 58 million people, or almost 40 percent 
not to participate in the program. What happened to these vouchers? For example, the New 
York Times reported that one investment banker, Boris Jordan, working for CS First Boston 
in Moscow, acquired 17 million vouchers on the secondary market for various clients. The 
ordinary Russian people did not know what to do with vouchers. They mostly sold them 
away. Managers together with other actors such as the mafia members, ex-communist 
bureaucrats were very influential in collecting the privatization vouchers from people. The 
managers together with workers bought other peoples’ vouchers so that they could increase 
their ownership in their own firms. The outsiders were excluded by illicit means, primarily 
through withholding of information about voucher auctions. Voucher auctions were usually 
local affairs, dominated by employees, related locals and possibly one or two block holders 
(usually voucher f unds ) . Thi s  situation led to enormous opportunities for corruption, 
namely for bribery.
In the end, employees of the newly privatized enterprise, who made up about 10 to 15 
percent of the population, owned 58 percent of the stock of those companies in 1996. All the 
other Russians got ownership of only 11 percent of the stock, 6 percent as individuals and 5 
percent through voucher investment funds. On the other hand, the very small group of 
citizens who control Russian commercial firms, certainly less than 1 percent of the 
population, ended up with 11 percent of all the stock by 1996, while Russian bank holding
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companies and financial-industrial groups have taken substantial stakes in one in ten of all
• 121privatized companies.
Although 35 percent of the shares were supposed to be sold for vouchers, an average of 
about 20 percent was put up for auction. A presidential decree on the rights of citizens to 
in the privatization was issued in 1993. It established that not less than 29 percent 
of all shares should be sold at voucher auctions within three months after an enterprise had 
been corporative. However, the share stayed at around 20 percent, because enterprises 
continued to resist voucher privatization, preferring to keep the stock for their employees. As
Anders Aslund pointed out: “ notably oil companies released less than 10 percent of their
• 122shares for voucher auctions.
The share of property given to citizens in the privatization process must be viewed in 
the context of the declining living standards of many Russians. In 1992, as the Financial 
Times reported in March 1996, “ the then state-owned Sberbank’s 70 million depositors in 
effect had their life saving wiped out as hyper-inflat ion destroyed the value of the ruble. The 
government is working on a plan to compensate these depositors but the sums are 
colossal.”'^  ^ Citizens saw the privatization in the context of all these events. That is why, 
they were fhistrated by the reform attempts in such a way they even did not involve in 
voucher privatization efficiently. One another important fact that the reformers had not been 
able to persuade the government to include all companies in the program of rapid 
privatization, so the program excluded a large number of controversial companies in order to 
get the process moving. The loans-for-shares scheme demonstrated that the later privatization 
of these large and valuable companies did not benefit ordinary Russians. This was one reason 
why the loans-for -shares scheme served as lighting root for public criticism of privatization. 
In fact, 43 percent of the Russian stock market was accounted for oil and gas giants, 21
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percent by electric utilities, 13 percent by metals, and 11 percent by telecommunication 
firms, many of which were held back from voucher privatization. These were the companies 
constituted the 100 most valuable companies in Russia. These companies were privatized 
by the loans-for-shares scheme, without citizen privatization.
To sum up, clearly most people realized that they did not benefit much economically 
from voucher privatization. As we have mentioned above, there were many reasons for this 
outcome. Most shares had gone to insiders, and many of the most valuable enterprises evaded 
voucher privatization. The rights of outside owners were weak, and people did not in their 
rights as shareowners; many people were disappointed that they failed to purchase shares in
concrete enterprises.
The proponent of the shock therapy evaluated the voucher privatization as a positive 
sign on the road to free market in Russia. They believed that voucher privatization was 
important in the sense that private property was becoming a reality in Russia. For them, the 
numbers was more important than who were the real actors in acquiring the private property 
in Russia. They did not pay attention to corruption and growing role of mafia and ex- 
communist officials in privatization process. The main two proponent of the shock therapy, 
Anders Aslund and Andrei Shleifer believed that private property was realized truly by the 
help of voucher privatization.
“As a result, 14 percent of the population or 21 million Russians enjoyed direct ownership of shares, and 
an addition^ 30 percent or 44 million had indirect ownership. These numbers are truly impressive. 
Although voucher auctions only privatized one-fifth of the shares of 14,000 large and medium-size 
enterprises, voucher privatization was towering event in the privatization process. The distribution of 
vouchers attracted extraordinary attention and was the theme of much government propaganda and 
information. Voucher privation served to redress the imbalance between insiders and outsider in the 
privatization process. Otherwise, people would have felt excluded from privatization and their 
dissatisfaction could have blocked the process. Moreover, information about voucher auctions from the 
privatization authorities and advertisements of voucher funds come to dominate televisions advertising. 
They helped to explain what privatization meant and brought people into the process. The transparency of 
the auctions undoubtedly helped to limit corruption, nomenklatura privatization, and public trust.” '^ ^
3.4.6. SmaU-scale Privatization
Financial Times, 27 March 1996
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While citizens got a smaller portion of the assets of large and mid-sized companies, 
their participation in private ownership of smaller businesses and apartments was large. In 
1992 nearly all firms with fewer than 200 employees were slated for privatization. The 
privatization offices in the country’s eight-nine regions held auctions and sold food stores, 
barbershops, beauty parlors, clothing shops, cafeterias, and bakeries for cash to the highest 
bidders. Because the local and regional governments got the proceeds from the sale of these 
shops and stores, they had powerful incentives to complete the sales quickly. Each region 
was given a monthly quota of enterprises to be sold, and they had to report their progress to 
Moscow. According to Joseph R.Blasi, small-scale privatization move forward rapidly and 
many Russian people took advantage of the freer economic climate and founded hundreds of 
thousands of small businesses each year of the economic reforms.
As Joseph R. Blasi mentioned: “ by late 1995, 105,111 retail stores -  six of every ten 
stores throughout the country -had become privately owned. About 1,000 small busineses a 
month were still being privatized in 1995. Usually the stores’ employees bought them, 
though outsiders gained ownership of some of them.'“^
Small-scale privatization had reached full speed in August 1992, and on average 5,000 
to 6,000 enterprises a month were privatized between August 1992 and April 1993. By the 
end of 1992, 46,815 enterprises had been privatized. By the end of 1993, about 89,000 
enterprises had been privatized, including more than 70 percent of all small enterprises. By 
September 1, 1994, the number of privatized enterprises had risen to 106,000.'^®
Privatization of housing has moved slowly. By early 1995, only a third of apartments 
had been privatized -about 11 million apartments -  and about a half million apartments were 
still being privatized each quarter of 1995. Citizens must apply to receive title to their
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apartments. This implied full property rights, including the right to sell, lease and bequeath
their flats. Local authorities were in charge of privatizing flats. The cost was negligible.
Initially people were hesitant to acquire title to their apartments. Under communism, rents
were low, representing a slight percentage of the tenant’s monthly income. Utilities were
heavily subsidized, and the state paid for insurance on the apartments. The main incentive for
ownership was the ability to sell the apartment, turn it to a son or daughter, or rent it.
“One government study finds that many tenants fear that private ownership will require them to pay 
heavily for maintenance and insurance and subject them to discriminatory property taxes. Since the 
typical apartment house still contained unprivatized apartments in 1996, the state continued to pay the 
building’s operating and maintenance costs.”*^’
In the end, several million citizen gained ownership in the privatization of small 
businesses and about 12 million in the privatization of apartments. Again here, it was clear 
one more time that most of the Western evaluation of the Russian privatization is based on 
the speed and numbers rather than the form of ownership. The proponent of the shock 
therapy paid little attention to the growing role of mafia and nomenklatura in the 
privatization process in Russia.
3.4.7. The Mafia as a Corporate Power
Throughout the transition period, the Russian Mafia proved itself to be a corporate 
power. The Russian Mafia, throughout the transition period capitalized their assets, converted 
privileges enjoyed by custom into property defended by right. Together with the 
nomenklatura, they have purchased a majority of state-owned assets by using the 
privatization process into their advantage. The Russian government’s Analytic Center for 
Social and Economic Policies reported on January 17, 1994, that gangs controlled about 
40,000 businesses, including 2,000 in the state sector.'^® On February 17, 1994 the 
Economist reported that private enterprises were forced to pay 10 to 20 percent of their
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earnings to criminal gangs, and that 150 such gangs controlled some 40,000 private and state- 
run companies and most of the country’s 1,800 commercial banks.'^' In 1995 the head of the 
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology said that the government believed that criminal 
structures in the state control over 50 percent of all economic entities. The institute reported 
that 40 percent of all entrepreneurs and 66 percent of all commercial structures were then 
involved in criminal relations, and that the Mafia had established control over 35,000 
economic entities, including 400 banks, 47 currency exchanges, and 1500 enterprises in the 
state sector. Quoting calculations by the Academy of Sciences’ Analytic center, the report 
stated that the practice of exacting tribute from commercial in the form of stock and 
transferred 35 percent of all capital and 80 percent of all voting shares into the hands of 
criminals. The Russian Mafia exports its capital to foreign bank accounts and then 
reintroduces it into the country as foreign investment in the name of foreign companies.
The report of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology referred to a finding by 
the Interior Ministry that 15,00 criminal associations divided the country into sphere of 
influence, and that the sphere of commercial activity was expanding beyond small time 
racketeering. The report mentioned that criminal structures involved in some very 
remunerative spheres of legitimate businesses: finance, export-import operations in the fuel 
and power complex, etc. The Interior Ministry also reported that 49 criminal gangs, 
operating, in Moscow, with 4,000 members, 257 bosses, and 7 kingpins; with money 
invested banking and financial structures they opened stores, restaurants, casinos, and 
automotive service enterprises. Several of the top 200 companies were reported to rely on 
criminal elements to prevent the buying of the shares. Several brokers who bought the shares
Economist. 17 February 1994
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of one firm were killed. In 1995, the Russian Business Roundtable lost nine of its thirty top 
officials to assassins. Forty-five business people were assassinated from 1993 to 1996.'^^
These claims on the Russian economy were subject to enormous discussion. Those 
who have optimist view of the Russian economic transition accepted that Mafia influence 
was most evident in the small business sector. In their words, ‘The Mafia is growing. But the 
influence that has been ascribed to it is in far in excess of the hard evidence.”'^ '* They denied 
the idea that Russian economy was on the edge of criminality. They accepted the fact that the 
reports were pointing toward gradual infiltration of large companies but not yet domination 
of them. Their question was: To what extent these figures refer to the 17, 937 mid-sized and 
large privatized enterprises that are at the center of Russian economy? They emphasized, 
“with the exception of the expensive commodity industries, such as metals and oil, where 
corruption began before privatization, there is little hard evidence that the Mafia owns these 
co m p a n i e s . T h ey  assumed the above-mentioned estimations to be referring to new 
businesses and places where criminal influence was widespread, such as small retail 
businesses and hotels. In their words,
‘This estimate then applies primarily to smaller enterprises, and it appeared at a moments when elements 
in the Academy of Sciences sympathetic to the old Communist order were regularly issuing press releases 
condemning privatization. The 1994 estimate of 40,000 businesses under criminal control and 2,000 in 
the state sector must be examined carefully. By January 1994 about 89,000 enterprises had been 
privatized. More than 90 percent of them were small retail shops. More than half of all-mid-sized and 
large enterprises had not been privatized by late 1993, when this estimate was prepared. The “40,000 
businesses” referred to in 1994 were four times the number of mid-sized and large enterprises were 
privatized at that time and twice the number of large enterprises in existence. Moreover, our surveys, 
reports streaming into the privatization ministry from all regions, and press reports indicated that a 
majority of the shares went to employees initially. If the 40,000 firms cited included most or all of the 
larger firms that had been privatized, organized crime would have had to take over the entire privatization 
process in eighty-nine regions; they had to have forced employees to sign their names to documents 
declaring a preference for majority employee ownership and subscribing for shares in thousands of 
enterprises with the collusion of Privatization Ministry bureaucrats in all of those regions -all in about 
eleven months. Clearly the 1994 estimate must refer mainly to small enterprises, and one must pay 
attention to the actual assertions in the government report cited by the Economist that criminal elements 
“controlled” these businesses and were demanding payments. If these estimates are correct, the 
reasonable assumption is that the “criminal control” took the form of the gangs’ well-documented and 
widely reported practice of demanding protection money from start-up small businesses and recently
ibid., p. 119 
ibid., p.l20 
ibid., pp. 115-116
117
privatized small shops. Many observers view thisjjractice as a private attempt to offer protection that the 
police could not provide in a transitional period.
They also did not pay attention to the fact that Mafia was very influential in collecting 
the shares of the companies, and they asked:
“Can it be true that 80 percent of corporate shares and 30 percent of capital are controlled by criminals? 
Not likely. Criminal elements are probably influential chiefly in three areas: first, smaller privatized 
businesses and start-up firms, where a lot of cash changes hands and a small amount of effort in the area 
of loan sharking and protection can lead to easy profit with little overhead; second, smuggling and metals, 
and wholesale and retail outlets where products can quickly be turned into cash; and third, some 
proportion of very profitable large enterprises that produce such commodities or have access to them. But 
available evidence is simply insufficient to substantiate the assignment of 30 percent or 80 percent or any 
other figure to this end. It would be bad Mafia businesses for the figure to be very large, because many 
big privatized firms are unprofitable, and even organized crime wants a risk-adjusted return.”'”
In this respect, they favored the insider privatization in the sense that the privatization
program’s strong emphasis on insider ownership was an important obstacle to the organized
crime members in their attempts at acquiring control over enterprises. In their words,
“It may be true, as police reports indicate, that organized crime criminals want to move their money into 
legitimate businesses and invest in undervalued Russian stocks, but the privatization strong emphasis on 
insider ownership and control has made entry to the larger enterprises costly. Indeed, management’s 
maneuvers to keep out outside investors may have served to keep out organized crime in the early
stages.’*138
As was clear in the above-mentioned statements, they involved the reliability of the 
estimations. In their words, “even if the estimate is correct, the numbers do not bear out the 
charge that the entire privatization process was criminalized.”’^  ^They were not in conscious 
the fact that the Russian economy was showing the signs of evolution towards Western-style 
capitalism on the one hand and the consolidation of corporatist, criminal-style capitalism on 
the other In the middle of 1990s, the Western conventional wisdom was emphasizing the 
former and thus was seeing Russia moving steadily toward market economy. They were not 
even mentioning about the danger of criminality in the small businesses sector.
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3.5. Agriculture
The situation in agriculture was more complicated. As Anders Aslund pointed out 
private ownership of a farm enjoyed a popular approval rating of 75 percent or more.''“ 
About 50 million Russian families have agricultural plots and enjoying working the land. 
Family farming had begun as one of the forms of lease under Gorbachev at the beginning of 
1990, but scale was limited. At the end of 1990, there were 4,400 private farms."" The 
Russian reformers had emphasized on the land reform at the Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies, which adopted the Law on the Peasant Farm and the Law on Land Reform as early 
as November and December 1990. The Law on the Peasant Farm gave individuals the right 
to leave collective and state farms with their shares of communal land and assets. However, 
the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies refused to adopt the law before it was amended 
with the stipulations that no land could be resold within ten years. In addition, the farm’s 
general meeting should decide what assets would go to a peasant farm. The number of 
peasant farms increased by about 45,000in 1991."*  ^ However, property rights to land 
remained limited and the RSFSR Constitution did not recognize private ownership of land, 
although it was accepted in the Law on Land Reform of December 1990."*^
Real land reform became a main focus by the Russian reformers throughout the 
transition years in Russia. The agrarian lobby, however, gained support in Congress of 
People’s Deputies. In April 1992, the majority of the Russian People’s Deputies voted 
against allowing private land ownership. This strong opposition made it difficult to change 
the constitution. In December 1992, the Democratic Russia movement carried out a 
campaign to gather signatures for a referendum on land reform. The campaign was 
successful; 1,9 million signatures were collected, although one million more were needed to
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force a referendum. The Congress of People’s Deputies was thus forced to give in to the 
demands. In the end, the Congress of People’s Deputies gave limited rights to sell land.''*'*
The agrarian reform was complicated more than ever before when Yeltsin assigned 
the task of carrying out agrarian reform to Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi from February 
1992 to April 1993. Aleksandr Rutskoi gave in to the demands of the agrarian lobby. He 
soon decided that the country could not afford to set up more family farms. Instead, he 
preferred the idea of setting up large agroindustrial companies with massive inflows of state 
subsidies. The agricultural sector continued to be the largest recipient of government 
subsidies. And the Central Bank continued to believe in credits to enterprises.
Although popular aspirations for agricultural reform were high, the mighty agrarian 
lobby, which was composed of the heads of some 25,000 kolkhozy and sovkhozy, countered 
these aspirations enormously. These agrarian barons had no interest in the privatization of 
agriculture. On the contrary they wanted to maintain their kolkhosy and sovkhozy, as well as a 
maximum of regulations and subsidies.
The difficulty in reaching at true agrarian reform could only be understood in the 
politics of lobbyism, which gained momentum in 1992. As mentioned before, two former 
general directors of military-industrial enterprises, Georgy Khizha and Vlademir Schumeiko, 
became prime ministers. Georgy Khizha was supervising the military industrial complex. 
Simultaneously, the general director of Gazprom, Viktor Chernomyrdyn, became deputy 
minister for energy. The agrarian lobbyists were influential in 1992 and in the spring of 1993, 
Aleksandr Zaveryukha, a true agrarian lobbyist, joined government deputy prime minister for 
agriculture. Khizha, Chernomyrdin, and Zaveryukha all fought for the interest of their 
lobbies. In addition, the agrarian lobby was tightly organized with the Agrarian Union, which 
sponsored the Agrarian Party in the parliamentary elections in December 1992. In the end.
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they fought against all attempts at true agrarian reforms in Russia and they made success to a 
considerable extent as well.
In the face of all these difficulties, the reform government tried to introduce a law that 
would allow private ownership of land. The Supreme Soviet, however, opposed it bitterly 
On October 27, 1993, Yeltsin finally issued a decree, “On the Regulation of Land Relations 
and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia,” which gave full approval of private 
ownership of land. With the introduction of this law, it became permissible t buy and sell and 
as well as to use it as collateral. In fact, this decree had been prepared in the sense that it 
would prepare the road for the to break up of state and collective farms. However, the 
agrarian lobbyists were far from any such ideas on the disintegration of state and collective 
farms since they were very vital to their political presence and material well-being. State and 
collective farms were very unproductive and inefficient. For instance, although private plots 
comprised very little of the total agricultural land, they were very productive and efficient. At 
the same time, government supported all attempts at setting up family farms. The expansion 
of the family farms continued after the disintegration of the USSR. 134,000 new family 
farms were set up in 1992 and 87,000 in 1993.This expansion started to fall due to the 
disappearance of the state subsidies in 1993. In the second half of 1993, only 12,000 new 
family farms were added, and 7,000 in 1994, One another prominent reason behind this fall 
was state and collective farms, because family farms were highly dependent on them.
The government also supported to use of private plots. New legal provisions were 
introduced for lull private ownership of the plots. Interestingly, although these private plots 
had comprised 2 percent of agricultural land, they accounted for 24 percent of gross 
agricultural production. From 1991 to 1993, the area of private plots was increased to 5 
percent of agricultural land in 1993 and they accounted for 36 percent of gross agricultural
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product. The owners of private plots reached at total number of 50 million in 1993 and they 
were very productive. Under the impact of new legal provisions, anyone who desired could 
have a private plot. Private plots were supposed to be privatized to their tenants.
In the end, in the face great resistance from the agrarian lobbyists, the government 
failed in breaking up the power of state and collective farms. The situation in the agricultural 
sector became more and more complex. Although the retail food prices increased rapidly 
during 1991-94, the financial situation of the agricultural sector deteriorated in this period. 
Prices of agricultural input increased sharply while procurement prices increased by less. 
Profitability in agriculture appeared to have declined 40 percent between 1991 and the first 
half of 1994.*''® However, as Anders Aslund pointed out the agricultural sector received large 
subsidies and credits, which, because of the high rate of inflation, were virtual gifts. An 
attempt was made in late 1993 to reform and liberalize agricultural prices, but following the 
agrarian lobby’s gains in the December 1993 parliamentary election, credits were 
reintroduced. A number of monopolistic, quasi-public agricultural procurement and 
importing enterprises continued to operate under the cover of price regulations and 
compulsory food deliveries to the state. Importers of agricultural goods continued to receive 
large subsidies.
The supporter of the shock therapy severely emphasized the importance of a true 
agricultural reform in Russia. The true agricultural reform could not be realized in Russia 
throughout the transition years due to the above-mentioned facts.
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CHAPTER IV: THE RESULTS OF SHOCK THERAPY AND THE WESTERN 
PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC CHANGE IN RUSSIA IN 1992-95
Shock therapy was supposed to bring about a rapid transformation of the Russian 
economy, building an efficient, technologically progressive, consumer-oriented prosperous 
capitalist market system. What has actually happened in this period? Has shock therapy 
worked in the manner that its advocates had predicted? Who has gained and who has lost 
from this policy? These were the questions pervaded the Western world in the early transition 
years.
As mentioned before Russian economic transformation was fascinating story on many 
grounds. Russian economic transformation was subject to great debates in the Western world. 
While some were arguing that Russia was a distorted picture of capitalism with robber barons, 
mafia, universal theft, economic stagnation and impoverishment for millions of Russian 
people, others argued that Russia was moving to a normal market economy.
4.1. The Result of the Shock Therapy
Free pricing was supposed to bring an increase output -the expected “supply 
response.” Store shelves in Moscow and St Petersburg rapidly filled up with a rapid wide 
variety of goods for sale, and this development cited with approval by the Western media. The 
appearance of small-scale street traders in Moscow was accepted as both sign of private 
market behavior and the evidence of supply response to the price liberalization.' This 
development was assumed to be the upcoming signs of Russian market behavior.
The critiques of the shock therapy argued that this did not result from any upturn in 
production. Instead, the only increase in supply came from an influx of previously unavailable 
imported goods. The sudden surplus in the markets was due, not to increased supply, but to a
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drastic drop in consumer purchasing power as rising prices placed many goods beyond the 
reach of many households.^
After the shock therapy was introduced, Russia experienced a severe decline in 
production sphere. It was such a decline that still continuing at the turn of the century. 
Figure 1.1 shows the decline in several indicators of overall economic activity in Russia 
during 1990-1995. During the four years following the introduction of Western neo-liberal 
ideas into the Russian economy, GDP fell by 42 per cent and industrial production by 46 per 
cent. Figure 1.1 shows that agricultural output also declined steadily although not as rapidly 
as did GDP or industrial production. Investment suffered a total collapse. This was a great 
problem that threatened the future of the Russian economy.
There was a great fall in each individual sectors and individual products in the Russian 
economy. Figure 1.2 and 1.3 shows the output performance of the eleven sectors of Russian 
industrial production. As these figures showed, during the shock therapy period from 1992 
through 1995 all of the sectors experienced large declines in output. Only electric power and 
fuel declined by less than one-third. Light-industry -which includes textiles, clothing, and 
leather goods -suffered the worst decline of the group. As seen in the figures, the metal and 
chemical sectors have finally begun to grow and fuel stopped declining in 1995. There was 
also a decline in other individual sectors of the Russian economy. Figure 1.4 and 1.5 shows 
the decline in other sectors in the early transformation years.
The price inflation led by shock therapy led to enormous deformities in the Russian 
economy. Before the introduction of the shock therapy in Russia, there was a hidden or 
suppressed inflation in Russia. Soviet consumer price inflation was less than 2 per cent per 
year in the 1980s and 5.6 percent in 1990.  ^ After prices were freed in January 1992, consumer
 ^David M. Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution From Above; The Demise of the Soviet System. (London; 
Routledge, 1997), p.l73
 ^ International Monetary Fund, Economic Review; The Economy of the Former USSR in 1991. (Washington 
DC: The International Monetary Fund, 1992)
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prices rose by 2,500 per cent over the course of 1992 (31.2 per cent per month). Inflation 
gradually slowed over the following three years, but in the last three months of 1995 
consumer prices were still rising at 4.1 per cent per month, or 63 per cent on annual 
basis.'*(See the figure 1.6)
By the end of 1995, consumer prices had risen by a factor of 1,411 compared to year- 
end 1991 and by a factor of 3,668 compared to year-end 1990. As mentioned before, a ride on 
the metro, Moscow’s subway system which cost 5 kopeks (0.05) rubles in 1991 had risen to 
400 rubles by June of 1995. A kilogram of beef rose from 2 rubles in Moscow shops in 
January 1991 to 3,187 rubles in June 1994.  ^ The persistent rapid inflation undermined the 
hopes for economic recovery.
The combination of depression and rapid inflation sharply decreased the real incomes of 
Russian wage earners and pensioners. In the face of rapid price increases, the ruble rate of pay 
of Russian workers also rose. The average monthly wage and salary earnings in Russia rose 
from 297 rubles in 1990 to 595,000 rubles by October 1995.*^  While 2,000-fold increase in 
ruble earnings over five years could not keep up with rising consumer prices. As a result, real 
earning fell during this period. The figure 1.7 shows, in 1992 average real pay fell 68 per cent 
of its 1990 level, climbed slightly in 1993, and then fell to 48 per cent of the 1990 level by 
1995. The situation of the pensioners got even worse. The minimum pension fell and reached 
25 per cent of its 1990 level by 1995.
In this period it became increasingly common for employees, to be paid late or to be 
paid only a fraction of their official wage. In March 1995 unpaid wages in industry.
* Vincent Koen, “Measuring the Transition; A User’s View on National Accounts in Russia.” (IMF Working 
Paper, January 1995)
 ^Kotz and Weir, op.cit., p. 177
‘’International Monetary Fund, Economic Reviews 1995: Russian Federation. (Washington DC: The 
International Monetary Fund, 1994)
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agriculture and construction alone amounted to an estimated 5.3 trillions rubles, which was 
about 22 per cent of the total wage and salary bill of Russia that month.’
The Russian people including employees, workers, pensioners constituted the losing part 
in the Russian economic transformation. Their situation gets worse and worse each year. In 
the Western world, many were paying attention to this aspect of the Russian economic 
change:
By early 1995 the real earnings of the average Russian worker had fallen by more than 50 per cent. Many 
people survived by buying only food. Many Russian urban residents spent their weekends cultivating 
their patotes and other vegetables at their small dacha outside the city, to survive the collapse of their 
money income. Rents and utilities remained relatively inexpensive. Purchases of clothing were 
postponed as long as possible, and new household durables became out of reach for the average Russian 
family.*
The interesting development was that huge decline in production did not bring a 
massive unemployment. The official unemployment rate reached a mere 3.0 per cent of the 
labor force in June 1995. Together with those who failed to be registered as unemployed, the 
number of o-unemployed reached to 7.7 per cent by June 1995.  ^The reason is that Russian 
enterprises, despite many of them were privatized, have not acted in the traditional capitalist 
behavior. Although the demand for their products has collapsed, enterprise directors have 
laid off few its workers. Traditional practices do not die easily and long tradition of 
paternalism towards employees has made Russian enterprises reluctant to cut costs by 
reducing the work force. The privatization program also was one another reason behind such 
development in the ground that the Russian managers needed the shares of workers to 
become leading one in the management of the enterprises. In this respect, it would be unwise 
to fire workers since they would sell their shares to the outsiders.
In the face of sharp drop in sales, instead of firing workers, some of the Russian 
enterprises diverted their production into other spheres such as producing for the warehouse.
 ^ International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation -Statistical Appendix. IMF Staff Country Report.
(Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 1995)
* Kotz and Weir, op.cit., p.l80
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Many observers reported factory warehouses stocked with goods in the early transition years. 
For example, in 1992, while only 400,000 passenger automobiles were sold in Russia, 1 
million were produced in Russia. That same year factories produced 3.2 million refrigerators 
and freezers despite selling only 1.1 million.**^  This example was important evidence that the 
inflation had hit the purchasing power of Russian people terribly.
In terms of foreign trade, although Russian foreign trade was about a total collapse at 
beginnings of 1990s, Russia foreign trade recovered .slowly in 1993 and 1994. Exports 
outside the FSU fell by 40 per cent and imports declined by about 55 per cent in 1990 and 
1992. This decline stopped in 1992 as Russian foreign trade regime became more open. In 
1991, trade between the former members of the Council for Mutual Assistance (CMEA) 
collapsed. In 1992 and 1993 the same thing happened to trade between the FSRs. The 
volume of Russia’s trade with FSRs declined by half from 1991 to 1993. Russia was 
compelled to reduce its exports to other FSRs, because they lacked international financing 
and were having repayment problems. Russia’s recorded trade surplus towards FSRs was 5.3 
per cent of GDP inl992. This was reduced to 3.2 percent of GDP IN 1993, when Russia’s 
total exports to the FSRs amounted to less than $14 billion. Russia’s total exports were about 
$57 billion in 1993.Export outside the FSU recovered slowly in 1993 and 1994.Basic export 
materials were oil and gas. Since their prices were still under regulation, and no real 
macroeconomic stabilization occurred in Russia, Russian enterprises were forced to export to 
survive. In this period, Russia’s three export markets were Ukraine, Germany, and 
China. "(See table 1.8)
Russian import continued to decline in the early transition years. It was about one-third 
of 1990 level in 1993. As result, Russia gained an impressive trade surplus of $16 billion in 
1993 and $12 billion in 1994. This situation made it possible for Russia to build up its
10ibid.jery F.Hough, “ Russia -On the Road to Thermidor,” Problems of Post Communism. 41 Fall, 1994, pp.26-32
127
international reserves in 1 9 9 3 . Foreign trade in Russia was very subject to comiption and 
criminality. This would be discussed later.
In the Russian economic transformation, not everyone fared badly. There were gainers 
and losers. The Western media captured this fact in the early transition years. A CBS News 
poll conducted a in Russia in May 1995 found that, while 66 per cent of the respondents said 
they were worse off than they had been before perestroika began, 16 percent said they were 
better off.'^ The top officers of some of the new banks became very wealthy. One study 
reported that, of the 50 richest and most influential members of the Russian business elite, 25 
were bankers.*'* Others were ex-nomenkaltura members who profited the transitional years 
enormously. As Marshall Goldman pointed out, 60 per cent of the owners of the newly 
privatized enterprises were Party officials or former factory managers.*^
The situation of Russian banks was another evidence in terms of showing the way of 
Russian economic change. As John Lloyd mentioned, “ From the beginning the new financial 
structures grasped their goal -to make money.”'  ^The new banks made money from money, 
instead funding the production. The highly inflationary environment of Russia provided them 
with enormous opportunities. As John Lloyd pointed out.
in“Easiest of all was to take ruble deposits, change them into dollars, then pay back the depositors ... 
deflated rubles which, even with apparently generous interest, left a substantif gain. The explosion of 
trading in previously scarce or forbidden foreign commodities was among the most popular activities: 
trade finance was - if  carefully done -  a virtual guarantee of profit. When they loaned, they did so at very 
high rates of interest, and for three or four months at the most. Another purpose of the security armies 
was to ensure that repayments were made promptly and in full (a large cause of assassinations was the 
failure to make such repayments.)”
The new commercial banks were finance department or channel banks, which were set 
up by large enterprises to channel state funds and to conduct money operation for them. For
12
‘Anders Asliind. How Russia Became a Market Economy Washington. D.C.:Brooking Institution, p281-282 
ibid.
'^Reported by the Associated press. New York, 10 May 1995, (See, Kotz and Weir, op.cit., p.l81) 
Business World Weekly, 9 August 1994 
The Wall Street Journal, 13 February 1996
John Lloyd, Rebirth of a Nation; An Anatomy of Russia. (Lx)ndon;Penguin Group, 1998), p.282
17 ;ibid p.288
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example, Gasprom had three major banks -  Imperial, Mosbiznesnank and Gazprom bank. 
The oil sector has also four different banks, called Tokobank, Neftekhimbank, 
Zapsibkombank and Yugorsky Bank; the first of these was in the top of the emerging 
banking houses. Gazprom together with Lukoil established the Imperial Bank. There were 
also other commercial banks and most of them were accused of being ‘mafia’ bank. As John 
Lloyd emphasized they were used to launder money.'® There were also other accusations 
about these commercial banks on the ground that they used state credits for their enrichment. 
As Anders Aslund pointed out:
‘The subsidized aedits were primarily directed towards three kind of enterprises: agrarian enterprises, 
energy enterprises, and enterprises in the northern regions of Russia. However, those credits were 
channeled through about 10 commercial banks, the so-calied court banks, which sat on the credits for a 
long time and used them for their own profit. That was a major source of enrichment.””
In Russia’s inflationary atmosphere, the bankers and their banks grew and got very rich. 
The bank and the new banker involved in the privatization process. They acquired the most 
valuable enterprises of the Russian economy through loans-for-scheme deal. In the famous 
“loans for shares’’ deal of 1995, Boris Yeltsin handed over control of the largest oil 
companies and the Norilsk nickel consortium at a fraction of their true worth to a small group 
of people in return for their support in the 1996 presidential elections. This act consolidated 
the new oligarchs in their effective command of economy and the government.
The new banking elite was originated from the leaders of Komsomol under the Soviet 
regime. In the perestroika period, they had started to taste the fruits of the capitalism by 
involving in trade. For example, Vladimir Gusinsky, who established the Most Group, was 
selling computer equipment during perestroika period. One another example, Mikhael 
Friedman, who established the Alpha Group, was selling carpets during perestroika period. 
Some prominent figures of the reform group in the transition years entered the banking 
sector. Both Pyotr Aven and Konstantin Kagalovsky, members of the rapid reform advocates,
” ibid, p.287
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became bankers, in the Alpha and Menatep Groups respectively; Sergei Dubynin, finance 
rninister after Boris Fyodorov, joined Imperial Bank (sat on the Gasprom board) until he was 
appointed chairman of the Central Bank at the end of 1995.^ *^  The prominent prime minister
o f the Gorbachev years, Nikolai Ryzhkov, who had a deep belief in the regulated economy,
21became chairman of Tveruniversal Bank and got very rich.
In the mid-nineties, the business people of Russia had become a large, powerful group, 
which has made great wealth for many of its members. They were very influential not only 
business but also in politics and media. One prominent figure, called Boris Brezovsky 
became an important actor not only in Russian economy but also in politics. He was the main 
supporter of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 presidential election. The logovaz under Boris Berezovsky 
became the force in the Russian market for foreign cars, especially BMWs, Mercedes, and 
Volvo. He also involved in media by taking 16 per cent of the Ostankino first channel (ORT) 
and buying Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 1995. Vladimir Gusinsky was the most prominent figure 
in the media. He bought Sevodnya and the NTV channel in 1993. He had close relations with 
Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov who had enriched himself through property deals in 1994. 
Gusinsky’s the Most group also funded political parties’ of both Gaidar and Yavlinsky.^^ In 
the end, Gaidar received financial and political support from a number of leading bankers. 
One another prominent figure was Oleg Boyko, the chief executive of Konsern Olbi, a 
financial holding company, and president of Bank Natsiolni Kredit. Boyko was a key backer 
of Gaidar who served as deputy chairman and chief financial officer of Gaidar’s Russia’s 
Choice political party.^^ This new rich class was the most who profited from the Russian
”  Anders Aslund, “Reform Vs. ‘Rent- Seeking’ In Russia’s Economic Transformation,’’ Transition, 26 January
1996, p.l4 
Lloyd, op.cit., p.288
Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy, and Andrej Rapaczynski, “Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face’’, 
Tran.sition. 26 January 1996, p.5 
Lloyd. op.cit., pp.289-303
*See the Chapter 3’s privatization part to grasp how privatization program led to enrichment of some prominent 
officials at the expense of Russian people.
Kommersant Daily, 14 September 1995
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economic transformation and that’s why they were great supporter of the ongoing reform 
policies. In 1995 Grigory Yavlinsky, who was a liberal economist and political leader of 
Yabloko, criticized the Yeltsin government for its capitulation to a small business elite that 
was getting rich on its economic policies. The new business people were also highly 
corrupt figures. For example, the Harvard Russian economy specialist Marshall Goldman 
accused Vladimir Gusinsky of having mafia connections.
The new rich class got rich through gaining ownership of privatized raw materials firms 
such as oil, gas and automotive enterprises, or by investment in real estate and housing 
construction. Meanwhile, as figure l.I showed, there happened little productive investment 
took place in Russia in the early transition years. The true paradox of the privatization was 
that it allowed the members of the nomenklatura to achieve something they could not have 
hoped for even under communism. Some other politicians are reputed to have become 
wealthy, including two successive mayors of Moscow, Gavril Popov and Yury Luzhkov.^^ 
Not only politicians but also other officials such as ex-KGB’S prominent figures were also in 
the struggle to become rich. For example. General Oleg Kalugin, Russia’s one time dissident 
KGB general, became one of his country’s richest man, trading around the world in scrap
• 27steel from decrepit state factories.
It is widely in discussed in the Western Media that the new rich class have sent large 
amount of money abroad for safekeeping. It was estimated that capital flight probably 
reached a total $60 billion to $73 billion between 1992 and 1996. Estimates of the capital 
flight during 1992-1994 range from $50 billion claimed by the Central Bank of Russia to as 
much as $100 billion.^^ It was interesting in the ground that this capital flight exceeded the 
combined inflow of Western direct investment and official aid during those years, which
New York Times, 14 September 1995 
Lloyd, op.cit.. p.288 
Wall Street .iournal. 13 February 1994 
”  Frydman, Murphy, and Rapaczynski, op.cit., p.7
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totaled to $19.4 billion.^’ Those opponents of the shock therapy in the Western media paid 
attention to this aspect of the Russian economic transformation and argued that shock therapy 
prompted a capital outflow from Russia instead of the desired capital inflow. The Russian 
capital was moving to the accounts in Switzerland instead of being invested in the Russian 
enterprises for restructuring in terms of technology and management.
A growing gap emerged between the majority, whose living standards dropped rapidly, 
and a minority who have done well under shock therapy. The opponents of the ongoing 
reform policies criticized the reform policies harshly in the ground that the implementation of 
the shock therapy not only changed the choices of Russian people but also hit the health of 
Russian people.
‘Talented young people in Russia started to dream about becoming bankers, not scientists, whose low 
salaries made it difficult to meet ends to survive. The quality and availability of health care declined 
sharply as the government subsidy was reduced. Many young doctors sought to emigrate. Public health 
services also declined. As a consequence, there have been epidemics of diseases rarely seen in Russia in 
the past. In the summer of 1993 a cholera epidemic hit southern Russia, and 15,210 cases of diphtheria 
were recorded in Russia in 1993.” °^
Their critics were also pointing to the right things while they were carrying the 
elements of nostalgia for the past.
“Russian science one of the most impressive achievements of the old regime, has suffered along with the 
economy. Russian research institutes had their budget slashed and were told to find projects that could be 
self-supporting. Some of Russia’s world-class research scientists have had to spend their summers, not 
working on research, but tutoring American high-school students in order to keep groceries on the 
table.^' For example, others left science to take accounting of jobs at banks, responding to the financial 
incentives. In a unique science version of cheap foreign labor, American corporations have hired top­
flight Russian scientists to work for them in Russia, at wages that are a small fraction of their of what 
they would pay for US researchers.’’^ ^
OMRI Daily Digest. Part I, No. 122, 23 June 1995
Economic Commission for Europe (1995) Economic Survey of Europe in 1994-95. (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations, 1995)
New York Times. 2 October 1994
High school students from New Jersey and Long Island, gearing up for the Westinghouse science competition, 
were able to pay to spend a summer under the tutelage of some of Russia’s top molecular biologists, protein 
physiologists, and biochemist in Pushchino, Russia. (New York Times. 25 July 1995)
In May 1992, Bell Labs paid for two Russian physicists, leading expert in waves and non-linear optics at the 
huge General Physics Institute, to do research for Bell labs. They were paid 5,000 rubles per month, or $11 at the 
current exchange rate. In that same month Coming, Inc., hired 115 scientists and technicians from two Russian 
research institutes. Sun Microsystems has hired large numbers of Russian computer scientists. (New York 
Times. 11 January 1993)
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Organized crime in Russia was another favorite media topic in the Western world. A 
report prepared fro Yeltsin in 1994 found that 70 to 80 per cent of private banks and 
businesses in major cities were forced to make payments of 10 to 20 per cent of their 
revenues to organized crime.^^ The head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s organized crime 
section estimated that 20 per cent of Russian bank loans were actually payments to “mafia” 
organizations.^'* The organized crime was very obvious and violent. As Konstantin Borovoi, 
chairman of Russian Commodities & Raw Materials Exchange and one of Russia's most 
prominent businessmen, explained: ‘The mafia is an attempt to imitate the government. It 
has its own tax system, its own security service and its own administrative system.”
Their activities were ranging from the export of natural resources, the smuggling of 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, managing privatization, banking to drug and prostitute 
traffic. The banking system became a criminal bonanza. Most of the commercial banks were 
under the control Russian mafia. For organized crime groups banking sector was very crucial 
in money laundering and to facilitate their money operations. To facilitate money-laundering 
operations, which permit the disposal of the profits from organized crime, Russian banks 
established ties to banks in Antiqua, the Cayman Islands. Even, they established banks 
there.^^ The Russian Interior Ministry officials estimated that $25 billion was transferred 
from Commonwealth states to Western banks by organized crime structures in 1993.^^The 
organized crime members killed 120 bank employees, including 15 directors, in 1993, and 
bank offices were subjected to 780 arsons, and explosion that year.^* At the same year, Sergei 
Yegorov, president of the Association of banks wrote a letter to President Yeltsin 
complaining “all of society and new financial and entrepreneurial institutions have become
New York Times. 30 January 1994 
ibid.
Paul, Klebnikov.,“Joe Stalin’s Heirs” Forbes. 27 September 1993, Vol 152. Issue 7, pl24 
http://open.academic. n2k.coin/canvas.cgi
Stephen Handelman, “The Russian Mafia: Politics by other Means,” Foreign Affairs. May/April 94, Vol.73 
p.87
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the well-organized, well-equipped bandits.”^^  At least two members of the Russian 
parliament were murdered during 1994-1995, with organized crime believed to be 
responsible/®
It was true of evidences that organized crime groups benefited from enormously 
transitional policies, especially from privatization process. It was reported that some 
residents of well-allocated Moscow apartments have been murdered in scams aimed at 
obtaining ownership of the recently privatized apartments.“*'
One another prominent area for organized crime members was smuggling. A large 
portion of Russia’s raw material exports is reported to be illegal. For example, border guards 
turned Russia’s border with Latvia into a sieve, as result, Latvia managed to export 238, 000 
tons of nonferrous metals in 1992 although it produces none.“*^ Oil smuggling was one 
another important area that Russian mafia involved in. The mob operators were very 
influential in Black Sea to transfer oil. Since oil prices remained regulated, they were at a 
fraction of world market prices. The difference between the domestic prices of oil and world 
market prices was one very important reason of the oil smuggling.
The big money is from oil exports, totaling $7 billion to the world market last year and an equal amount 
to the former Soviet republics, most of which now have to pay world prices. About half the exports have 
been going through the mafia-infested Spets-Export firms, which can buy oil at the low domestic price 
and sell at a market price 400% higher. Bribes and threats frequently accompany the granting of oil 
export quotas.
Boston Globe. 9 May 1994 
New York Times. 16 August 1993
Russian legislator Andrei Aizderdzi was shot to death at his home after the newspaper he owned printed the 
names of 266 organized crime figures (New York Times. 28 April 1994). Sergei Skorochkin, a businessman and 
parliamentary deputy, was kidnapped and slain on 1 February 1995. In a pervious incident, Mr. Skorochkin had 
shot dead a man whom he had identified as mafia agent. (New York Times. 3 February 1995)
When Moscow apartments were privatized, they were generally given to their current occupants. Those living 
in apartments in choice locations have been offered generous cash deals to trade their apartment for one in a less 
desirable location, along with an offer of transportation to the new apartment. However, they would not arrive at 
the new home. Moscow police reported the confirmed murder of 32 Muscovites, with an additional 1,750 
unaccounted for, in such apartment scams in the first three months of 1994. One police official suggested city 
officials in charge of apartment registrations were bribed to look the other way in such murderous scams. 
(Moscow Times. 4 June 1994)
'*^Handelman. op.cit.. p86 
Klebnikov, op.cit.. p.l27
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Combating export corruption is tough. Last month Foreign Economic Relations Minister Sergei Glaziev 
withdrew export privileges from all but five of the Spets-Export firms. Four days later he was fired.
It was highly reported that bribery became a common method of doing in Russia. An 
academic study of business in Moscow in 1993 found 80 per cent reported that bribes were 
required to do business. One Moscow businessman told in 1995 that he was able to obtain a 
30 to 40 per cent discount from state-owned suppliers of building materials in exchange for 
business.'*^
The opponent of the shock therapy argued that the rise of organized crime after 1991
related to the shock therapy strategy of reforms and turned Russia into a distorted caricature
of capitalism. In the western newspapers and journals, there was a great debate on the
definition, origin, nature, extent and influences of the Russian mafia on the Russian
economy. There were very many interesting and conflicting views of mafia in the Western
media. In the early years of transition mafia became one of the most explosive force in
Russian economic life. The Western commentators on the Russian economy underestimated
and misunderstood the influence of the Russian mafia on the Russian economy. Some
commentators believed that this was the price to be paid for transition to free market
economy. Some western commentators believed that it was evidence that points to early
stage of capitalism. As Stephen Handelman pointed out:
“Many Russian policy makers (and some foreigners) believe that corruption and crime are the price that 
must be paid for Russia’s experiment with free enterprise.“  The say that a period of lawlessness is part of 
price every society pays for radical economic change. Pointing to examples of Latin American 
economies, they suggest that without certain amount of robber-baron-style entrepreneurship, the 
consumer goods in most Russian cities would disappear.’’“”
According to George Melloan said,
“Russia is right now a bit like America west of Dodge City in the mid-1800.’’“'®
ibid.
“ Kotz and Weir, op.cit., p. 185 
Handelman. op.cit., p.87 
http://andrsn.stanford.edu/Other/redmaf.htm
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Michael Scammell, a professor of Russian literature at Cornell, argued,
‘Today’s corruption seems to be characteristic of a profound change and upheaval, when Russian society 
is in the stage (to paraphrase Marx) of the primitive accumulation of capital. The situation of should be 
compared not with profit-making today’s America but with the rough-and-tumble of America of a 
century ago, and the new entrepreneurs should be compared with the robber batons of those days.
Some economist argued, “ A corrupt market is preferable to no market.” ®^ There were
even some views about positive effects of Russian Mafia on the Russian economy.
“Corruption is one-way entrepreneurs can bypass cumbersome roadblocks. Similarly, if formal markets 
are rigid or monopolized by a small group, then a black market could be more efficient and promote 
growth. Citizens who made antiquated products for official markets could be more productive in a black 
market that is more responsive to demand. If current policies promote import substitution (and a ration 
import licenses), bribing an official to get an import license for a good for which your country lacks 
competitive advantage (and would otherwise produce at higher cost) should be beneficial to the national 
economy.”'"
There was also enormous discussion about the origins of the Russian mafia. Some 
argued that it was a result of the western originated transitional policies that mafia became 
the most explosive force in the transitional years. On the contrary, some argued that mafia 
was a fact of communist regime and claimed that Gorbachev reforms (Perestroika) 
accelerated the mafia and corruption by delimitating property rights.^^ Others questioned the 
transitional policies on the ground that how it led to enormous corruption in Russia. They 
questioned the privatization program enormously. For example, Thomas E. Weisskopf 
questioned voucher program enormously, said that voucher privatization program founded 
not only the cash basis of ftirther corruption in Russia but also legitimized the criminal 
earnings in Russia. He had warned that voucher program would not result in transfer of 
property to the people since inflation decreased the real purchasing power of people.^53
Wall Street .lournal. 16 March 1992 
New York Times. 26 December 1993
50 Kennedy Scott, “Comrade’s Dilemma: Corruption and Growth in Transition Economies,” Problems of Post- 
Communism, March /Apr 97, Vol.44 Issue 2, p.33
ibid.
Cameron Half, “The Russian Mafia: The Challenge of Reform,” Harvard International Review, Summer97, 
Vol.19, Issue 3, pp.54-56
For a detailed account of discussions, see also, http;//www.cato.org/dailvs/l-07-98.html 
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Indeed, privatization was one of the most controversial aspects of the transitional
policies. According to defenders of shock therapy it laid the foundation of institutional
change in Russia by giving property to the Russian people. They believed that privatization
was one of the most successful aspects of the transition in Russia. '^* The opponent of the
transitional policies believed that it was one main reason of corruption in Russia.
“Control and ownership of state enterprises were handed over to enterprise managers through worker 
buyouts with funds provided by their allies among informal entrepreneurs and organized crime groups. 
By 1996, this process of property transfer left the majority of the formal hierarchies in charge of 
privatized enterprises and left the banking industry almost exclusively in the hands of former informal 
entrepreneurs and organized crime groups. Organized crime groups that were left out of this transfer 
infiltrated banking sector through extortion enforced by contract killing of banking managers who 
refused to compromise. The formal hierarchies also handed over municipal properties to organized crime 
members at fractions of their values. As state enterprises and properties were almost being given away, 
competition among organized aim e groups to acquire them led to the gang wars of 1991-1992. The wars 
ended after the triumphant organized crime group bosses defined territorial and functional through 
informal agreements that guaranteed monopoly fights for each groups.”’^
Commentators on the Russian transition talked about the lack of legal code to prosecute 
corrupt government officials, define property rights, permit access to bank accounts, regulate 
banks, prevent money laundering, screen civil service applicants, inspect the source of 
foreign capital and soon. As Stephen Handelman pointed out:
“Under the existing system, police may arrest a group of felons caught in a criminal act, but the lack of 
Western-style conspiracy laws means police cannot prosecute the mastermind if he or she stays off scene. 
Under Soviet law, “racketeering” was considered a capitalist concept and therefore, inapplicable to 
Soviet reality. On the other hand, making a profit—“speculation,” a serious offense under the old Soviet 
criminal code—remains an ambiguous area for post-Soviet law enforcement. Provisions for settling 
disputes between private companies have yet to be clarified, no guidelines yet exist for establishing 
contracts or declaring bankruptcy. Russia has no independent Judiciary and no way of tackling more 
sophisticated varieties of white-collar crime. Currents laws offer no means of impounding the records of 
fraudulent companies or checking the criminal provenance of bank accounts. Even if such provisions 
existed, their enforcement would be doubtful. Russian policeman are so poorly equipped that some 
pursue criminals by bus and taxi. In such an environment, it is no wonder that crime flourishes.”^^
They presumed that If Russia had copied a Western legal code; it would not have fallen 
to victims to organized crime groups. Stephen Handelman criticized the Western countries
54
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and institutions rightly and proposed that Western countries should provide Russia with 
necessary legal help.
“Westerners underestimate the extent to which organized crime and corruption have hampered Russian 
political and economic reforms. Early assumptions that the introduction of free enterprise would smooth 
the way for democracy failed to take into account the lingering power of the former Soviet establishment. 
Organized crime has reinforced the old structures in their battle to retain control over key sectors of the 
economy and strengthened popular hostility toward the free-market democratic policies pursued by pro- 
Western reformers. The West should take Russian organized crime far more seriously than it has up until 
now. The current situation poses a double dilemma to policy makers in Western capitals. While internal 
Russian developments have moved once again to the top of the international agenda, the West has 
increasingly less influence over Russia’s domestic affairs. Western advice and financial assistance, albeit 
limited have been discredited by Russia’s bruising encounter with the chaos of the marketplace. 
Nationalist and authoritarian remedies are now descendant. But important areas of influence remain 
unexplored. The first area requires a conceptual change in economic aid policies and in strategies for 
developing the Russian market. Until recently, the West concentrated on helping Russia meet its 
international debt load while encouraging it to carry on with austerity policies. Since December elections, 
opinion shifted toward providing more overt support for social safety net programs as a way of easing 
economic discontent. But, these policies still do not address the central problem: the legal vacuum at the 
heart of the Russian economy. Western advice and assistance in creating a commercial structure, 
including a viable banking system and regulatory agencies, and in developing a legal framework for 
business activities would go far toward meeting the security concerns of Russian and foreign investors. 
International assistance in bringing Russia’s justice and law enforcement system into modem era is 
crucial.” ’^
As mentioned by Stephen Handelman, the western countries and institutions could 
grasp the extent and damages of the Russian mafia on the Russian economy. They just 
focused on providing Russian with IMF funds and necessary social safety programs. They 
even did not questioned what was happening to the IMF help in Russia. The communist and 
nationalist trends in Russia were in their concern mostly. Especially after 1993 December 
parliamentary elections, these fears were on the agenda. The West main concern was to 
support Yeltsin and his clan in the Kremlin at the expense of everything, since they were 
seen as the guarantee of the reforms in Russia. The Western countries were not paying 
attention to the corruption events in Russia at that time.
As a result, organized crime and corruption hit the Russian economy terribly. They 
controlled major enterprises, evaded taxes and appropriated state subsidies by forming
C Q
business lobbies that substantially influenced political decisions. Such massive
ibid, pp.90-91
58 Peter Rutland, “Business Lobies in Contemporary Russia.” International Spectator 32, no. 1 (1997): p23-37
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redistribution of state funds left the rest of population to a predatory taxing system justified 
by the need to insure the survival of what remained of state institutions. Because of this and 
ill-defined formal system of property rights, emerging small entrepreneurs were inclined to 
evade taxes by keeping their business in the shadow economy. Unable to seek legal 
enforcement of contract, parties with conflicts invited organized crime groups to defend their 
interests. Under such conditions, organized crime groups offered their services as passive 
players throughout the post-Soviet states. They provided protection and informal system of 
dispute settlement in return for significant fees.^’ They forced the new firms to pay 10 to 20 
per cent of their profit. They put new commercial banks under their control not only to 
launder their criminal earnings but also to send their earnings abroad. This capital flight 
represented another cost of organized crime. While Russian government was looking for 
Western economic aid to stabilize the economy, billions of dollars were leaving the country. 
Estimates of capital flight in 1992 in excess of $4 billion, and by 1994 the figure reached $1- 
2 billion per month.^ *^  While hyperinflation reduced real incomes of state employees, the 
decline in state budget left the police with little resources to fight organized crime groups. As 
a result, corruption plagued the state institutions all over.
4.2. The Debate in Western World on the Russian Economy
In the early transformation years in Russia, there is no evidence that the application of 
shock therapy that is transforming the Russian economy into an efficient technologically 
progressive consumer-oriented, prosperous capitalist market system. The immediate effect 
effects have been plummeting production, rapid inflation, impoverishment of the majority, 
increased inequality, declining public services and growing crime and corruption. The 
argument in the Western camp was that transition policies would lead to prosperity after
Mark, op.cit.. p.569 
“  Half, op.cit·. p.57
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prolonged hardship. The transition policies would provoke a short-term decline then recovery 
would replace it. Their arguments, however, could not be realized in Russia.
The proponent of the shock therapy argued that If Russia in an economic recession, this
was due to backsliding and inconsistencies in the implementation of the shock therapy in
Russia. Each time, they warned Russian officials to implement reform policies consistently
and rapidly to reach at true transformation of Russian economic system. They argued that the
neo-liberal ideas have not applied truly in Russia. The problems including recession and
corruption caused by excessive gradualism in the implementation of shock therapy. To
support their assertion, they put forward the following ideas.
“Liberalization has been too gradual. The intended liberalization of foreign trade did not occur. While 
imports were liberalized, export regulation on the contrary became more restrictive. They were the 
greatest impediment to a true liberalization of the economy. The most damaging kind of foreign trade 
regulations persisted. Their crucial characteristic was that export licenses and quotas were distributed by 
fiat by central organs. These licenses were of great commercial value. As could be expected, massive 
corruption evolved around export licenses, since the procedures for the allotment of licenses are not very 
transparent. A second problem was that energy prices remain regulated and extremely low by 
international standards. That’s why; there happened massive corruption in this sphere. A third problem 
was that the limited internal liberalization of both prices and trade flows. Up to 40 per cent of inter­
enterprise distribution remained subject to centralized allocation and centralized distribution was usually 
connected with price controls. Fourth, inter-republican trade remained regulated by state orders. Fifth 
freedom of enterprise was not really established. Sixth, monetary and fiscal policies were not strict and 
severe. There were no bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy procedures as well.”*'
As the effects of the shock therapy became known, in Eastern and Central Europe as 
well as the former Soviet Union, a sizeable literature arose critical of shock therapy. The 
critics of the western neo-liberal ideas, which were directed at transforming Russian 
economic system into free market, based on the questioning of each component of shock 
therapy. First and foremost criticism was put forward by David M. Kotz and Fred Weir. They 
argued that the belief that a rapid transition was necessary to prevent the old Soviet elite from 
regrouping and stopping the process was based on a false premise -  that the party-state elite 
was opposed to building capitalism. The great majority of that state elite favored capitalism.
*' Anders Aslund and Richard Lavard.Changing the Economic System in Russia. (London, Pinter Publishers 
Ltd., 1993) pp.20-25, see also, Anders Aslund, “Russia’s Collapse; Winners Takes All,” Foreign Affairs. 
Sept/Oct 99, Vol.78, Issue 5, pp.64-75
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The problem was die to the fact that they wished a capitalism in which they could enrich 
themselves at the expense of the great majority. Other critics was based on two different 
explanations. First, it was argued that shock therapy failed to take account of the structure of 
the pre-existing socioeconomic system that Russia inherited from the Soviet days. Second, 
the economic theories underlying shock therapy have serious internal flaws.
4.3. The Questioning of the Individual Components of Shock Therapy
4.3.1. Price Liberalization, inflation, and the missing ‘^ supply response”
As mentioned at the beginning, the critiques of the shock therapy argued that this did 
not result from any upturn in production. Instead, the only increase in supply came from an 
influx of previously unavailable imported goods. The sudden surplus in the markets was due, 
not to increased supply, but to a drastic drop in consumer purchasing power as rising prices 
placed many goods beyond the reach of many households.
The rising prices drove the newly freed ruble’s value down relative to foreign 
currencies, sharply raising the ruble cost of imported goods. Thus, enterprises, after, initially 
raising prices, found their cost sharply rising, as labor, domestic non-labor inputs, and inputs, 
and imported inputs all became more expensive. The cost squeeze led enterprises to raise 
prices again and again. The result was cost-price spiral.
The inflation was made worse by the highly monopolized economy, which Russia 
inherited from the Soviet days. Russia’s giant enterprises faced little competition and did not 
fear inroads into their markets by new rival firms. In the end, they increased prices without 
restraint.
Rapid inflation unleashed by price liberalization created a poor investment 
environment, which also worked against any positive supply response. Rapid inflation caused 
people and institutions that had money on hand to exchange their rapidly depreciating rubles
Kotz and Weir op.cit., pp. 186-87
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for assets that were expected to hold their real value, particularly foreign currencies, real 
estate, and minerals. As those with money to invest poured it into such assets, their prices 
driven up rapidly. This created opportunities for very high profits from speculation -that is, 
from buying whatever has a relatively rapidly rising prices and reselling it later. Those 
positioned to do so made quick fortunes. As a result, little productive investment took place 
in Russia.
4.3.2. Macroeconomic stabilization
The anti-inflation policy component of shock therapy required the reverse of state
spending. As was mentioned in the third chapter, shock therapy’s tight fiscal and monetary
policies could not stop inflation. Indeed, the tight fiscal and monetary policies could not be
applied in Russia. The proponents of the shock therapy argued steadily that inflation was a
result of soft monetary policies in Russia. The opponent of the shock therapy’s tight and
fiscal policies believed argued that shock therapy’s tight public spending and monetary
policies carry serious long-term cost for Russian economy. They argued that scarce credits
are a major obstacle to the much-needed modernization of Russian industry.
“For example, the automobile enterprise VAZ (Volga Automobile Associated Works) has had success in 
international markets with its Lada model. But tight monetary policy has blocked the access to credit it 
needs to raise its product to world standards. A company official remarked bitterly, “ The IMF is not 
interested in Russian car production. Why keep car production going here, when car companies in the 
United States and Japan can’t sell all the cars they make?”“
4.3.3. The Problem of Privatization
The Russian government succeeded in privatizing most of Russia’s enterprises. This 
policy, however, did not bring the expected benefits for the Russian economy. The policy of 
rapid privatization imposed high cost on Russian society. Russia had no pre-existing 
legitimate wealthy class of people who could buy large state enterprises. Under such
New York Times, 23 July 1992
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conditions, it was inevitable that the nomenklatura and mafia members became influential in
the privatization process at the expense of Russian people.
“For example, Deputy Minister Rem Vyakhirev became second-incommand and replaced Chernomyrdin 
when he move back to the government as deputy prime minister. Forbes magazine estimates that 
Vyakhirev’s net worth today exceeds $1 billion. Similarly, Vagit Alekperov, the acting minister of the 
Fuel and Energy Ministry during Soviet days, was also identifiedin Forbes’ list of billionaries. Despite 
the fact that the state retained ownership of sub-soil minerals and most of the land, Alekperov put 
together a collection of choice properties, including oil fields and refineries, into what in 1991 became 
Lukoil. Today, it is Russia’s largest oil company, producing more than 50 millions tons of crude oil 
annually.’’“
Privatization together with the other components of shock therapy has been major 
cause of rapid expansion of organized crime and corruption. Besides members of old elite, 
the other group in society well positioned to gain control of the newly privatized state assets 
was organized crime.
Handing over the enterprises to private owners did not assure that they would be 
operated efficiently. The opponent of the shock therapy argued that the shock therapy’s 
advocates exaggerated the form of ownership. They argued that the advocates of shock 
therapy did not comprehend how Soviet communism had left a demoralized and dissatisfied 
work force. They argued that restructuring Russia’s enterprises would be wiser policy instead 
of privatizing them.^^
4.3.4. The limited impact of free trade and investment
Under the new policies of relatively free trade, foreign products quickly displaced many 
domestic ones in the main cities. Some commentators on the Russian economy argued that 
the liberalization of trade and investment had limited effect on the Russian economy. They 
argued “while this may provided some incentives for Russian industry to produce more 
efficiently, the peculiar nature of Russian market has limited such effects. The new rich and 
middle-class are the main market for such surge. They prefer foreign products and do not 
object to the high prices most imports carry. The majority of Russians, who have been left
“  Marshall I. Goldman, “Russia’s Energy: A Blessing and A Curse,” .Tournal of International Affairs, Fall 99, 
Vol.53, Issue.I, p.76
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with very limited purchasing power, can buy some imported food or small luxuries, but they 
are largely forced to rely on cheaper domestic goods. Thus, the new imports exert less of the 
competitive pressure for product improvement or price restraint than had been expected.
They continued to argue that most of Russia’s industry could not yet compete with 
Western products on an equal footing. That is why, turning the country open to relatively free 
importation is not wise policy. They even proposed protectionist policies to support Russian 
industries from severe superior foreign competition.
As to foreign direct investment, Russia failed to attract much of it. Total direct 
investment in Russia during 1992-1994 amounted to $3.9 billion. That averaged about $9 per 
capita per year for the Russian population.^^ There were foreign direct investment only in the 
sphere of oil and raw materials. . Russian oil companies were in need of foreign investment 
not only to stop decline in oil production but also to accumulate capital and modernise the 
obsolete oil industry. While foreign investors were certainly eager to invest, resistance came 
from the heads of the various Russian energy companies, as well as other members of the 
Russia’s new rich class. One of the most powerful oligarchs, Boris Brezovski, insisted in 
January 1998 that it was not Russia’s interest to allow foreigners to make strategic 
investment in energy sector. The Communist party and nationalist camp in the Russian 
parliament shared similar views. Foreign investment was limited due to lack of legal 
protection and continuing bureaucratic reasons. Rapid inflation, expanding crime, corruption 
and hostility against foreign firms constituted other major obstacles. For instance, as to 
investment in Russian oil and other companies, enterprises, foreign investors had limited *
Kotz and Weir, op.cit. p. 191 
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legal regulations to preserve their share holdings. The attitude of the Russian business 
community against foreign investment was very hostile as well.
‘The fleecing of Kenneth Dart's investments in several Russian petroleum-operating companies is one of 
the most notorious examples of what can happen to even the most sophisticated foreign investor. 
Navaromco, a Cyprus-based company established by Dart, invested substantial sums in two Russian 
petroleum-producing companies, Samaraneftegaz and Noyabrskneftegaz. Both companies controlled 
valuable operating oil fields, and investment seemed to be a clever and cheap way to gain access to some 
of the state-owned petroleum reserves. Yet in both cases. Dart found that he could do no more than stand 
by helplessly as majority shareholders proceeded to trample on his legal rights as a minority stockholder. 
In the case of Samaraneftegaz, Dart discovered he had been outmaneuvered by Yukos, the oil company 
whose majority stockholder was Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his Menatep Bank. Khodorkovsky had 
borrowed $800 million from Western banks such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Credit Lyonnais. 
While the loan was not a problem, the collateral Khodorkovsky put up to borrow the money was the stock 
of Samaraneftegaz. This meant that if Yukos encountered difficulties-as it did due to falling oil prices in 
late 1998-Dart's investment would simply be wiped out when creditors claimed the collateral. Dart was 
similarly outmaneuvered in Noyabrskneftegaz by the Siberian oil company Sibneft, in which Boris 
Berezovsky owned 97 percent of the company's equity Berezovsky's banditry was more complex than 
Khodorkovsky's. For years Noyabrskneftegaz had sold the oil it produced at a low price to Sibneft, which 
then resold it at a high price. So Noyabrskneftegaz operated at a loss while Sibneft was extremely 
profitable. In addition, Noyabrskneftegaz decided to issue shares secretly and then sell them to four 
investment companies, which by coincidence resold those shares to Sibneft. What upset Dart was that the 
shares were sold at 50 percent of the market price, and existing stockholders were not given the 
preemptive right to participate in a similar purchase. As a result, Dart's share of ownership in 
Noyabrskneftegaz declined from 7.6 percent to 4.4 percent, while Sibneft's share rose from 61 percent to 
78 percent. Moreover, the shares that Dart held fell in value by 40 percent.”
One another major obstacle was whether Western oil companies could share in 
production of newly developed fields via production share agreements. As Marshal Goldman 
pointed out:
‘The struggle to convince the Duma to pass a law formalizing the rules for PSAs* reflects the same 
concerns. Whenever possible, foreign oil companies have urged the passage of such agreements because it 
would allow them to act as if they had an equity interest in the fields they are developing-for if 
production increases, so would their share of the output and revenue. Another benefit of such an 
agreement is that by agreeing to a fixed tax regime, the state cannot later finagle other means to capture 
any windfalls or production increases generated by the Western operator. Realizing that a PSA law would 
attract substantial foreign investment and increase output. President Yeltsin had periodically urged the 
Duma to pass such legislation. When it refused, he issued a decree authorizing many of the same benefits. 
After time, however, many Western oil companies became wiser to Russia's ways and refused to invest 
further.”™
In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin had decreed that foreigners could only purchase up to 
15 per cent of the stock of a Russian oil company. However, as to protection of share
Mashall I.Goldman, ‘‘Russian Energy: A Blessing and A Curse,” .Tournal of International Affairs, Fall99,
Vol.53 Issue 1, p.78 
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holdings and other legal regulations to facilitate foreign investment, no other regulations took 
place in the following years. As result, to invest in Russia became a risky business. In 
response, foreign investors reacted by putting their investment in the non-Russian states 
surrounding the Caspian Sea. In the early years, there have been 40 joint ventures with the 
Western companies in the oil business in Russia.^'
The drop in Russia’s energy output continued through the late 1990s and 1990s.By 
1996, 293 million tons of petroleum were produced, compared to 536 millions tons in 1985 -  
a drop of more than 45 percent.’  ^ In order to offset this decline, President Yeltsin revoked a 
decree in November 1997 and authorized foreigners to own 100 percent of stock. Finally, in 
December 1998 the Duma passed the necessary facilitating laws, which were aimed at 
facilitating production-sharing agreements.’^
The opponent of the shock therapy assumed the shock therapy’s results to be 
responsible for the failure of direct foreign investment in Russia. They argued ‘The 
continuing legal and bureaucratic obstacles faced by foreign investors are undoubtedly part 
of the reason. But even these problems been solved, the conditions created by shock therapy 
did not make Russia an attractive location for the kind of foreign investment that was desired. 
Rapid inflation, falling production, decline in real incomes, and expanding crime and 
corruption created an environment that is very unstable, both economically and politically. 
Foreign investors will not make any long-term investments in any country suffering such
>)74conditions.
4.4. An Alternative Approach to Rapid Economic Transformation
The opponent of the rapid economic transformation in Russia proposed a different 
alternative that is based on gradual transformation of the economic system. They argued that
”  ibid., p.78 
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the designers of shock therapy both showed a deficient understanding of the process by 
which a capitalist system develops and paid little attention to the features of the pre-existing 
economic system in Russia. “History shows that gradual economic transformation can indeed 
work. Capitalism fist arose in Britain very gradually over a period centuries,” they 
argued.^^Some also found shock therapy’s laisesez-faire approach to transforming the 
economy is unrealistic.
“Some historians believe that capitalism developed in Britain with little state help, although even that is 
disputed. But there is no dispute that later transitions to capitalism received major support from the 
power of government. In the United States the federal and state governments played a critical role in 
fostering capitalist development in the early and mid-nineteenth century. Government subsidized and 
built canals and railroads, educated the labor force, and protected manufacturers from superior foreign 
competition.” *^
They proposed an approach that is called a two-sector strategy. This strategy based on 
developing a new private alongside the old state sector, rather than converting state sector 
into a private market sector. By keeping state-produced input cheap and providing low-cost 
credit for start-up enterprises, favorable conditions could be created for starting new- 
consumer-goods firms. This was the strategy China has followed since the late 1970s.
4.5. How Shock Therapy Failed to Take Account of the Features of the Pre-existing 
Economic System in Russia
The advocates of the shock therapy failed to take account of the features of the pre­
existing economic and political changes in Russia. That is why, their policies failed in 
bringing the necessary changes in Russia to reach at free market. From the beginning it was 
clear that their policies would result in failure.
First, the state socialist system was a very centralized one in which outputs and 
production processes were closely specified for enterprises all across the Soviet Union from 
the center in Moscow. In this system, there was logic to building very large enterprises with 
only one or two sources that are producing each major product. The system was ver
ibid, p.l93 
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monopolistic. Second, the system was based on a very high degree of vertical integration. 
Each enterprise would receive a given input from the same sources. In a sense, individual 
enterprises were not really separate, independent entities like capitalist firms. The system was 
a vast, inter-connected, integrated production machine. Third, many towns and cities in 
Russia dominated by a single enterprise, or a few enterprises. These enterprises were 
providing cities with not only employment but also with social services. Fourth, since the 
system worked by direct allocations of gods and services from one another, the financial side 
of the system remained very underdeveloped and largely passive. Financing was 
automatically provided for planned activities and played no independent role in directing 
production. One another feature of the system, it was highly corrupt.
These features of the state socialist system explain why western neo-liberal ideas on the 
transition of Russian economic system failed to bring prospects for successful transition in 
Russia. Because the system was highly monopolistic, it was highly difficult to restructure the 
existing system. By stopping credits, it was hoped that market forces would drive firms that 
were inefficient or produced unwanted products out of business, while rewarding those that 
effectively met consumer wishes. But the vertical integration and company- town structure of 
the inherited Russian economy made this unworkable. As Leijonhuffud, A mentioned, “if 
one inefficient producer goes bankrupt, it will drag on down many other enterprises, efficient 
or inefficient, that depend on it for either supplies or markets. And down with bankrupt 
enterprises go the towns and cities dependent on them for employment, tax employment, tax 
revenues, and public services. A scheme of market-determined bankruptcy, given this 
economic structure, is not appropriate. The pressure to keep the pipeline of credits and 
subsidies open, even if at a reduced rate of flow, was very difficult to resist. The state has 
little choice but to keep enterprises afloat through direct subsidies and cheap credit. This 
suggest that it is not possible to turn enterprises into autonomous entities as the privatisation
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program envisions, as well as rendering tight monetary and fiscal policy ineffective as a 
means to rein in the inflation.”
IMF also played a harmful role in Russia’s transition to free market by advocating 
shock therapy as a mean to Russia’s transformation into a free market economy. From the 
beginning, it was highly clear that shock therapy was not applicable in Russia. In the 
beginning of 1992, there was a deep belief in the Western economists and IMF specialists 
that inflation could be stopped in Russia if the ruble is stabilized thorough IMF’s stabilization 
fund. However, IMF failed to bring the $24 billion aid package in 1992. The leading figures 
of shock therapy such as Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Aslund argued that it was a fatal mistake 
that the Western countries could not provide the real reform government with the necessary 
stabilization frmds and thus helped growing of conservative elements in Russia.
Western countries had one big chance to make a difference, at the beginning of 1992. 
The West, especially the United States, enjoyed enormous goodwill and influence in Russia.
It should have used his power to push for all the measure necessary for Russia’s complete 
economic reform -liberalization of commodity prices, deregulation of exports, unification of 
exchange rate, and the establishment of market interest rates -  which are standard elements 
of any International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. President Yeltsin appealed to the West 
for help, but in vain. The IMF concluded a minor agreement in July 1992, but by then 
Russia’s reformers had been defeated, in part because they had counted on the West’s help. 
Instead, Western countries were preoccupied with securing repayment of the Soviet debt. 
Rather than providing money for reforms, they gave credits to dubious commodity traders. A 
remorseful West has repeatedly tried to make amends for its initial lack of action. But its 
support, primarily through IMF, has gone to far less reformist governments, and the result
have been mixed. 78
A, Lejonhufvud, New Left Review, 199:1993, p.l23 
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By supporting the monetary union among former Soviet republics, IMF played a 
harmful role in Russia. The result of that policy of monetary union became one important 
reason of the inflation in Russia in the early years of transition. Russia received over $18 
billion IMF help until 1996. In each case, IMF demanded that Russia should adopt the 
necessary reforms. But despite defaulting on its promises, Russia continued to receive 
financial aid. In other words, the cheap credits allowed Russia to delay its reforms, while the 
IMF was effectively rewarding Moscow for not reforming.’^
The IMF and the western countries could not grasp the importance one fact that the 
post-communist Russia was governed by those many former communist apparatchiks and 
most of them were at the core of the Yeltsin regime. None of them has an understanding of 
free market economy and democracy. There was a huge knowledge gap. That’s why, the 
reforms had no sophistication, scope and discipline. That’s why, the necessary reforms such 
as the bankruptcy laws, the rule of law, anti-monopoly mechanisms, shareholder rights and 
inadequate measures concerning corporate governance could not be followed strictly in 
Russia. The combining result was an atmosphere in which corruption and crony capitalism of 
the worst kind flourished.
The macroeconomic policy failure of the West and the IMF was combined with their 
ignorance in building necessary institutions and providing Russia with necessary legal codes 
in terms of business for creation of a modern market economy. Furthermore, the West and its 
institutions such IMF failed to address the huge knowledge gap in Russia. Russian 
entrepreneurs, politicians and managers severely lacked modern economic and business 
knowledge. That’s why, population resorted Soviet-era of behaviour of stealing from and 
cheating state. Embezzlement and corruption became rampant. Historic Russian and Soviet-
”  For a detailed account of discussion, see
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era business practices caught up with post-communist Russia. The Western countries did not 
pay attention to these facts.
4.6. Conclusion
The principal sign of the stabilization of a political system is the creation of a new 
ruling class; the term “new ruling class” in itself implies something distinct from the old 
class. The post-communist period in Russia in many respects was an incomplete revolution 
profound continuities and political practices. In contrast to Germany, after the Second World 
War, where its traditional order had been destroyed by defeat and allied intervention, it was 
out of the old Soviet order that new Russia was bom. As Richard Sakwa pointed out, “the 
post-communist system emerged out of the old nomenklatura and its way represented the 
reconstitution of late Soviet forms of rule -but without the CPSU.”**
The transformation of Politburo member into the President, the oblast Party secretary 
into the mayor, the criminal entrepreneur into a businessman implied the transformation of a 
new elite as the formation of old in the post-communist Russia. The new elite dominated 
many of Russia’s regions and republics.
After the coup in 1991, Yeltsin concentrated on economic reform at the expense of 
democratic renewal and remarkably little decommunization took place. There was 
remarkably little turnover in the regional and local elites. According to Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya 75 per cent of the new political elite and 61 per cent of the new business 
elite came from the old Soviet nomenklatura.®^ Yeltsin regime established a strategic alliance 
with the old administrative elites by choice to secure a social base to his own rule. Indeed, an 
important reason why the collapse of communism was so peaceful was that the old elite had 
split up and the economically oriented part of the old elite opted out of communism.
Andrei N.Nedishevski, “The Formatioon of a Ruling Class,” Russain Social Science Review, Sep/Oct97, 
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However, they did not want a competitive market immediately. They preferred an 
intermediate stage in which they could take more control of the economic assets.
Russia’ transition from a command economy to capitalist economy has been a struggle 
between rent-seekers and those who wanted to apply reforms to consolidate capitalism in 
Russia. In the early transitional years, the foreign observers misjudged the real threat to 
economic and political reforms. They firmly focused on nationalism, fascism (the central 
threat to economic and political reforms), unemployment, starvation and inflation. To a 
considerable extent, these were threat to market economy and democracy in Russia. 
Throughout the transition period, inflation turned out to be a major problem, and persistently 
high inflation brought about a sharp fall in output and in the standards of living of people in 
Russia. It also led to an increase in wealth differentials among people in Russia.
The central threat to market economy and democracy was the existing and growing 
rent-seeking sector consisted of economic and political figures. Rent-seeking refers to any 
activity designed to exploit a monopoly position or to gain access to government subsidies, 
as opposed profit-seeking in a market with competitive firms.®^  When communism was 
collapsing, the Soviet Union was a paradise for rent-seekers. The methods of rent-seeking 
were, arbitrage, import subsidies, subsidized credits and nomenklatura privatisation.
Arbitrage was the fundamental method of rent-seeking; buying cheaply at fixed state 
prices and selling at high free-market prices. That was the main preoccupation of the 
cooperatives that mushroomed in the Gorbachev era. In 1988, state managers were allowed 
to set up private co-operatives for arbitrage with their government- owned businesses. 
Managers of oil companies bought oil from their enterprises privately, extracted export 
licences and quotas from corrupt officials, and sold the oil abroad at the market price. In 
1992, when Yegor Gaidar tried to end this rampant embezzlement by freeing Russai’s
Olga Kryhshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Sovite Nomenklatura to Russain Elite,” Europe-Asia 
Studies. Jun 96, Vol.48, Issue 5, pp.3-4
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commodity prices and exports. The state energy lobby, led by Chernomyrdin and supported 
by communists resisted enormously. Eventually, the reformers succeeded in deregulating 
commodity prices, but only after managers extracted billions of dollars from their enterprises.
A similar source of rents was import subsidies. In the winter of 1992, the fear of 
famine was real. The reformers thus had no chance to abolish the existing subsidies for food. 
A food importer paid only one per cent of the going exchange rate when purchasing essential 
goods from abroad, but could resell them relatively freely on the domestic market and pocket 
the subsidy. These imports were paid for with Western “humanitarian” export credits that 
were added to Russia’s state debt. Total import subsidies were 17.5 per cent of Russia’s 
GDP in 1992. These profits were highly concentrated, benefiting a limited number of traders 
in Moscow who operated through the old state agricultural monopolies.
Another form of rent was huge subsidized credits. Business elites had an alternative 
way of making money in the early 1990s: cheap credits from the Russian Central Bank. 
Under the Soviet system, interest rates had no economic function. When prices liberalized in 
January 1992, money became scarce, as the money supply did not rise as fast as prices. The 
state enterprises urged the government and the Central Bank to replenish their working 
capital, and unfortunately, the government and Central Bank gave way to those demands to a 
considerable extent. In 1992, while inflation was 2,500 per cent, the bank issued credits at 10 
or 25 per cent a year. Thus, those credits were virtual gifts from the state to the enterprises 
that received them. The total volume of credits amounted to some 30 per cent of the GDP in 
1992. Many bankers became rich enormously.®  ^ Nomenklatura privatisation was another 
form of rent, which was discussed, extensively in the third chapter. Nomenklatura 
privatisation benefited most enterprises, but particularly the managers of energy enterprises.
Aslund, op.cit.2. p.l7 
Aslund, op.cit3..
Brigitte Granville, The Success of Russian Reforms. London: (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1995), p.67
153
In the end, a relatively group benefited enormously from rent-seeking during the end of 
communism and the birth of capitalism. The sectors where most rent-seeking occurred were 
energy, agriculture, trade and banking. The rise of oligarchs was a direct result of slowand 
partial reforms. As aforementioned, the economically oriented part of the old elite had opted 
out of communism in the Gorbachev era. However, they did not want a competitive market 
immediately. They preferred having an intermediate stage in which they could enrich 
themselves at the expense of people.
The truth about Russia, in the early transitional period, was that it was ruled by a 
handful of men who were called oligarchs. In 1996, the Yeltsin victory in the presidential 
election was distinguished by the rise of a new class of oligarchs. After the elections, the 
bankers, media barons, and the industrialists who had financed Yeltsin’s election campaign 
got rewards they wanted. These rewards were positions in the Kremlin, broadcasting and 
commercial licences, and access to national resources pile.^  ^ The new oligarchs were so 
humiliating to Russians not because they are wealthy but because so little of their wealth
87found its way back to the Russian economy.
If Russia is in an overall social, economic and political crisis, the nomenklatura 
revolution gives us the hints. The transition was in many respects was an incomplete 
revolution with profound political, economic and social continuities. In Russia, pattern of 
political transition left much of the old system in their place. That’s why, Russian economic 
reforms doomed to failure.
** Grigory Yavlinski, Russia’s Phony Capitalism: Oligarchy or Democracy, Foreign Affairs. May/June98, 
Vol.77 Issues, p.70 
ibid.
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Appendix A. Privatization
1994 1995 1996 What
General
Directors
wanted
Insiders 65% 55% 58% 69%
Management 25 16 18 44
All the top managers 7 8 10 40
General Director 2 3 4.5 13
Middle and Lower Managers - 8 8 1
Nonmanagement employees - 39 40 25
Outsider, Russian 21 32 32 24
Citizen - 9 6 -
Unrelated commercial firms - 8 11 -
Suppliers - 3 2 -
Customers - 2 1 -
Other firms - 2 1.3 -
Investment funds - 6 5 -
Holding companies - 1 2.6 -
Banks - 1 1.6 -
Pension funds - - 0.02 -
Insurance companies - - -
Foreign corporations, banks, individual funds - 1 1.6 -
State 13 13 9 7
Figure 1.1 Inside and outside ownership of enterprises, 1994-1996 (percent)
Source: Russian National Survey, 1994-1996 (See, Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse, The 
Privatization of the Russian Economy, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997), p.l93)
Majority Owners 1995 1996
Employees 59.0% 64.7%
Rank and file 26.7 30.5
Managers 2.3 4.2
Top Managers 0.4 0.4
General Director 0.4 0.8
No majority insider 29.4 28.8
Nonstate outsiders 17.3 19.8
State 3.1 2.6
None 20.3 12.8
Figure 1.2 Majority owners of private-sector corporations, 1995 and 1996 (percent)
Source: Russian National Survey, 1994-1996 (See, Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse, The 
Privatization of the Russian Economy. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997), p.I93)
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Appendix B. Macroeconomic Indicators on the Russian Economy
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990-94 1991-94 1990-1995 1991-95
Gross Domestic Product -9 -19 -12 -15 -4 -47 -42
Industrial Production -8 -18 -14 -21 -3 -50 -46
Agricultural Product -5 -9 -4 -12 -11 -35 -32
Investment -15 -40 -12 -27 -67 -61
Figure 1.1 Percentage Change in Macroeconomic indicators for Russia
Source: International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation -Statistical Appendix, IMF staff Country Report, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 1995, p.85
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Figure 1.2 Percentage change in real gross industrial output by sector, 1991-95
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1995, Russian Federation -Statistical Appendix, IMF staff Country 
Report, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 1995
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Sector_____________
Electric power 
Fuel
Ferrous metallurgy 
Nonferrous metallurgy 
Chemicals 
Petrochemicals 
Machinery 
Wood products 
Construction materials 
Light industry 
Food Processing_____
1991
0.3
-9.0
-7.4
-8.7
-8.3
-3.0
- 10.0
-9.0
-2.4
-9.0
-9.5
1992
-4.7
-7.0
-16.4
-25.4
- 22.6
-19.4
-16.2
-14.6
-20.4
-30.0
-16.4
1993
-5.3
-15.0
-16.6
-18.1
-19.9
-24.9
-16.6
-18.7
-17.6
-23.4
-9.2
1994
- 8.8
- 10.0
-17.4
-9.0
- 20.0
-35.0
-33.0
-30.0
-27.0
-46.0
-17.0
1995
-5.0
- 0.6
+ 12.0
+0.8
+8.0
+13.0
-4.0
-7.0
- 6.0
-36.0
-9.0
Figurel.3 Percentage change in real gross industrial output by sector
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1995, Russian Federation -Statistical Appendix, IMF staff Country 
Report. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 1995, p.2
Tractors
Television sets
Cotton textiles
Washing Machines
Chemeical Rbersand threads
Refrigerators and freezers
Cement
Flour
Vegetable oil 
ftiper
Mneral Fertilizer
Ftetroleum
Steel
Passenger Gas 
Natural Gas
-60 -50 -40
Percentage Change
Figure 1.4 Percentage change in output volumes for selected products, 1991-95
Source: International Monetary Fund, Economic Reviews 1995, Russian Federation, Washington DC: The 
International Monetary Fund , 1995, p.66
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Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Natural gas (billions of 
cubic meters)
643.4 641.0 618.5 561.1 600.0
Passenger cars (thousands) 1.030 963 956 799 785
Steel (million tons) 77.0 66.9 58.1 48.8 51.6
Petroleum (million tons) 462.3 399.3 353.5 312.7 306.8
Mineral fertilizers (million 
tons)
15.0 12.3 10.0 7.5 8.9
Paper (thousands tons) 4.765 3.604 2.882 2.214 2.775
Vegetable Oil (thousands 
tons)
1.165 994 1.137 793 678
Flour (million tons) 20.5 20.4 17.2 12.7 11.6
Cement (million tons) 77.5 61.7 52.2 37.2 36.9
Refrigerators and freezers 
(thousands)
3.710 3.284 3.485 2.626 1.764
Chemical fibers and 
threads (thousands tons)
529 474 349 197 220
Washing machines 
(thousands)
5.541 4.289 3.863 2.100 1.325
Cotton textiles(million 
square meters)
5.295 3.294 2.324 1.508 1.225
Television sets (thousands) 4.439 3.672 3.975 2.161 979
Tractors (thousands) 178 137 89 29 22
Figure 1.5 Output Volumes for selected products
Source: International Monetary Fund, Economic Reviews 1995, Russian Federation, Washington DC: The 
International Monetary Fund, 1995, p.66
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Figure 1.6 Average rate of consumer price increase per month during 1991-95
Source: OECD, Short-Term Economic Indicators: Transition Economies, Paris Centre for Co-operation with 
Economies in Transition, various issues, p.92
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Figure 1.7 Real Pay and pensioas
Source: International Monetary Fund, Economic Reviews 1995, Russian
International Monetarv Fund, 1995, pp.73, 78
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Exports outside the FSU 71.1 50.9 42.4 43.0 48.0
Imports outside the FSU 81.8 44.5 37.0 27.0 35.7
Trade balance -10.7 6.4 5.4 16.0 12.3
Figure. 1.8 Foreign Trade, 1991-94
Source: Anders Aslund, How Russia Became Market Economy, The Brooking Institution, Washington, D.C.. 
1995,p.281
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